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ABSTRACT 
This research asks the following question: Why are tactical emergency casualty care 
(TECC) rescue task force (RTF) and Israeli hospital trauma programs the best approaches 
to addressing the current gaps and weaknesses in trauma management in the United 
States in the context of terrorist attacks and/or active shooter incidents? 
The purpose of this thesis is to ascertain why existing tactical emergency medical 
service protocols in most public safety jurisdictions are deficient and to analyze which 
types of resources jurisdictions need in order to ensure that they have optimal programs 
in place for mass casualty incident response. 
Active shooter and terrorist attacks have been on the rise since the 1990s. This 
thesis found that most public safety organizations in the United States are unprepared to 
provide emergency medical services during these incidents. Provision of tactical 
emergency medical services in hostile environments require that emergency medical 
services personnel train and deploy using TECC RTF guidelines and the Israeli hospital 
paradigm. This thesis recommends the implementation of a national standard to ensure 
that these programs are instituted in jurisdictions across the United States.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Active shootings and terrorist attacks have increased at an alarming rate in recent years in 
the United States. According to research conducted by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) and Texas State University, between 2000 and 2013, 486 people were 
killed and another 557 were wounded in 160 separate active shooter incidents.1 Data 
gathered by U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS’s) National Consortium for 
the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism indicates that 208 terrorist attacks 
took place in the between 2001 and 2011 in the U.S.2 Active shooter and other mass 
casualty incidents require the deployment of extensive law enforcement and emergency 
medical resources. While the primary police mission at these incidents is to neutralize 
threats, firefighters and emergency medical services (EMS) personnel must administer 
on-scene medical aid to victims. The quintessential public safety response to active 
shooter events is one in which law enforcement and emergency medical responses are 
integrated. However, multi-disciplinary responses to contemporary mass shootings in this 
country, such as those that have taken place in Aurora, Colorado (Century Theater in 
2012), Washington, D.C. (Washington Navy Yard in 2013), and the Los Angeles World 
Airport (LAX in 2013), have been disjointed rather than consolidated. In fact, most 
jurisdictions in the United States have insufficient resources and protocols in place to 
administer emergency medical services at mass casualty incidents.  
The primary purpose of this research is to demonstrate the need for public safety 
jurisdictions in the U.S. to adopt dynamic tactical emergency programs to ensure the 
delivery of medical services at mass casualty incidents. This is because penetrating and 
blunt trauma injuries sustained by victims in active shooter and terrorist attacks, such as 
gunshot and shrapnel wounds, cause massive hemorrhaging and can be fatal in minutes 
                                                 
1 J. Pete Blair, and Katherine W. Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents, 2000–2013, 
(Washington, DC: Texas State University, and Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2014), 6.  
2 Gary LaFree, Laura Dugan, and Erin Miller, Integrated United States Security Database (IUSSD): 
Terrorism Data on the United States Homeland, 1970 to 2011 (College Park, MD: START Resilient 




unless treated quickly. Furthermore, the administering of emergency medical services in 
mass casualty situations is frequently hampered by the lingering presence of perpetrators 
at the scene of the attack. 
Over the course of the past two decades, the U.S. military has developed program 
that has revolutionized the way in which casualties are treated on the battlefield. The 
military’s tactical combat casualty care (TCCC) has been proven to save lives because its 
protocols address the need to stop bleeding and hasten evacuation from sites of injury to 
hospitals. TCCC doctrine is adaptable to the civilian emergency medical community 
where it has applicability in the treatment of wounded people in high-threat 
environments. A civilian version of TCCC, known as tactical emergency casualty care 
(TECC) has gradually made its way into some public safety jurisdictions in the U.S. 
TECC makes provisions for the rendering of emergency medical services in austere 
environments, including active shooter events, wilderness settings, and urban 
environments. A TECC program known as the rescue task force (RTF) is ideal for the 
delivery of on-site emergency medical care at active shooter and terrorist incidents. In 
TECC RTFs, specially trained and equipped EMS personnel enter hostile scenes under 
the escort of police force protection units to treat trauma victims and evacuate them to 
hospitals. 
TECC is different from TCCC in that it makes provisions for the treatment of 
children, the elderly, and the infirm in civilian domains. In addition, TECC doctrine also 
takes into consideration statutory limitations and civil liability concerns that TCCC does 
not. There are alternatives to the TECC RTF model. One involves specially trained police 
officers providing initial emergency medical services at the scenes of active shooter 
incidents and terrorist attacks. Another is for tactical medics assigned to SWAT police 
teams to render these services. This thesis will demonstrate why the TECC RTF is 
superior to the two alternatives. 
Response to mass casualty incidents also requires hospitals that are uniquely 
trained, equipped, and staffed. The nation of Israel has developed a methodology for the 
effective management of casualties that occur in mass terrorist attacks, such as suicide 
bombing attacks. In the Israeli model, logistics are as important as the medical 
 xix 
procedures that are performed on patients. Upon notification of terrorist attacks, Israeli 
hospitals activate surgical teams for each patient and senior trauma surgeons quickly 
diagnose patients as they arrive at emergency departments to determine which are most in 
need immediate life-saving interventions. The Israeli system is adaptable to the U.S. In 
the wake of the marathon bombings, hospitals in Boston were able to care for high 
volumes of casualties seamlessly because they had learned Israeli hospital concepts such 
as surge capacity, assigning multi-disciplinary surgical teams to each patient, and the 
importance of having experienced trauma physicians monitor each victim’s progression 
throughout the emergency department.3 
This thesis examines four case studies to evaluate the need for the implementation 
of TECC rescue task force programs and specialized hospital trauma care protocols in the 
United States. 4  The case studies are the Israeli hospital trauma model, the Century 
Theater shooting (Aurora, Colorado), the Boston Marathon bombings, and the Los 
Angeles International Airport active shooter incident of 2013. Qualitative analysis of the 
research material was undertaken in an effort to determine the effectiveness and 
feasibility of military tactical emergency medical programs and their utility in the civilian 
domain. Analyses of these case studies illustrate the urgent need for standardized TECC 
rescue task forces and the Israeli trauma paradigm in the U.S.  
The research conducted for this thesis indicates that most public safety 
jurisdictions in the United States are not ready for active shooter events or terrorist 
attacks resulting in mass casualties because they have not implemented TECC rescue task 
force programs and Israeli hospital trauma protocols or anything as effective. The 
research indicates that most public safety jurisdictions in the United States are not ready 
for active shooter events or terrorist attacks resulting in mass casualties. As a result of 
these systemic deficiencies, the nation is particularly vulnerable, and lives could be lost 
unnecessarily due to the inability to get medical care to the wounded during high threat 
situations. The TECC rescue task force model is the most optimal one to ensure that 
                                                 
3 The Boston Marathon bombing will be the subject of one of the case studies of this thesis.  
4 The case studies are on Israeli hospital trauma model, the Century Theater shooting in Aurora, 
Colorado, the Boston Marathon bombings, and the Los Angeles International Airport active shooter 
incident in 2013. 
 xx 
emergency medical services are administered effectively at scenes of mass casualty 
events, and the Israeli hospital model is the exemplar for definitive care. 
Obstacles to the implementation of TECC rescue task forces include the high cost 
of training and equipment, as well as the increased risks posed to EMS personnel. 
Establishment and sustainment of TECC rescue task forces requires funding, support 
from public safety officials, and joint tactical training for both police officers and EMS 
practitioners. Police officers assigned rescue task forces need to provide force protection 
to firefighters and EMS personnel as they enter active shooter scenes to administer first 
aid. Furthermore, fire and EMS departments will need to outfit their rescue task force 
personnel with basic TECC equipment such as combat application tourniquets and 
hemostatic bandages. Additionally, medics assigned to rescue task forces need ballistic 
protection equipment—specifically body armor and helmets—because they will be 
entering high threat areas, running the risk of being exposed to gunfire and explosive 
devices.  
 The U.S. Congress, the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Health 
Affairs (OHA), and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) should 
identify funding mechanisms that will meet the needs for TECC rescue task force training 
and equipment. Possible sources of funding include FEMA’s Assistance to Firefighters 
Grant (AFG) and homeland security grants such as the State Homeland Security Grant 
Program (SHSP). Priority should be given to public agencies that either have TECC 
programs or who are in the process of establishing them.  
There is also a need for hospitals in the United States to emulate the Israeli 
hospital method for treating mass casualties. The Israeli all-hazards approach works well 
for any type of large-scale trauma event. In order for U.S. hospitals to provide 
comprehensive care during active shooter events, terrorist attacks, and other large-scale 
medical emergencies, they need to prepare to handle a high volume of seriously injured 
or sick people. Funding for improvements in hospital capabilities may be available 
through the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ Hospital Preparedness 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Active shootings and terrorist attacks are on the rise in the United States. 1 
According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and researchers from Texas State 
University, the U.S. has averaged 16.4 active shooter incidents annually between the 
years 2007 and 2013, compared to an average of 6.4 per year from 2000 to 2006.2 The 
communities of Aurora, Colorado, Newtown, Connecticut, Washington, D.C., Los 
Angeles and others have experienced tragic consequences of targeted violence against 
civilian populations. Terrorist attacks on U.S. soil have also proven to be a persistent 
threat over an extended period. According to data gathered by DHS’s National 
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 208 terrorist attacks 
transpired in the U.S. between 2001 and 2011.3 In very general terms, terrorist attacks 
may be defined as acts of violence perpetrated in the name of a political, ideological or 
religious causes.4 Some of these attacks were carried out by international terrorist groups, 
such as Al-Qa’aida, and domestic terror organizations, such as Ku Klux Klan and 
Minuteman American Defense.5 Other were carried out by lone wolf actors such as Nidal 
Malik Hasan, who killed 13 people and wounded another 31 at Fort Hood Texas in 
November 2009, and James W. von Brunn who opened fire at the National Holocaust 
Memorial Museum in July 2009, killing a security guard.6 In April 2013, homegrown 
                                                 
1 J. Pete Blair, and Katherine W. Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents, 2000–2013, 
(Washington, DC: Texas State University, and Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2014), 6.  
2 Ibid.  
3 Gary LaFree, Laura Dugan, and Erin Miller, Integrated United States Security Database (IUSSD): 
Terrorism Data on the United States Homeland, 1970 to 2011, Final Report to the Resilient Systems 
Division, DHS Science and Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security (College Park, 
MD: START Resilient Systems Division, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology 
Directorate, 2012), 8, http://www.start.umd.edu/sites/default/files/files/publications/
START_IUSSDDataTerroristAttacksUS_1970-2011.pdf 
4 Merriam-Webster, “terrorist attack,” accessed March 21, 2015, http://www.webster-dictionary.org/
definition/terrorist%20attack  
5 Ibid., 14. 
6 Ibid.  
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terrorists detonated two bombs near the Boston Marathon finish line killing three and 
wounding 261 people.7  
The resolution of active shooter and other mass casualty incidents requires 
extensive police and emergency medical resources. There are two primary public safety 
problems that materialize during acts of mass violence. The first is that law enforcement, 
or in some circumstances bystanders, must respond quickly to prevent the assailants from 
harming additional victims. The second is the administration of emergency medical 
treatment to critically wounded victims. These two problems are interconnected because 
in most instances the perpetrators are still present when police and emergency medical 
service (EMS) personnel arrive on scene. The typical active shooter response procedure 
in the majority of jurisdictions in the U.S. involves the police immediately engaging the 
assailants while fire an EMS personnel remain on standby in a safe area adjacent to the 
scene until police have cleared it of all threats. Such was the EMS response to recent 
active shooting events in Aurora, Colorado (Century Theater in 2012), Washington, D.C., 
(Washington Navy Yard in 2013), and Los Angeles, California (Los Angeles Airport 
[LAX] in 2013). This EMS protocol is inadequate because victims in these scenarios 
typically suffer from penetrating bullet and fragmentation wounds that cause rapid blood 
loss, and death may occur in a matter of minutes if medical attention is not rendered 
quickly. It frequently takes law enforcement an hour or longer to clear active shooter 
scenes, and during this time, it is likely that casualties will exsanguinate if they are not 
administered medical aid.  
The U.S. does not have enough civilian tactical emergency support programs, 
leaving the nation as a whole unprepared to respond to active shooter and other mass 
casualty events. The Columbine massacre in 1999, in which two assailants shot 36 high 
school students and faculty members, exposed gross inadequacies in the way in which 
police and EMS in the U.S. responded to active shooter events. Although police and 
emergency medical personnel arrived on scene within minutes of the first 911 calls, and 
the perpetrators committed suicide less than one hour after the shooting began, it took 
                                                 
7 Arthur L. Kellerman, and Kobi Peleg, “Lessons from Boston,” New England Journal of Medicine 
368, no. 21 (2013): 1956–1957, DOI: 10.1056/NEJMp1305304. 
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SWAT officers four hours to clear the Columbine High School building. During this 
time, paramedics were forced to wait outside the school, unable to administer first aid to 
multiple victims. This protracted response led to at least one preventable death.8  
After the attacks, the governor of Colorado convened the Columbine Review 
Commission, which determined that both police and emergency medical response to the 
shootings were exceedingly inadequate.9 As a result of Columbine, virtually every police 
department in the U.S. changed tactics. Rather than waiting for SWAT teams to arrive, 
police now immediately contact and engage active shooters upon arrival on scene.10 
Although the police response to active shooters has changed markedly since the 
Columbine tragedy, the emergency medical response methodology to active shooter 
events has not progressed commensurately and most jurisdictions do not have any formal 
protocols for getting medical aid to the wounded during these types of situations.11 The 
lag between police response and when the EMS are allowed to access to the wounded is 
tragic and unnecessary because there is currently a doctrine that makes provisions for the 
integration of EMS personnel and police at active shooting events. The genesis of this 
new and dynamic doctrine comes from the U.S. military’s tactical medical methodology.  
Over the course of the past two decades, the U.S. military has dramatically 
changed the modus operandi in which its medics treat casualties on battlefields, and this 
transformation also has significant implications for the realm of civilian trauma care. The 
military’s contemporary  paradigm is called tactical combat casualty care (TCCC), which 
is centered upon hemorrhage control, force protection for medics, and rapid evacuation of 
wounded combatants from points of injury to hospitals. Through the development and 
implementation of TCCC, the U.S. military has made great strides in providing medical 
care to wounded soldiers. The TCCC program is credited with saving lives of U.S. armed 
                                                 
8 Columbine Review Commission, The Report of Governor Bill Owens, 2001, State of Colorado, 52–54, 
http://www.keystosaferschools.com/Reports/Commission%20Report%20on%20Columbine.pdf 
9 Ibid., 127–128.  
10 Elizabeth Chuck, and James Eng, “Swarming Police Response in Mall Shooting Highlights ‘Paradigm Shift’ 
Since Columbine,” NBC News, December 12, 2013, http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/12/13/15869486-swarming-
police-response-in-mall-shooting-highlights-paradigm-shift-since-columbine?lite 
11 Michael S. Schmidt, “In Mass Attacks, New Advice Lets Medics Rush In,” New York Times, December 7, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/08/us/in-mass-attacks-new-advice-lets-medics-rush-in.html?_r=0  
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service personnel wounded on battlefields in Iraq and Afghanistan at an unparalleled rate 
of 90 percent. 12  This rate is remarkable when compared with survivability rates in 
previous wars, which in Vietnam was 84 percent, and in World War II was 80 percent.13 
The essence of TCCC is rapid medical intervention with tourniquets, hemostatic agents, 
and other medical equipment to address preventable causes of death, such as 
hemorrhaging, collapsed lungs, and airway obstructions, and followed by immediate 
evacuation to a medical facility. Additionally, in TCCC, medics go into battle with their 
own dedicated force protection units and are uniquely trained and prepared to treat the 
wounded in dangerous environments. While TCCC was designed for military operations, 
many of its concepts are suitable for and are adaptable to the civilian emergency medical 
community. 
A civilian version of TCCC, known as tactical emergency casualty care (TECC), 
has been developed in the United States. One TECC program is known as the rescue task 
force (RTF). In the TECC RTF model, police officers and EMS personnel deploy in 
integrated teams at mass casualty incidents. TECC RTF programs incorporate specialized 
equipment, training, and tactics that enable first responders to operate in hostile 
environments. The Arlington County Fire Department (ACFD) in Virginia created the 
nation’s first RTF program and some public safety agencies in the U.S. have followed 
suit; however, a relatively small number of public safety agencies have TECC RTFs. The 
alternatives to TECC RTF programs involve the rendering of emergency medical services 
by police officers and/or SWAT team medics. While these alternatives have merits, the 
TECC rescue task force model is optimal because it enables an all-inclusive public safety 
agency approach to active shooter and terrorist incidents. Without TECC rescue task 
force actualization, EMS personnel will be prevented from quickly entering the locations 
where critically injured people lie in need of medical attention. 
The need for TECC RTF programs has been made evident by recent mass 
shooting events during which victims had to wait for long periods of time for medical 
                                                 
12 Brian Eastridge  et al., “Death on the Battlefield (2001–2011): Implications for the Future of Combat Casualty 
Care,” Supplemental version. Journal Trauma Acute Care Surgery 73, no. 6 (2012): S431–S432, DOI: 10.1097/
TA0b013c3182755dcc.  
13 Ibid., S431–S432.  
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care to reach them. For example, in the midst of the Century Theater active shooter 
incident in Aurora, Colorado, police officers had to rush casualties to hospitals in patrol 
cars because EMS personnel and ambulances were unable to access areas where wounded 
victims were being triaged.14 During the Washington Navy Yard shootings, paramedics 
remained on standby at a safe distance from the building where victims lay injured, 
unable to treat them while police conducted security sweeps of the facility. These victims 
were eventually carried outside to EMS units by law enforcement officers and civilians 
who were already inside the building.15 In the November 2013 Los Angeles International 
Airport (LAX) shooting rampage, paramedics were held on standby just 150 yards away 
from the location where a critically wounded Transportation Security Administration 
(TSA) employee lay bleeding for 28 minutes after being shot.16 These are examples of 
active shooter events where emergency medical care was lacking because of insufficient 
protocols and training procedures.  
Another critical component in the administering of emergency services at mass 
casualty events is proximity to hospitals with personnel that are well trained and 
equipped to handle large numbers of casualties simultaneously. Israel’s hospital model is 
ideal for handling mass casualties stemming from terrorist attacks on civilian populations, 
and the Israeli system is teachable to other countries. Israeli emergency medical 
physicians became proficient in the treatment and management of high volumes of 
trauma patients injured in response to the onset of suicide bombings in the 1990s. 
Physicians from some hospitals in the United States, such as those at Massachusetts 
General Hospital in Boston, have turned to Israel to learn best practices in managing 
large numbers of traumatic injuries. 
                                                 
14 Ben Brumfield, and Cristy Lenz, “Rescue Workers Weren’t Prepared for Chaos of Aurora Shooting” CNN,  
May 2, 2013, http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/02/us/colorado-aurora-shooting-report  
15 Metropolitan Police Department, After Action Report Washington Navy Yard, September 16, 2013, 
Internal Review of the Metropolitan Police Department (Washington, DC: Metropolitan Police 
Department, 2014), 48, http://mpdc.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/mpdc/publication/attachments/
MPD%20AAR_Navy%20Yard_Posting_07-2014.pdf 
16 Los Angeles Fire Department, After Action Review: LAX Shooting Incident (Los Angeles: Los Angeles Fire 
Department, 2013), 5–6.  
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
The majority of public safety departments across the U.S. are not addressing the 
need for TECC rescue task force and Israeli hospital trauma programs. Fire and EMS 
departments do not have the TECC RTF training or standard operating procedures in 
place that could empower them to enter mass casualty events assimilated with law 
enforcement. In addition, level 1 trauma hospitals in the U.S. have higher case fatality 
rates than level 1 trauma centers in Israel,17 despite the fact that Israel has sustained an 
extraordinary number of terrorist attacks in recent years.18 As a result of these systemic 
deficiencies, the U.S. is particularly vulnerable, and lives could be lost unnecessarily due 
to the inability to get medical care to the wounded during high threat situations. Public 
safety officials in many localities cite the high cost and increased risk for firefighter 
paramedics as justifications against implementation of TECC rescue task force 
programs.19 Moreover, some policy makers also point to the relative scarcity of active 
shooting events as argumentation against the establishment of TECC rescue task forces. 
The research conducted for this thesis demonstrates the need for a national 
standard for TECC rescue task force and Israeli hospital trauma programs. The 
implementation of these programs requires a commitment by public safety leaders to 
equip and train public safety and hospital professionals to respond to active shooter and 
other mass casualty events. Additionally, research is needed to explore possible vectors 
for program realization. This thesis will recommend a systematic implementation of 
TECC rescue task force and Israeli hospital trauma methodologies in jurisdictions across 
the United States. TECC rescue task force programs will save lives by equipping first 
responders with the training and tools necessary to treat the wounded during or in the 
immediate aftermath of an active shooter event or terrorist attack. The implementation of 
                                                 
17 Avraham Rivkind et al., “Trauma Care and Case Fatality during a Period of Frequent, Violent 
Terror Attacks and Thereafter,” World Journal of Surgery 30, no. 8 (August 2006), 7, figure 2, DOI: 
10.1007/s00268-012-1637-6.  
18 Israeli Security Agency (Shabak), “Analysis of Attacks in the Last Decade,” accessed March 8, 
2014, http://www.shabak.gov.il/English/EnTerrorData/decade/Fatalities/Pages/default.aspx  
19 Paul Atwater, “Force Protection for Firefighters: Warm Zone Operations at Paramilitary Style Active Shooter 
Incidents in a Multi-Hazard Environment as a Fire Service Core Competency” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
2012), 70–71. 
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Israeli hospital trauma programs in the U.S. are imperative to ensure the provision of 
definitive medical care to those injured in mass casualty events. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Why are tactical emergency casualty care (TECC) rescue task force (RTF) and 
Israeli hospital trauma programs the best approaches to addressing the current gaps and 
weaknesses in trauma management in the United States in the context of terrorist attacks 
and/or active shooter incidents?  
C. HYPOTHESIS 
TCCC lessons learned are slowly making their way into the civilian emergency 
medical domain in the U.S. For example, some public safety jurisdictions are using 
tourniquets, training their personnel on hemorrhage control techniques, and planning for 
rapid evacuation of trauma victims from volatile environments. A select few jurisdictions 
have adopted and implemented a civilian version of TCCC called tactical emergency 
casualty care. Practitioners of TECC have the same objectives as those of TCCC, which 
is the administering of rapid medical interventions in hostile environments; however, 
TECC takes additional factors into consideration special populations, such as children, 
elderly, and the disabled. Also, TECC doctrine considers civilian statutory limitations and 
liability concerns. Additionally, TECC involves a series of programs that allow for the 
delivery of emergency medical services in austere environments. These include, but are 
not limited to urban, wilderness, and maritime settings. 
As referenced earlier in this chapter, one aspect of TECC is the creation of rescue 
task forces.20 In the RTF archetype, firefighter-paramedics train with police officers and 
deploy in tandem with them at active shooter scenes. RTF paramedics are equipped with 
ballistic helmets and body armor, and carry tourniquets, hemostatic bandages, and other 
portable medical implements to treat patients with severe injuries. Although public safety 
agencies in a few other localities have been proactive in initiating RTFs, most 
                                                 
20 Blake Iselin, and E. Reed Smith, “Arlington County, VA Task Force Rethinks Active Shooter 
Incident Response,” Journal of Emergency Medical Services (December 2009), http://www.jems.com/
article/major-incidents/arlington-county-va-task-force 
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jurisdictions in the U.S. do not have RTFs or any similar type programs, and therefore 
they do not address the need to have an integrated police and EMS response to mass 
casualty events. Deficiencies in existing EMS protocols come to light when active 
shooter events take place in the U.S. and casualties go untreated for inordinate periods of 
time. One of the reasons for this takes is complacency. Many decision makers in the field 
of emergency medical services fail to recognize any correlation between combat 
casualties and injuries seen in civilian trauma, and therefore they do not see the need for 
civilian tactical emergency medical programs. Other reasons cited are costs, perceived 
ineffectiveness, and concern over complications of using military TCCC equipment and 
methodologies in civilian EMS environments.21 
What is needed at this time in the U.S. is a paradigm change from the status quo 
of standby EMS responses at active shooter events to a more dynamic approach modeled 
after TCCC doctrine. TECC provides the framework for this archetypal transformation. 
Although esteemed public safety advocacy groups such as the International Association 
of Firefighters (IAFF)22 and the Joint Committee to Create a National Policy to Enhance 
Survivability from Mass Casualty Events 23  laud the concepts of RTFs and tactical 
emergency casualty care, the majority of cities and towns across the U.S. are ill-prepared 
to render medical assistance on scene during active shooter and terrorist events. This is 
because they lack RTF programs.  
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis will examine two interrelated paradigms for the treatment of victims in 
mass casualty events. These paradigms encompass the rapid dispensation of on-scene 
emergency medical services and specialized hospitals with highly developed trauma care 
capabilities. The U.S. military has created a prototype for the delivery of on-scene 
                                                 
21 Joseph M. Galante et al., “Identification of Barriers to Adaptation of Battlefield Technologies into Civilian Trauma 
Care in California,” Military Medicine. 178, no. 11 (November 2013): 1228–1230, DOI: 10.7205/MILMED-D-13-00127  
22 International Association of Firefighters, “IAFF Position Statement: Rescue Task Force Training,” accessed July 
15, 2014, http://www.iaff.org/Comm/PDFs/IAFF_RTF_Training_Position_Statement.pdf  
23 Joint Committee to Create a National Policy to Enhance Survivability from Mass Casualty Shooting Events: The 
Hartford Consensus II, “Active Shooter and Intentional Mass-Casualty Events: The Hartford Consensus II,” Bulletin of the 
American College of Surgeons 98, no. 6 (2013): 14–16, http://bulletin.facs.org/2013/09/hartford-consensus-ii/  
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emergency medical services in high-threat environments through a program known at 
tactical combat casualty care. The civilian adaptation of TCCC is TECC. The nation of 
Israel has developed a model for the provision of trauma care at hospitals during mass 
casualty situations. Both TCCC modeled programs, such as TECC, and Israeli-style 
hospitals are essential to save lives during active shooter events and other large-scale 
casualty incidents. 
Case studies provide a basis for this thesis’s assertion that TECC RTF and Israeli 
hospital trauma programs are critically necessary in the U.S. Qualitative analysis of the 
research material was undertaken in an effort to determine the effectiveness and 
feasibility of TECC rescue task force programs and the Israeli hospital trauma model in 
the U.S. The case study method was selected because it allowed the researcher to draw a 
correlation between the existence of TECC rescue task force programs, the omnipresence 
of highly evolved trauma centers (such as those in Israel) and victim survivability in mass 
casualty events (e.g., chances for survival in combat and active shooter situations is 
improved with rapid medical intervention).24 Analyses of these case studies demonstrate 
that there is an urgent need for standardized TECC rescue task force programs and 
Israeli-style trauma centers in the U.S. The purpose of using case studies and qualitative 
analysis is to illustrate the lack of essential TECC rescue task forces in the U.S. and make 
recommendations for systemic improvements. Additionally, the thesis includes a 
comparative analysis of Israeli and U.S. level 1 trauma hospitals. This analysis shows that 
case fatality rates (CFRs) at Israeli level 1 trauma centers are significantly lower than 
level-one trauma centers in the U.S. 
E. CASE STUDIES 
The first case study in this thesis describes the Israeli hospital trauma model. 
Israel has developed one of the world’s preeminent systems for managing high volumes 
of casualties emanating from terrorist attacks and the Israeli methodology is adaptable to 
hospitals in the U.S. Next there are three case studies examining emergency medical 
                                                 
24 Russ S. Kotwal et al., “Eliminating Preventable Death on the Battlefield,” Archives of Surgery 146, no. 12 (2011): 
1350, DOI: 10:1001/archsurg.2011.213.    
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responses to recent mass casualty incidents in the United States: the Century Theater 
shooting event in Aurora, Colorado, the Boston Marathon bombings, and the LAX active 
shooter incident that transpired in 2013. 
1. The Israeli Hospital Trauma Model 
In response to a sustained number of suicide bombings and other terrorist attacks 
resulting in mass casualties, Israeli hospitals have developed a unique and highly efficient 
system for treating large numbers of trauma patients. Israeli trauma specialists have 
discovered that they must balance logistics with medical care when handling high 
volumes of victims from a terror attack. Emergency management and health officials in 
some public safety jurisdictions in the U.S., such as those in Boston, Massachusetts, 
consult with Israeli trauma physicians on a regular basis to learn best practices in mass 
casualty care. A case study on the Israeli model, detailed in Chapter IV, will explain how 
Israeli hospitals respond to suicide bombings and other events in which numerous people 
are traumatically injured. 
2. Aurora, Colorado—Century Theater Mass Shooting, July 2012 
On July 20, 2012 just after 12:30 a.m. in Aurora, Colorado, a gunman opened fire 
in a crowded movie theatre wounding 82 people, 12 of whom died.25 Mayhem ensued as 
1,200 panicked moviegoers fled the Century Theater complex, while others lay inside 
theater nine’s auditorium, unable to move due to their injuries. 26  Although police, 
firefighters, and ambulances arrived on scene within minutes of the first 911 call, EMS 
personnel were initially placed on standby by their incident commanders. Another 
problem manifested when ambulances did attempt to navigate to triage locations but were 
swarmed by scores of frantic shooting victims and bystanders who were seeking medical 
assistance. This added to the confusion, making it more difficult for EMS to triage 
victims and determine which people were most seriously wounded. Because the theater 
                                                 
25 TriData Division System Planning Corporation, Aurora Century 16 Theater Shooting: After Action Report For The 
City Of Aurora (Arlington, VA: TriData Division System Planning Corporation, 2014), 42, 
http://www.courts.state.co.us/Media/Opinion_Docs/
14CV31595%20After%20Action%20Review%20Report%20Redacted.pdf  
26 Ibid., 44.  
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complex’s parking lot was flooded with pedestrians, parked cars, and police vehicles, 
ambulances had difficulty driving to areas where large numbers of wounded were being 
triaged. As a direct result of communications breakdowns, fire and EMS officials were 
also unaware for some 17 minutes that some of the most seriously wounded were at the 
exterior rear of the Century Theater.27 
Due to the fact that a multitude of wounded people were in peril of bleeding to 
death, police and fire officials made an unorthodox decision to load victims into police 
cars and rush them to area hospitals. While this quick thinking saved lives, it also 
exposed weaknesses in Aurora’s emergency medical response protocols to mass casualty 
events. The Century Theater case study illustrates why it is vital to have an integrated 
police and TECC rescue task forces and hospitals capable of managing mass casualties in 
the wake of active shooter events. 
3. Boston Marathon Bombings, April 2013 
On April 15, 2013 at 2:49 p.m., two bombs detonated near the finish line of the 
Boston Marathon. The scene was one of turmoil as scores of grievously wounded, either 
lying on the ground helplessly or walking in bewilderment seeking medical assistance. 
Some people did not survive the blasts, while others did and suffered limb amputations 
and other life-threatening injuries severed. In fact, victims exhibited similar types of 
injuries to those previously seen in terrorist improvised explosive device (IED) attacks in 
Iraq, Afghanistan, and Israel. 
Within seconds of the explosions, police officers, emergency medical service 
personnel, and bystanders (race spectators and participants) mobilized and began tending 
to the injured. Dozens of emergency service personnel were already prepositioned at aid 
stations, looking after fatigued runners as they crossed the finish line.28 In the moments 
after the bombs went off, these EMS, firefighters, nurses, doctors, and bystanders (some 
                                                 
27 Karen Crummy, and Carlos Illescas, “Aurora Theatre Shooting Report Shows Delays in Fire, Ambulance 
Response,” The Denver Post, May 1, 2013, http://www.denverpost.com/ci_23143246/aurora-theater-shooting-report-shows-
delays-fire-ambulance 
28 National Public Radio, Lessons Learned in Emergency Preparedness after Boston Bombings, National Public 
Radio, May 2, 2013, http://www.npr.org/2013/05/02/180594745/lessons-in-emergency-preparedness-after-boston-bombings 
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of whom were military veterans) re-focused their attention on the bombing victims.29 
First responders used tourniquets to prevent many of the victims from exsanguinating.30 
A pressing issue was time: dozens of victims had to be transported to hospitals before 
they bled to death and first responders consequently worked to expedite them from the 
blast sites to trauma centers. 
Although the number of casualties was high (261 people were injured and three 
were killed), many victims were saved because Boston’s first responders and hospital 
staffs had previously studied lessons learned from U.S. military medical practitioners of 
TCCC and Israeli trauma specialists. Medical officials in Boston also noted the 
importance of EMS and bystander intervention at the scene of the Marathon blasts. 
Furthermore, of great importance was the application of direct pressure to open wounds 
and use of tourniquets to stop bleeding. 
The Boston case study demonstrates how immediate EMS response, utilization of 
hemorrhage control techniques, and rapid transport to hospitals staffed with physicians 
trained in Israeli trauma protocols saves lives. Although Boston did not have a formal 
TECC rescue task force program in place prior to the marathon bombings, the use of 
TCCC techniques and the integrated law enforcement EMS response very closely 
resembled TECC rescue task force precepts. The emergency medical response to the 
Boston Marathon bombing was a triumph, albeit a cautionary one. Emergency medical 
personnel were in the immediate proximity of the bomb’s blast zones. Therefore, they 
were already inside the secure perimeter and had unobstructed access to the wounded. 
The outcome could have very well been different had there been secondary explosive 
devices at the scene or had the terrorists decided to target the first responders as they 
tended to the wounded. 
                                                 
29 Herman B. “Dutch” Leonard et al., Why Was Boston Strong? Lessons from the Boston Marathon Bombing 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard Kennedy School and Harvard Business School, 2014). 
30 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Lessons Learned: Boston Marathon Bombings: Hospital 
Readiness and Response,” Lessons Learned Information Sharing, accessed March 21, 2014, https://www.llis.dhs.gov/sites/
default/files/Boston%20Marathon%20Bombings%20Hospital%20Readiness%20and%20Response.pdf  
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4. Los Angeles International Airport Shooting, November 2013 
On November 1, 2013 a gunman opened fire with and assault rifle inside the 
passenger terminal of LAX, wounding three TSA employees and one civilian. The 
assailant was subsequently shot and incapacitated by police approximately five minutes 
into the event. Nevertheless, police continued to address the problem as an ongoing 
active shooter event for an extended period of time. One of the wounded TSA workers, 
struck with 12 bullets, lay within 20 feet of an airport exit and bled for 28 minutes before 
he was loaded into a wheelchair and moved to paramedics waiting on standby outside the 
airport terminal.31 Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD) paramedics arrived on scene 
quickly, but they were ordered by their commanders to remain on standby until the police 
conducted their security sweeps, which was the standard protocol for an active shooter 
event at that time. This led to delays in getting medical attention to the injured, and police 
ultimately had to transport victims from inside the terminal building to the LAFD triage 
area that was set up outside. Prior to the shooting at LAX, the Los Angeles Fire 
Department (LAFD) was in the process of evaluating a rescue task force model to 
determine its suitability for the department. As a result of the shootings, the LAFD 
announced that it was implementing RTF within just weeks of the LAX shootings. This 
case study will show why an integrated police and EMS responses are critical during 
active shooter events, and why TECC RTF is among the optimal program designs to 
deliver emergency medical services in hostile environments. 
F. DATA ANALYSIS 
A case study of Israeli hospital trauma methodology was conducted for the 
purpose of demonstrating how that country manages large numbers of casualties in the 
wake of terrorist attacks. Despite the high numbers of terrorist attacks in Israel in recent 
years, the mortality rate of patients treated in Israel’s six level 1 trauma centers decreased 
by five percent between 2000 and 2010.32 Israeli hospitals have developed an effective, 
                                                 
31 Los Angeles Fire Department, After Action Review: LAX Shooting Incident, 5–6. 
32 Maya Siman-Tov, Irina Radomislensky, and Kobi Peleg, “Reduction in Trauma Mortality in Israel during the Last 
Decade (2000–2010): The Impact of Changes in the Trauma System,” Injury 44, no.11 (2013): 1148, DOI: 10.1016/
j.injury.2012.08.054.   
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systematic approach to treating high volumes of casualties after suicide bombings and 
other types of terror attacks. The comparative analysis conducted for this thesis shows 
that on average, level 1 trauma hospitals in Israel have lower case fatality rates (CFRs) 
than level 1 trauma hospitals in the United States. Recognizing that Israeli hospitals are 
among the world’s most proficient in providing medical care to victims of mass casualty 
events, leaders from some U.S. hospitals, such as those in Boston, have regularly 
consulted Israeli trauma specialists over the course of the past decade. Doctors in Boston 
credited lessons learned from Israel with saving lives of those injured in the Boston 
Marathon bombing. 33  Evidence of this success can is measured by the number of 
critically injured bombing victims that were saved by expert medical care. 
For each the three case studies on active shooter and mass casualty events in this 
thesis, after action reviews and assessments were conducted. Analysis identified patterns, 
variables, and causes from failures and successes in the treatment of wounded pursuant to 
active shooter or mass casualty attack. In addition, the research focused upon existing 
protocols and procedures and appraised the medical outcomes of each incident. 
Performance was measured by the ability of EMS personnel to access the wounded, 
administer first aid rapidly, evacuate casualties, and ultimately save lives.  
This thesis will identify the critical need for a national standard for TECC rescue 
task force programs in jurisdictions throughout the United States. The continuing absence 
of TECC rescue task force programs contributes to the unnecessary loss of life and 
functionality to lead productive a productive life. The cost for medical bills and loss of 
income in for those wounded terror attacks is significant. For instance, one surviving 
victim of the Century Theater massacre, who was 23 years old at the time of the event, 
sustained a gunshot through his right eye and suffered a traumatic brain injury, which has 
left him paralyzed on the left side of his body.34 He has been unable to work or care for 
himself since the shooting, and it has been estimated that his medical bills could reach $2 
                                                 
33 Yvette Alt Miller, “Boston/Israel Collaboration,” Aish, April 20, 2013, http://www.aish.com/jw/id/
BostonIsrael-Collaboration.html  
34 Kevin Simpson, “Comedy Helps Pull Caleb Medley through Tragedy of Aurora Shootings,” Denver 
Post, July 20, 2014, http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_26181632/comedy-helps-pull-caleb-medley-
through-tragedy-aurora 
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million.35 Communities across the nation would greatly benefit by the establishment of a 
national standard for TECC rescue task force implementation. Most jurisdictions in the 
U.S. still have no set standard for dealing with atypical emergency medical situations, 
which include, but are not limited to active shooter and mass casualty events. Conversely, 
there are some public safety agencies that have established TECC rescue programs, such 
as the Arlington County (Virginia) Fire Department, the fire departments of Orange 
County, California, and the Los Angeles Fire Department (which established a RTF after 
the 2013 LAX shooting incident).  
Hospital care is another critical component of emergency medical response to 
mass casualty incidents. While competent emergency medical response on scene is 
critical, ultimate survivability of trauma victims depends on definitive hospital care. 
Israel realized this in recent years as the country sustained a devastating spate of suicide 
bombings and other terrorist attacks. Israeli trauma physicians have determined that 
logistics and proper planning are just as important as surgical interventions when 
managing victims of mass casualty events. Although lessons learned from Israel have 
found their way to some jurisdictions in the U.S., not enough hospitals adhere to Israeli 
guidelines and therefore are not prepared for large-scale casualty situations. 
G. METHODS SUMMARY 
A qualitative analysis of the case studies supports the hypothesis that TCCC and 
TECC programs, such as the rescue task force approach along with highly evolved 
trauma hospitals, such as those in Israel, are crucial to save the lives of those wounded in 
mass casualty incidents. The data also indicates that civilian jurisdictions lacking TECC 
rescue task force programs have experienced great difficulties in responding to active 
shooting events. This is at variance with those communities that have TECC training, 
equipment, and a plan for an integrated and multidisciplinary medical response. The next 
chapter will consist of a review of literature on TCCC, TECC, and the Israeli hospital 
trauma model for mass casualty incidents. 
                                                 
35 John Blackstone, “Aurora Shooting May Ruin One Victim’s Finances,” CBS News, July 23, 2012, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/aurora-shooting-may-ruin-one-victims-finances/  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The previous chapter consisted of an overview of military and civilian tactical 
emergency medical programs, as well as the Israeli hospital model for mass casualty 
incidents. The last chapter also explained the research questions and methodology of this 
thesis. The current chapter will be broken down into six sections to review existing 
literature in the field of tactical emergency medicine.  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The main body of research on tactical emergency medicine has been conducted 
over the course of the past two decades by U.S. military physicians. Their research 
strongly indicates that the treatment of battlefield casualties has improved dramatically 
with the development of an emergency medical doctrine known as tactical combat 
casualty care. 36  The central tenets of TCCC include rapid, on-site treatment of 
hemorrhaging injuries, airway obstructions, and collapsed lungs. In TCCC, curative 
interventions are administered by specially trained medics who work in tandem with 
force protection units. TCCC was established by the U.S. Special Operations Command 
(USSOCOM) in the wake of the Battle of Mogadishu in 1993, in which 18 U.S. 
servicemen died.37 This battle exposed systemic flaws in how combat medics treated 
soldiers wounded under fire. TCCC was subsequently created and advanced and has 
become the emergency medical standard for all U.S. combat units. According to Frank 
Butler and Lorne Blackbourne, TCCC has resulted in lives being saved at a historically 
high rate.38  
                                                 
36 Frank K. Butler, John Hagmann, and George Butler, “Tactical Combat Casualty Care in Special Operations,” 
Military Medicine 161, supplement 1 (1996): 1–16, http://www.valorproject.org/uploads/TCCC_Special_Operations.pdf  
37 Robert L. Mabry et al., “United States Army Rangers in Somalia: An Analysis of Combat Casualties on an Urban 
Battlefield.” The Journal of Trauma Injury, Infection, and Critical Care 49, no. 3 (2000): 516, DOI: 10.1097/00005373-
2000090000-00021  
38 Frank K. Butler, and Lorne Blackbourne, “Battlefield Trauma Care Then and Now: A Decade of Tactical Combat 
Casualty Care,” Journal Trauma and Acute Care Surgery 73, no. 6, supplement 5 (2012): S395–S402. DOI: 10–1097/
TA.0b0133318. 
 18 
Lessons learned from U.S. military researchers in the field of combat casualty 
care are making their way to the civilian emergency medical community in the U.S. 
Acquiring knowledge from the military and recognizing that active shooters and other 
domestic acts of terror are essentially combat situations, some jurisdictions in the U.S. 
have implemented tactical emergency medical programs to address the need for treating 
and evacuating the wounded in high threat situations. A civilian version of the military’s 
TCCC, the TECC, has been implemented in a few jurisdictions in the U.S., including 
Arlington County in Virginia. The Arlington County Fire Department (ACFD) has a 
TECC program known as a rescue task force (RTF), which is designed to provide 
emergency medical care during active shooting incidents and other mass casualty events. 
In the RTF methodology, firefighter paramedics enter warm zones with police force 
protection units, similar to the manner in which U.S. military medics deploy with force 
protection details.39  
Despite the demonstrated need for TECC rescue task force teams to respond to 
active shooting events and terrorist attacks, decision makers at public safety departments 
in the U.S. have failed to see the utility of such programs in the civilian domain. Thus, 
most communities do not have standardized TECC rescue task force programs. The lack 
of tactical emergency medical programs means that public safety agencies in most U.S. 
jurisdictions are underprepared to provide comprehensive medical responses to mass 
casualty events.40  
B. CAUSES OF DEATH ON THE BATTLEFIELD AND SYSTEMIC 
IMPROVEMENTS IN COMBAT CASUALTY MEDICINE 
Until the early 1980s, definitive information on the causes of injury and death on 
the battlefield was scant. According to Brian Eastridge et al., research in the field of 
combat casualty care consisted of individual observations, along with “compilations of 
                                                 
39 Cynthia Kincaid, “Raise an Alert,” Journal of Emergency Medical Services, March 25, 2013, 
http://www.jems.com/article/raise-alert   
40 Eric Hartley, “In ‘Active Shooter’ Case, O.C. Medics to Go in Sooner,” Orange County Register, 
August 21, 2013, http://www.ocregister.com/articles/fire-517421-county-paramedics.html    
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medical administrative data and post hoc evaluations of data.”41 Prior to the 1970s, most 
research on battlefield casualties involved patients who reached the hospital while still 
alive. Data gathered on these casualties appeared skewed because there was a shortage of 
information available on the actual causes of death on the battlefield. Then, in 1970, the 
Joint Technical Coordinating Group for Munitions Effectiveness initiated a study that 
examined the causes of death of U.S. soldiers killed in Vietnam between 1967 and 1969. 
This study, which was referred to as the Wound Data and Munitions Effectiveness Team 
(WDMET) study, revealed that 15 to 20 percent of those killed in action died from one of 
three potentially preventable causes of death: extremity bleeding, collapsed lungs, and 
airway obstructions.42 This finding was significant because these types of wounds are 
treatable with rapid medical intervention and transport to a hospital. The WDMET study 
was among the first foundational inquiries on combat casualty statistics and generated 
significant interest in the military’s medical community. 43  Based on the WDMET 
statistics, military medical researchers, including U.S. Army Colonel Ronald Bellamy, 
postulated that if assistance to the wounded on battlefields could be improved, lives 
would be saved in future martial conflicts.44  
In 1984, Bellamy wrote a groundbreaking article in the field of tactical emergency 
medicine entitled “The Causes of Death in Conventional Land Warfare: Implications for 
Combat Casualty Care Research.” Bellamy opined that previous research about 
battlefield casualties placed too much emphasis on soldiers who had survived their 
injuries and not enough attention was focused upon the cases in which mortality 
occurred. It was his position that the military could learn much about saving lives by 
analyzing specific causes of death. In doing so, better strategies could be devised for 
combat casualty care.45 Bellamy built his research upon data from the WDMET study 
                                                 
41 Eastridge et al., “Death on the Battlefield (2001–2011),” S432.  
42 Iselin, and Smith, “Arlington County, VA Task Force.”  
43 Ibid.  
44 Ronald F. Bellamy, “The Cause of Death in Conventional Land Warfare: Implications for Combat Casualty Care 
Research,” Military Medicine 149, no. 2 (1984): 62.  
45 Ibid.  
 20 
and other previous investigations concerning combat casualties,46 studying casualty statistics 
from World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War to determine the effectiveness of combat 
casualty care. Bellamy found that roughly 50 percent of all combat-related deaths were caused by 
exsanguination. He contended that survivability of wounded soldiers in combat operations could be 
drastically improved through a renewed prioritization of medical care at the site of injury, with a 
special emphasis being placed on the treatment of hemorrhages.47 Bellamy was also among the first 
medical experts to recognize deficiencies in advanced trauma life support (ATLS) in the treatment of 
casualties on the battlefield. He posited that ATLS provided a sound platform for general care in most 
medical emergencies, but it required augmentation to address unique problems faced in combat 
situations such as penetration wounds caused by bullets and explosives.48 
Bellamy determined that the most frequent cause of death in combat occurred 
from uncontrolled bleeding 49  and concluded, “Many combat deaths were potentially 
preventable, including blood loss from extremity wounds, collapsed lungs and obstructed 
airways.”50 The value of this research was that it categorized the different causes of death 
in combat and further validated findings that most battlefield deaths occurred from 
exsanguination. In many cases, hemorrhages are treatable with rapid medical 
intervention, and Bellamy’s study has proved instrumental in the evolution of tactical 
emergency medicine. 51  Building on the work of Bellamy, other military researchers 
started to look for ways to get medical attention to wounded combatants in a more 
expedient manner, rationalizing that improving blood loss management protocols would 
undoubtedly save lives. 
In 1995, Captain Frank Butler, Jr., (U.S. Navy), Lieutenant Colonel John 
Haymann (U.S. Army), and Ensign E. George Butler (U.S. Navy) were tasked with 
assessing the viability of treating battlefield wounds with ATLS. The catalyst for this 
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research project was the Battle of Mogadishu in 1993. During this battle, Somali militiamen shot 
down two U.S. special forces’ helicopters, and wounded more than eighty U.S. soldiers, of which 18 
died.52 At the time that the Battle of Mogadishu transpired, ATLS was used by both civilian and 
military paramedics to treat a wide variety of injuries, ranging from routine medical 
emergencies to combat injuries. American combat medics in this engagement found 
themselves confronted with several problems, the most acute of which was their inability 
to sufficiently treat hemorrhaging injuries and difficulties in evacuating the wounded to 
hospitals due to enemy fire. U.S. medics in Mogadishu found that ATLS protocols were 
insufficient to treat wounded combatants because it did not prioritize bleeding.  
At the outset of their research project, Butler and his colleagues examined data 
from previous combat casualty studies, interviewed emergency medicine subject matter 
experts and practitioners. In their revolutionary paper “Tactical Combat Casualty Care in 
Special Operations,” Butler, Hagmann, and Butler concluded that ATLS was inadequate for 
treating wounded soldiers because it failed to make provisions for the delivery of medical 
services in combat environments. Since most deaths in combat are the result of blood 
loss, Butler, Hagmann, and Butler deemed hemorrhage control the new top priority. 
Furthermore, they contended that combat medics were particularly vulnerable because 
they were not guarded by force protection units while tending to the wounded in volatile 
situations.53  
Another significant shortcoming of the use ATLS protocols on battlefields was 
that it did not take into consideration the exigent need to evacuate the wounded from 
points of injuries to fully equipped medical treatment facilities (MTFs).54 This research 
also indicated that an inordinately high number of preventable deaths had transpired in 
previous military engagements as a result of extremity wounds-injuries that are treatable 
with proper training, skills, and equipment.55 Butler and his colleagues subsequently 
recommended a new set of standards to treat battlefield casualties, tactical combat 
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casualty care. Butler, Hagmann, and Butler hypothesized that TCCC is an essential tactical, 
medical, and logistical program that emphasizes, above all else, the control of hemorrhages on the 
battlefield.  
In April 1997, Rear Admiral Tom Richards mandated the Navy SEALS adopt TCCC as the 
standard of care in all for combat operations, and in 1998, Colonel Stanley McChrystal mandated 
TCCC as the standard of care for U.S. Army’s 75th Ranger Regiment. However, the effectiveness of 
TCCC was not rigorously tested until the commencement of military engagements in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.56 Military operations in these two countries represented the largest deployment of U.S. 
combat forces since the Vietnam War, and U.S. casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan were substantial 
and accelerated the development military of TCCC.  
In 2007, U.S. military researchers published two separate white papers on the causes of death 
on Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). In one of these articles, 
entitled, “Causes of Death in U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Global War on Terrorism 2001–
2004,” John Holcomb et al. observed that between October 2001 and November 2004 there were 500 
U.S. Special Forces (SOF) casualties, of which eighty-two died. They found that of these eighty-two 
fatalities, only twelve (fifteen percent of the cohort studied) died of wounds that were potentially 
survivable, such as extremity wounds.57 This study is important because special forces personnel 
were, at this time, trained in TCCC and the study determined that advances were being in the 
treatment of combat casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan. The reasons for the improvement of casualty 
care were that medics were adhering to TCCC doctrine, medics placed emphasis on hemorrhage 
control, tourniquets were being used with increased frequency, and prioritization was being placed on 
rapid evacuation from the point of injury on battlefields to full time medical facilities. This study also 
points to areas in which medical care in the battlefield can be improved through enhanced knowledge, 
training, and equipment.  
Another study on causes of death was undertaken by Joseph F. Kelly et al. These researchers 
examined nature of death of U.S. 982 servicemen killed in combat during Operation Iraqi Freedom 
(OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) from 2003 to 2004 and again in 2006. The purpose of 
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this was to learn more about specific causes of death in these conflicts and to compare fatalities that 
transpired in the earlier years of the wars (2003–2004) with those that took place in a later year (in 
2006). The goal of this study was to analyze battlefield casualty statistics in order to find areas for 
improvement. Kelly et al. found that 85 percent of combat deaths in OEF and OIF were the result of 
hemorrhaging.58 They divided the cohort into two groups: those that died of non-survivable wounds 
(NS) and those that died of potentially survivable (PS) wounds. It was determined that just over 23 
percent (232 victims) died from torso hemorrhage, extremity bleeding, or compressible injuries to the 
neck or groin—all of which are considered to be potentially survivable.59 The significance of this 
study is that it shows areas where combat casualty care can be improved by identifying specific causes 
of death as many injuries are potentially survivable. Torso hemorrhage can best be treated by rapid 
evacuation from the battlefield to a hospital where the patient can undergo surgery. Extremity 
bleeding can be stanched with the use of tourniquets, and wounds to the neck or groin can be dealt 
with by the application of direct pressure and hemostatic agents and bandages. Kelly et al. found that 
enemy forces were inflicting more lethal injuries on U.S. service personnel as the wars in Afghanistan 
and Iraq progressed; however, they also found that a greater number of lives were saved by the 
implementation of TCCC protocols, such as point of injury care and the use of tourniquets and 
hemostatic dressings.60 
In 2011, Russ Kotwal et al. published “Eliminating Preventable Death on the Battlefield,” a 
study that examined casualties sustained by the U.S. Army’s 75th Ranger Regiment during Operation 
Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Between October 1, 2001 and 
March 31, 2010, the 75th Rangers carried out 8,000 combat missions and sustained a total of 419 battle 
casualties with an unprecedentedly high survival rate of 92 percent.61 Tourniquets were successfully 
used on 66 of the 419 casualties. The researchers note that tourniquets were used with great frequency 
and resounding success to save lives in OIF and OEF. Kotwal et al. submitted that military 
engagements typically result in advancement of medical knowledge due to lessons learned by medics 
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and physicians through treating large numbers of wounded on the battlefield. Furthermore, Kotwal et 
al. credits the implementation of TCCC, along with the detailed tracking of each and every casualty in 
the Joint Trauma Registry and Joint Theater Trauma Registry (JTTR), a web-based pre-hospital 
trauma registry (PHTR) and Armed Forces Institute of Pathology.62 Through the tracking and 
analysis of this data, medical, and tactical researchers are able to look for ways in which combat 
casualty care can be improved. TCCC practitioners constantly use data and after action reviews to 
look for ways in which treatment can be improved, with the ultimate goal of eradicating preventable 
deaths on the battlefield.  
Mabry and McManus submitted that TCCC has “revolutionized the management 
of combat casualties in the pre-hospital tactical setting.” 63  They surmised that 
improvements were the result of fundamental changes in how soldiers are treated at the 
point of injury, with emphasis on hemorrhaging and breathing problems. Furthermore, 
they point out that the tools used by medics to deliver treatment, such as tourniquets, are 
unsophisticated and portable. Moreover, Mabry and McManus posit that TCCC 
principles, which emphasize the delivery of emergency medical services in austere 
environments, can be easily adapted by civilian EMS practitioners during law 
enforcement actions, terrorist attacks and natural disasters.64  
In 2011, Frank Butler, one of the creators of TCCC, and Lorne Blackbourne collaborated to 
assess the effectiveness of TCCC in treating casualties taking place in OEF and OIF. They chronicled 
the evolution of TCCC from its incipient phases in which its use was limited to U.S. special forces, to 
later stages when it was adopted by all U.S. military forces and most coalition forces by 2010. They 
reported that as of 2011, all U.S. combat medics were being taught TCCC protocols. Furthermore, 
Butler and Blackbourne validate what previous research of TCCC programs indicated: that TCCC 
saves lives of wounded combatants at an unprecedented rate.65  
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In 2012, Brian Eastridge et al. examined 4,596 combat fatalities that occurred in OEF and 
OIF between October 2001 and June 2011, and determined that fatalities from extremity bleeding 
dropped sharply with the induction of modern tourniquets and TCCC programs.66 Their study is 
important because it is a comprehensive examination of mortality statistics and shows a correlation 
between survivability and TCCC programs. In addition, this study also shows the value of using a pre-
hospital trauma registry to record and analyze casualties. Data collated in pre-hospital registries is 
being used to find areas for improvement in battlefield casualty care. 
C. DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN TOURNIQUET 
At the onset of the war in Afghanistan in 2001, the 75th Ranger Regiment and 
Navy SEALS were the only military entities that had established TCCC programs. In 
August 2002, U.S. Army Institute of Surgical Research (USAISR) commander John 
Holcomb (former Army surgeon in Mogadishu) convened a group of medics returning 
from Afghanistan for recommendations on improvement of casualty care in the field. The 
consensus was that what medics most needed were effective tourniquets, which 
heretofore had been unavailable.67 Up until 2002, combat medics were still carrying 
World War II-era tourniquets, which consisted of rubber tubing and straps. These 
antiquated tourniquets did not adequately stop the flow of arterial bleeding, and the 
pervasive opinion in the medical community, albeit unscientific, was that they could do 
as much harm as good because they caused permanent muscle and nerve damage to the 
patient.  
The use of tourniquets has been controversial. In 2003, John Navein, Robin 
Coupland, and Roderick Dunn point to the tourniquet’s reputation as “an instrument of 
the devil that sometimes saves a life.”68 In other words, risks and rewards of the device 
were unclear. They conceded that tourniquets had saved lives in some cases but argued 
they should only be used as a last resort. Navein Coupland and Dunn noted that scant 
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historical data was available to determine how much tissue damage occurred, how many 
limbs needed to be amputated, and how many lives had been actually saved as a result of 
tourniquets.69 
The “tourniquet controversy” posited by Navein, Coupland, and Dunn, would 
soon be resolved by the design of a modern and effective tourniquet, and publication of 
the first definitive studies on tourniquet effectiveness. As a result of Holcomb’s 
conference in 2002 and additional feedback from the Afghan and Iraqi wars, the U.S. 
military set out to develop a modern tourniquet suitable for use the modern battlefield. 
Several tourniquets were evaluated, and by early 2004, the combat application tourniquet 
(C.A.T.) was selected and issued to combat troops.70 According to Kragh et al., the 
C.A.T. is highly effective, relatively inexpensive at approximately $28 per unit, and 
simple to use. It stops bleeding, and there is a low risk of vascular damage to limbs. This 
tourniquet has been proven so effective that the military now issues it to all U.S. soldiers 
serving in combat areas.71 
In 2008 and 2009, Kragh et al. conducted studies involving the use of tourniquets 
on a total of 499 individuals (both civilian and military personnel) wounded in OIF and 
OEF. Kragh et al. determined that 87 percent of the 499 casualties treated with 
tourniquets survived. Also, they found that when tourniquets were applied before the 
onset of shock, survivability rose to 90 percent. These statistics represent the highest 
survival rates for wounded combatants in recorded history and validate the effectiveness 
of the modern tourniquet. What the Kragh et al. studies reveal is that tourniquet 
application saves lives, particularly when they are used prior to the patient going into 
shock from blood loss. Tourniquets are effective, but for maximum effectiveness they 
must be applied quickly. Tourniquets stop hemorrhaging in victims, and extend the 
transport time necessary for medics to get these victims to the hospital. Furthermore, 
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tourniquets can be used with minimal risk of limb morbidity.72 Kragh et al.’s research 
represents the first data-driven, conclusive research into tourniquets ever conducted, and 
dispelled previously held notions in the medical community that tourniquets were 
ineffective and harmful.  
D. PASSING OF TCCC TO CIVILIAN PUBLIC SAFETY JURISDICTIONS 
IN THE UNITED STATES 
The American emergency medical community continues to look for ways to 
improve the treatment of casualties on battlefields as well as at domestic terrorist 
incidents in the U.S. with the ultimate goal of eliminating preventable deaths. 73  In 
addition to being of great benefit to military emergency medicine practitioners, TCCC 
has made possible the dispersion of combat trauma doctrine to the civilian emergency 
medical domain in the U.S. Lessons learned from TCCC in Iraq and Afghanistan are 
gradually making their way into the civilian emergency medical community as military 
trauma surgeons and medics transition back to civilian practice in America.74 Kotwal et 
al. state that TCCC “is the model for improving pre-hospital trauma care and casualty 
outcomes on the battlefield and has considerable implications for civilian trauma care 
systems.”75 In addition, they contend that implementation of TCCC programs “may have 
profound implications for civilian trauma, training, care, and preventable death, 
especially in light of the fact that equivalent epidemiological studies on potential 
survivable death from trauma in the civilian pre-hospital environment are sparse.”76 They 
suggest that TCCC has utility in the civilian emergency medical community in the U.S.—
specifically in the treatment of casualties in austere environments. 
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Butler and Blackbourne also argue for the transition of TCCC doctrine into the civilian 
domain. They specifically recommend the widespread use of tourniquets and hemostatic agents by 
civilian trauma practitioners, and they also advocate for TCCC implementation into tactical 
emergency medical support programs, such as SWAT and specialized tactical emergency medical 
response teams in the U.S. In addition, Butler and Blackbourne suggest that the first step toward 
establishing TCCC programs is for jurisdictions in the U.S. is the development of guidelines based on 
operational requirements. They recognize that difficulty may arise in the actual implementation of 
TCCC programs by public safety agencies. Difficulties may include concern over scope of practice, 
liability, training, and costs necessary to initiate and sustain such programs. Butler and Blackbourne 
also point out that in the military domain, TCCC development and implementation was notably 
accelerated after the Committee on Tactical Combat Casualty Care (CoTCCC) was initiated. 
CoTCCC, is comprised both military and civilian medical officials whose goal has been to support 
and mature TCCC programs to their full potential. Moreover, CoTCCC works in tandem with groups 
such as the American College of Surgeons Committee on Trauma and the Prehospital Trauma Life 
Support (PHTLS) Executive Council, in furtherance of best practices in the application of emergency 
medicine. Nevertheless, Butler and Blackbourne contend that TCCC should not be limited to the 
military domain and should be coalesced into the civilian realm.77 From the results of this study, the 
researchers conclude that TCCC is the optimal and suitable approach for both military and civilian 
environments. 
Kurt Grathwold and Steven Venticinque expound on the great strides made in the field of 
combat casualty care by military practitioners in Iraq and Afghanistan between 2002 and 2008.78 The 
most significant lesson is the military’s ability to get highly trained personnel with fully functional 
equipment to treat wounded combatants in remote settings. They note the remarkable diminishment 
of combat fatalities as a result of TCCC and see opportunities to transition lessons learned from the 
military to the civilian domain. They argue that TCCC principles, such as the use of tourniquets, and 
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ability to treatment of large numbers of casualties are necessary in both martial and domestic trauma 
care programs.79 
Joseph Galante et al. wrote an article in November 2013 analyzing the results of a study in 
which they surveyed a cohort consisting of all 28 of local emergency medical services agency 
(LEMSA) directors in the state of California regarding the current state of tactical emergency medical 
programs in each of their respective jurisdictions. Galante et al.’s goal was to determine what barriers 
(if any) existed to the implementation of TCCC-themed programs in civilian settings.80 Of the 28 
LEMSA directors to whom the anonymous electronic survey was sent, 14 (50 percent) responded. 
The basic premise of this study is that TCCC programs have been used by U.S. military forces in Iraq 
and Afghanistan over the course of the past decade with great success, and Galante et al. argue that 
TCCC should be adopted by civilian jurisdictions in the U.S. In particular, they cite the effective use 
of tourniquets and hemostatic agents at the point of injury. They found that while most LEMSA 
directors generally supported the deployment of tactical emergency medics with SWAT or during 
other specialized law enforcement activities, respondents from only one-third of the jurisdictions 
surveyed had adopted TCCC tactics. Most of the local EMS directors surveyed indicated they were 
hesitant to employ modern combat application tourniquets or hemostatic remedies to control bleeding. 
Among the reasons against transitioning TCCC protocols cited by LEMSA directors were that injury 
patterns in civilian trauma cases differ from those seen in combat, and they expressed skepticism 
about the effectiveness of TCCC implements to treat civilian trauma patients. The directors also stated 
concern that tourniquets and hemostatic agents could cause complications, such as infection and 
vascular damage to patients. Galante et al. counter these arguments by stating that the TCCC 
methodology of triaging injuries and addressing hemorrhaging as a priority has substantial benefits for 
civilian EMS practitioners—particularly when used in support of law enforcement operations.81 Such 
operations could very well involve response to an active shooter event or a terrorist attack. It is worth 
noting that the Los Angeles Fire Department came under heavy criticism for the extended period of 
time it took to provide medical attention to wounded TSA officers at LAX International Airport in 
November 2013 (this will be addressed further in one of the case studies of this thesis). 
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Frank Butler and Richard Carmona point out that some TCCC concepts and practices have 
already made their way into the civilian emergency medical realm in the U.S. Examples they cite are 
the mass shootings at Fort Hood in 2009, during which an army medic used a tourniquet to 
successfully treat a wounded civilian police officer; and the mass shooting in Tucson, Arizona in 
2011, where deputy sheriffs used inexpensive and simple medical kits to administer first aid.82 When 
many of these officers were dispatched to the scene, they quickly went to work by using the 
equipment contained in the kits to stem the flow of bleeding wounds suffered by victims. This shows 
that basic training and equipment can be used to great effect in active shooting events.  
Shortly after the Boston Marathon bombings, Arthur Kellerman and Kobi Peleg published an 
article in the New England Journal of Medicine in which they credit lessons learned from combat 
medics and trauma surgeons in Afghanistan and Iraq as having had a tremendous impact in the overall 
response to the bombings.83 Kellerman and Peleg posit that the emergency medical response 
to the Boston Marathon bombings was exemplary, as evidenced by the fact that almost 99 
percent of the 264 people wounded survived. Kellerman and Peleg attribute much of this 
success to the fact that civilian emergency medical professionals in the U.S. are learning 
from their military counterparts in Iraq and Afghanistan on how to deal with combat 
casualties such as blunt trauma shrapnel wounds, burns, and amputations.84 Although 
Kellerman and Peleg laud the medical response and outcome to the bombings, they 
cautiously note that at least some of the success was happenstance. They point to the fact 
that the bombs went off near the finish line of the race, where a multitude of emergency 
medical personnel were prepositioned to aid fatigued runners. Also, blast sites were in 
close proximity to several of Boston’s largest and best hospitals, ensuring that victims 
had unfettered access to first class trauma care. Kellerman and Peleg argue that 
stakeholders in the emergency preparedness field need to take a more proactive approach 
to training and preparing for mass casualty events.85  
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E. Reed Smith, one of the founders of Arlington County’s rescue task force 
program, and John B. Delaney make the case for the universal adaptation of the military 
TCCC program in jurisdictions throughout the U.S. via TECC doctrine. They argue that 
the first firefighters or EMS personnel on the scene of an active shooter event have the 
duty to enter warm zones with police to treat and extricate victims.86 The ramifications of 
not doing so will be unnecessary loss of life.  
In April 2013, the American College of Surgeons and FBI brought together an 
elite group of physicians, fire service, and law enforcement professionals and paramedics 
for a daylong conference in Hartford, Connecticut to discuss strategies to respond to 
active shooter events in the U.S. The conference culminated with the production of a 
white paper known as “The Hartford Consensus.” The overarching goal of the Hartford 
Consensus is “to improve survival from active shooter events”87 and it recommended an 
integrated law enforcement, fire/rescue, and EMS response to active shooter events.”88 
Despite the fact that TECC is increasingly recognized as a best practice by fire 
and police departments across the nation, there is still no standard for its implementation 
in the U.S. In his 2012 Naval Postgraduate School thesis, Paul Atwater determined that 
there are several reasons why local governments may be resistant to the implementation 
of TECC programs, such as rescue task forces (RTFs).89 TECC programs are expensive 
to establish and maintain, as there is a high cost involved with equipping and training 
tactical medics. Additionally, jurisdictions across the country could face lawsuits if a 
member of a RTF is injured or killed while trying to treat a casualty under fire in an 
atypically high threat situation, such as an active shooting event. Atwater also determined 
that there are political and cultural barriers within public safety jurisdictions that have 
proven to be hindrances implementation of joint EMS/police escort models at active 
shooter incidents. It may be difficult for public safety officials to justify costs and 
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personnel for such TECC-type EMS/police escort programs, and some fire service 
officials may find it ethically difficult to send firefighters into active shooter scenes.90 In 
his applied research paper for the National Fire Academy, Karl Lieb argues that many 
fire departments in the country have no established policy or protocols to provide tactical 
EMS support to police during active shooter events. Lieb also cites the high cost of 
equipment and liability concerns as the biggest obstacles to the implementation of tactical 
EMS programs.91  
E. ISRAELI EMERGENCY MEDICAL RESPONSES TO MASS CASUALTY 
EVENTS 
Israel is a country with a highly advanced trauma response system. This system 
evolved rapidly in the face of increased terror attacks. Between September 29, 2000 
(which marked the start of the Al-Aqsa Intifada)92 and 2009, a total of 8,022 people were 
wounded in mass casualty incidents with 1,178 of them dying. Most of the casualties 
were attributed to suicide bombings (43 percent), firearm projectiles (27 percent), and 
detonation of explosive devices (eight percent). 93  These types of attacks result in 
extensive penetrating and blunt trauma injuries—similar to those seen in war zones—and 
without early medical intervention, many victims will die. At the dawning of these 
attacks, emergency departments at Israeli hospitals were overwhelmed when large 
numbers of casualties arrived simultaneously. Between 2001 and 2003, Israel 
experienced a tremendous surge in fatalities as a result of terrorist attacks.94 As a result, 
Israeli trauma surgeons learned through trial and error how to effectively deal with large 
numbers of injuries. They started classifying bombings by setting (e.g., open space, bus, 
semi-confined space) and analyzing casualties and the medical responses to each as well 
as looking for ways to improve medical response and victim survivability. Doctors noted 
that bombings that occurred indoors or in confined settings caused the most severe 
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injuries due to overpressure from the blasts. Subsequently, they developed specific 
protocols provide optimal levels of care in the wake of suicide bombings. In 2004, a 
group of Israeli trauma surgeons published a research paper titled “Suicide Bombings: 
Update and Modifications to the Protocol,” in which they detailed specific methodologies 
for the effective treatment of mass casualties after mass casualty incidents.95 This paper 
lays out a framework for emergency medical response to mass casualty events, and will 
be described further in chapter four of this thesis.  
The Israeli approach toward treating casualties involves training and preparation; 
collaboration, logistical coordination, and innovative medical expertise. The most 
seriously wounded must be treated first, while those who are not suffering from life-
threatening wounds may have to wait for medical care. The priority is to identify and 
treat extreme internal and external hemorrhaging injuries first because these are highly 
lethal if medical intervention is not rendered immediately. 96  Another study was 
conducted by Avaraham Rivkind et al., who sought to measure the effectiveness of Israeli 
hospital trauma protocols by analyzing case fatality rates (CFRs) at Hebrew-Hadassah 
Hospital Shock Trauma Unit (HHSTU) and comparing them with CFRs at 51 U.S. level 1 
trauma centers. Rivkind et al. found that between 1999 and 2003, HHSTU had a CFR of 
2.62 percent, compared to a CFR of 5.73 percent in the 51 U.S. trauma centers studied.97 
One of the important aspects of this study is that it showed that trauma patients, 
particularly those suffering from gunshot wounds and blast injuries have a higher survival 
rate at HHSTU than at U.S. level 1 trauma centers. Rivkind et al. undertook a follow-up 
study in which they compared CFRs at five Israeli level-one trauma centers with CFRs at 
51 level 1 trauma centers in the U.S. between 1998 and 2008. They discovered that over 
this 11-year period, even during junctures where there were high volumes of terrorist 
attacks, the CFRs in Israel were lower than those in the U.S. This is mainly attributable to 
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the Israeli approach in which senior trauma physicians oversee all aspects of patient care 
from the point of injury through hospital admittance.98 
According to the chief medical writer for the Associated Press, in 2005, Israeli 
trauma surgeons made the first of several trips to hospitals in the United States to lecture 
on the efficacy of their newly developed paradigm to treat victims of mass casualty 
events.99 Dr. Pinchas Halpern, director of emergency medicine Sourasky Medical Center 
in Tel Aviv, instructed medical staffs at Massachusetts General Hospital and Brigham 
and Women’s Hospital in Boston on how to control the flow of wounded by dispersing 
them to different hospitals (avoiding overcrowding at any one medical center), on triage 
methods to assess wounds, and on recommendations for best practices to detect multiple 
injuries that may be present in victims of bombings.100 This information would later be 
used by trauma specialists at Boston area hospitals to treat those wounded in the 
Marathon bombings in April 2013. 
In an article published in New Yorker magazine shortly after the Marathon 
bombings, Dr. Gawande Atul, a surgeon at Boston’s Brigham and Women’s Hospital 
noted that physicians from Massachusetts General Hospital (MGH) consulted with Israeli 
doctors prior to the bombings and modeled the MGH emergency department on those in 
Israel.101 Open source news reports from National Public Radio (NPR) and other media 
outlets quoted MGH trauma surgeons, who credited their ability to save victims from the 
marathon attacks with lessons learned from their colleagues in Israel.102  
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Bruria Adini and Kobi Peleg contend that the Israeli national medical system’s 
“all-hazards approach” is highly effective for dealing with mass casualty events.103 In the 
all-hazards approach, staffs at hospitals do not train differently for suicide bombings, 
pandemics, or other types of mass casualty incidents. They argue that mass casualty 
events have common factors, and it is simpler to train broadly rather than to try to tailor 
different strategies to different types of events. When faced with a mass casualty event, 
hospital staff can modify protocols based on existing resources. 104  This concept is 
significant to this because it is one that can be transferred to hospitals in the United 
States. 
Adini et al. describe the all-hazards approach as being made up of “critical 
building blocks” that include standard operating procedures (SOPs), training and drills, 
and knowledge of personnel and equipment.105 Additionally, Adini et al. state that some 
of these building blocks, such as refined EMS and hospital staff SOPs, training, and drills 
have a greater positive impact during mass casualty events than knowledge and 
equipment. The reason for this is that successful medical response to mass casualty 
events requires preparation, collaboration, and skill. When emergency medical staffs are 
well trained and know precisely where to go and what to do when mass casualty events 
occur, the outcomes are more likely to be favorable for the victims. 
F. CONCLUSION  
The literature shows that over the course of the past two decades the U.S. military 
has made great strides in the treatment of battlefield casualties through the development 
of TCCC, as evidenced by historically high survival rates of those wounded in combat. 
Changes came about when the military medical researchers and practitioners put a 
renewed emphasis on hemorrhage control, treatment of collapsed lungs and airway 
obstructions, and the rapid evacuation of casualties from points of injury to full time 
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medical facilities where definitive interventions can be performed. The equipment needed 
for TCCC programs is very basic from a technological perspective and man-portable. 
Effective hemorrhage control is achieved through the use of modern tourniquets and 
hemostatic agents; breathing problems resulting from airway obstructions are treated with 
nasopharyngeal airway devices or emergency airway puncture, and collapsed lungs are 
addressed with the insertion of thoracic needles into the patient’s chest.  
The research of Kragh et al. proves that modern combat application tourniquets 
have been used by medics with great effect to stanch bleeding at the point of injury and 
pose minimal risk of vascular damage in patients.106 Tourniquet use essentially buys time 
for medics to transport patients to hospitals for definitive care. Kotwal and other 
researchers have demonstrated that TCCC has saved lives of combatants at 
“unprecedented” rates in Iraq and Afghanistan.107 Under TCCC protocols, medics have 
substantially improved the methods in which they address hemorrhage control and 
breathing difficulties, as well as the speed in which injured soldiers are transported to 
hospitals. 
An examination of the literature on civilian trauma care also shows that the nation 
of Israel has developed an effective system for managing mass casualties, particularly in 
the hospital setting. In the Israeli model, logistics go hand-in-hand with medical care and 
that treatment of multiple casualties requires multi-disciplinary teams assigned to each 
patient to ensure that each patient receives comprehensive care. Training and drills are 
also necessary to guarantee that hospital personnel know exactly what actions to take in 
situations where large numbers of casualties arrive at the emergency department. Israeli 
emergency medical protocols are adaptable in the U.S., and they were used with great 
success by hospitals in Boston to save the lives of dozens of people seriously injured in 
the marathon bombings.   
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In Thinking in Systems: A Primer, Donatella Meadows suggests that those seeking 
to transform systems must find leverage points within those systems to effect change.108 
Meadows describes leverage points as “places within a complex system….where a small 
shift in one thing can create where a small shift in one thing can produce big changes in 
everything.”109 One of the leverage points defined by Meadows is a paradigm change.110 
In the context of this thesis, a paradigm change is needed for public safety agencies 
across the U.S. to be prepared to provide dynamic emergency medical responses to mass 
casualty events. This change will not take place spontaneously, and leverage points must 
be identified within systems of public safety jurisdictions across the U.S. to bring about 
paradigm change. The next chapter will detail public safety agencies’ responses to recent 
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III. INCREASES IN ACTIVE SHOOTER AND MASS CASUALTY 
EVENTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND PUBLIC SAFETY 
AGENCIES’ RESPONSES 
The last chapter consisted of a review of the existing literature on the U.S. 
military’s tactical combat casualty care (TCCC) program, civilian tactical emergency 
medical programs such as tactical emergency casualty care (TECC), and the Israeli 
hospital trauma model. This chapter will be organized into four sections to discuss: (A) 
the increase of active shooter and mass casualty incidents in the United States problems 
with the delivery of emergency medical services; (B) police and emergency medical 
responses to active shooter and mass casualty incidents; (C) the International Association 
of Firefighters (IAFF), U.S. Fire Administration, and Joint Committee to Create a 
National Policy to Enhance Survivability from Mass Casualty Shooting Events’ positions 
on tactical emergency casualty care in response to active shooter and mass casualty 
incidents; and (D) the lack of TECC rescue task force implementation and practice in the 
U.S.  
The rising frequency and lethality of active shooter and mass casualty incidents in 
the United States in recent years have made it necessary for public safety agencies to 
develop dynamic tactical and medical emergency response plans. Since the Columbine 
High School massacre in 1999, there has been a drastic shift in police response to active 
shooter and mass casualty incidents. Rather than waiting for SWAT team arrival, 
responding police officers in most jurisdictions will attempt to apprehend or otherwise 
engage the assailants to prevent them from harming additional victims. While this is an 
essential step in bringing an active shooter and mass casualty events to a conclusion, the 
other phase pertains to the emergency medical treatment of wounded at the scene. During 
high threat tactical situations, the application of emergency medicine has proven to be 
problematic because EMS personnel in most U.S. jurisdictions typically stage outside the 
secure perimeter and wait for police to render the scene safe. Such stage and wait, or 
standby, procedures are inadequate because casualties in such events require immediate 
medical attention. At the active shooter incidents that transpired at Century Theater in 
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Aurora, the Washington Navy Yard, and Los Angeles International Airport, EMS 
personnel were held outside secure perimeters and away from victims while police 
worked to clear the scenes of potential threats. The protocol of keeping EMS providers 
on standby proved problematic in each of these instances because it created lengthy 
delays in the provision of medical treatment to those people who were injured.  
There are mechanisms to deliver emergency medical care to victims of mass 
violence in hostile environments. In 2007, the Arlington County Fire Department in 
Virginia established the first rescue task force (RTF) program in the U.S. RTF’s involve 
joint firefighter-police officer deployments at active shooter incidents to administer 
medical aid to victims and then the rapid evacuation of casualties to hospitals. The ACFD 
RTF is a TECC program modeled after the U.S. military’s TCCC doctrine. Whereas both 
programs address the exigent need to treat casualties in high threat environments, the 
RTF system takes into account special populations such as pediatric and geriatric 
patients, scope of practice, and liability issues. A select few other jurisdictions in the 
nation have followed suit and created RTFs so that they will be prepared to deliver 
emergency medical services during mass casualty situations. However, most public safety 
departments in the U.S. do not have RTFs. The U.S. Fire Administration, International 
Association of Firefighters, and public safety advocacy groups have recommended the 
establishment TECC programs such as RTFs. However, as of the present date, most 
public safety jurisdictions do not have such task forces. The most prevalent justification 
against implementation of TECC programs cited by public safety officials are the 
heightened risks posed to firefighters and EMS at active shooter and other volatile 
situations. 111  Notwithstanding, the risks faced by firefighters participating in TECC 
programs are outweighed by the loss of human life at mass casualty events. Unless 
emergency medical services are administered promptly to victims of shootings and IED 
attacks quickly, people will die unnecessarily.  
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A. THE INCREASE IN ACTIVE SHOOTER AND MASS CASUALTY 
INCIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 
Active shooter incidents have increased at an alarming rate in the past fifteen 
years in the U.S.112 According to data collected by researchers at Texas State University 
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 67 active shootings events transpired between 
2000 and 2008, with an average of over seven events per year.113 However, these figures 
have surged in the past five years to an average of more than 18 incidents annually, and 
93 active shooting incidents between 2009 and 2013.114 There have also been disturbing 
trends in the scale and lethality of active shootings. In the 2012 shootings in Aurora, 
Colorado, 82 people were wounded, 12 fatally, when a gunman stormed the Century 
Theatre movie complex.115 Later that same year, 26 people, including 20 children, were 
shot to death at Newtown Elementary School in Connecticut.116 Additionally, in April 
2013, 264 people were injured in the Boston Marathon bombings, three of whom died on 
scene.117 
Active shooter and mass casualty incidents present several problems for public 
safety agencies, the first of which is celerity of police response. The speed at which 
police can get to the scene of appears to have tremendous impact on active shooter 
events, and there is a direct correlation between police response time and event 
duration.118 On average, active shooter incidents last approximately 12 minutes although 
37 percent end in five minutes or less.119 Once police arrive, perpetrators typically turn 
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their attention to police or commit suicide. 120  Regardless, police arrival mitigates 
additional loss of life as police prevent the assailants from accessing further victims.121 
Another notable problem manifested at active shooter events is inadequate 
emergency medical response. In most instances, firefighter and paramedics are required 
to stay outside the secure perimeter while police clear the scene of the threat.122 This is a 
process that can take several hours, as was the case with the Columbine, 123  the 
Washington Navy Yard shootings, 124 and the LAX active shooter event of 2013.125 
While police are preoccupied with assailants at active shooting scenes, those wounded 
desperately wait for medical attention. Unfortunately, in some instances, people die 
because of lengthy delays in EMS personnel reaching them.126 
B. POLICE AND EMERGENCY MEDICAL RESPONSES TO ACTIVE 
SHOOTER AND MASS CASUALTY INCIDENTS IN THE UNITED 
STATES  
The event in American history that exposed gross inadequacies of police and 
emergency medical services (EMS) responses to active shooter situations was the 
Columbine High School (CHS) massacre. On April 15, 1999, two heavily armed students 
initiated a targeted assault at the school. The assailants shot 36 people, killing 13 of 
them.127 The first 911 call was made at 11:19 a.m., and most victims were wounded 
within the next 17 minutes. Police officers arrived on scene at 11:23 a.m., but per 
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departmental protocols, waited outside the school until a special weapons and tactics 
(SWAT) team arrived at 12:06 p.m. SWAT team member were the first officers to clear 
CHS of the threat. The perpetrators killed themselves two minutes later, 49 minutes after 
the first 911 call, but this was not readily apparent to law enforcement. Consequently, it 
took the police over three hours to conduct a thorough safety sweep and secure the 
school. Some of the wounded were not evacuated until 3:22 p.m.,128 over four hours after 
the first shots were fired. 129  Emergency medical personnel followed established 
procedures by remaining outside the school until police finalized their security sweep. At 
least one person, teacher Dave Sanders, slowly bled to death from gunshot wounds that 
were likely survivable. Sanders had waited for over four hours for paramedics to 
administer first aid to him. By this time, it was far too late because he had already 
exsanguinated.130  
After the Columbine shooting, the governor of Colorado convened a review 
commission to investigate events leading up to the massacre, as well as to assess the 
police and emergency medical responses to the event. The Columbine Review 
Commission concluded that although the police personnel followed established protocols, 
engagement rules for what is now known as active shooter events were too slow and 
needed to be changed.131 The typical active shooter response for most police departments 
in the country prior to Columbine called police to establish a security perimeter around a 
threat area and wait for SWAT teams to arrive and make entry. As a result of Columbine, 
virtually every police department throughout the U.S. changed its tactics within 18 
months.132 Now, rather than waiting for SWAT teams, the first officers on scene of an 
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active shooting will make contact with the assailants to apprehend or otherwise 
neutralize.133  
Some of these new rapid response and engagement tactics are credited in helping 
police mitigate casualties, such as the December 2012 mall shooting in Clackamas Town 
Center outside Portland, Oregon. 134 Mark Lomax, executive director of the National 
Tactical Officers Association points to what has changed since Columbine:  
There’s been a paradigm shift…in the past, it was the standard protocol if 
there was a shooting incident or barricade suspect or hostage situation, the 
first responder would secure and contain the crime situation until the 
SWAT team or negotiators of bomb techs would arrive…School shootings 
highlighted a need to teach first responders to handle situations before 
those specialized units arrival.135  
This response is necessary to end active shooter events swiftly by preventing perpetrators 
from harming additional people. 
The Columbine Review Commission also found that there were lengthy delays in 
getting medical help to injured victims trapped inside the CHS building. 136  The 
commission recommended that SWAT teams have more emergency medical technicians 
(EMTs) to enhance emergency medical capabilities at active shooter events.137 While this 
is a sensible recommendation, in many cases, there would still be a time gap between first 
responders arriving at a scene and SWAT team deployment. It takes time for SWAT 
teams to mobilize, and as is often the case, the active shooter event is over before SWAT 
team arrival. 138  Furthermore, people sustaining penetrating and blunt force trauma 
wounds require immediate medical attention. It is imperative that victims of shootings 
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and IED attacks receive immediate care because death from extreme blood loss can take 
place in two to three minutes unless treated properly.139 
Currently, there are still precarious delays between law enforcement securing 
active shooting scenes and emergency medical personnel having access to treat the 
wounded at active shooter events in the U.S. At an active shooter event, the primary goal 
law of enforcement is to stop the shooter from inflicting additional casualties. However, 
there is also a need to get medical assistance to victims as quickly as possible, and time 
becomes a critical factor: penetrating wounds caused by ballistic projectiles cause severe 
bleeding and breathing problems. Death from blood loss can occur in two to three 
minutes, airway obstruction in four to five minutes, and a collapsed lung in 10 to 15 
minutes.140 Therefore, emergency medical personnel have a limited amount of time to 
administer casualty care. In recent mass casualty events, such as the Century Theater 
(Aurora, Colorado) and LAX active shootings, the time it took to deliver emergency 
services to victims exceeded these limits. Paramedics need to be able to quickly access 
and treat victims on scene, and they cannot always wait for the police to conduct an 
exhaustive search for the perpetrators of active shootings. 
In contrast to police organizations, most fire/EMS departments do not have 
established protocols for treating the wounded at active shooter situations.141 The typical 
response is for fire personnel and paramedics to remain on standby until the scene has 
been declared safe by police.142 As referenced in the introductory and literature review 
chapters of this thesis, officials in some jurisdictions, such as the Arlington County Fire 
Department (ACFD), have seen the need for a more proactive approach. In 2007, ACFD 
established the nation’s first RTF. 143  The RTF is based on the military’s TCCC 
protocols. RTF consists specially equipped firefighter paramedics who team up with 
police officers to respond to active shooter or other atypical medical emergencies. Other 
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fire departments, such as those in Orange County144 and Los Angeles, California have 
also recently established rescue task forces after active shooting events have transpired in 
each of their respective jurisdictions.145 Although the establishment of these rescue task 
forces is a positive development, the majority of public safety departments in the U.S. do 
not have the standard operating procedures, equipment, or trained personnel to effectively 
deal with medical emergencies during active shooter and mass casualty incidents. It often 
takes a cataclysmic event, such as the Los Angeles International Airport shooting in 
November 2013, to demonstrate why TECC rescue task force programs are necessary.146 
C. INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIREFIGHTERS, U.S. FIRE 
ADMINISTRATION, AND JOINT COMMITTEE TO CREATE A 
NATIONAL POLICY TO ENHANCE SURVIVABILITY FROM MASS 
CASUALTY SHOOTING EVENTS’ RECOMMENDATIONS ON 
TACTICAL EMERGENCY  
Several prominent organizations in the U.S. have recommended the establishment 
of formalized tactical emergency programs. The International Association of Firefighters 
(IAFF), a fire service advocacy group with over 300,000 members, has issued Position 
Statements recommending the establishment of TECC, 147  and Rescue Task Force 
programs.148 The Joint Committee to Create a National Policy to Enhance Survivability 
from Mass Casualty Shooting Events, an ad-hoc group medical emergency professional 
which includes representatives from the American College of Surgeons, fire service 
officials and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) also recommends the adoption of 
tactical casualty combat care programs by state and local public safety agencies.149 
According to this committee, TCCC programs are quintessential in improving 
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survivability of victims in active shooting events because they make provisions for 
tandem response of fire, EMS, and law enforcement personnel.150  
In September 2013, the U.S. Fire Administration issued a formal recommendation 
that public safety agencies across the U.S. look to TECC programs to provide 
comprehensive response to active shooter and mass casualty events: “training, equipment 
and protocols around use of TECC for medical first responders should be explored, 
considered and implemented when feasible.” 151  The Committee-Tactical Emergency 
Casualty Care (C-TECCC), which is comprised of emergency medical experts from over 
55 agencies, is working to expedite the transition of TCCC precepts to the civilian 
domain. C-TECC recommends and works with agencies all over the U.S. to advocate and 
assist with implementation of TECC programs.152  
D. CONCLUSION 
Despite the declared need for tactical emergency medical programs by emergency 
medical professionals and public safety officials across the U.S., there is still no national 
policy for the implementation of programs such as rescue task forces. In fact, most 
jurisdictions in the U.S. currently have no standardized tactical emergency programs. As 
is often the case, TECC rescue task force programs have been only been implemented 
after calamities involving loss of life occur.153 The dearth of TECC rescue task force 
programs in the U.S. are typically exposed in the wake of mass casualty events, and 
consequently, after action reviews almost always recommend a more integrated police, 
firefighter, and EMS response to a mass casualty event. Obstacles to implementation 
include increased risks to EMS personnel, the high costs equipment and training, and 
liability concerns.154 
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This chapter covered the rise in active shooter incidents in the United States in 
recent years, police and emergency response to these incidents, and the support that 
TECC and rescue task force programs have among some public safety organizations. 
Rapid on-site treatment at mass casualty events is crucial to increasing victim 
survivability and TECC rescue task forces offers the best way to ensure that emergency 
medical services are administered in high-threat environments. The other vital component 
in emergency casualty care is accessibility to a highly skilled and trained hospital 
workforce capable of managing a large-scale medical event. It takes a concerted effort to 
effectively manage these calamities. First responders and hospital personnel must work in 
unison to help mass casualty victims at the point of injury, during transport, and 
eventually at the hospital. An example of a country that has developed a paradigm for 
care of numerous casualties simultaneously is Israel. Israeli emergency medical 
practitioners combine speed of transport, intermediate and definitive medical 
interventions, and logistics to save the lives of those wounded by IEDs and other terrorist 
attacks. The following chapter is a case study that illustrates the Israeli model for mass 
casualty events. Israeli hospitals have grown adept in treating large numbers of casualties 
emanating from terrorist attacks on its civilian population, and an examination of the 





IV. THE ISRAELI EMERGENCY MEDICAL RESPONSE MODEL 
FOR MASS CASUALTY EVENTS 
The preceding chapter detailed the why tactical combat casualty care (TCCC) and 
tactical emergency casualty care (TECC) programs are necessary to provide medical 
services in volatile situations and mass casualty incidents. The U.S. military has 
developed the preeminent system—TCCC—for on-site care and evacuation of wounded 
people in high threat environments. Some public safety organizations in the U.S. have 
adopted TECC programs to address medical emergencies at the scenes of active shooter 
events. This chapter will explain the Israeli hospital paradigm for the management of 
victims wounded in mass casualty incidents. Mass casualty events are challenging under 
any circumstances; therefore, hospital personnel must be uniquely trained and prepared 
for them. Israel has sustained numerous terrorist attacks over the course of the past two 
decades, and out of necessity, trauma surgeons in Israel have developed a robust 
emergency medical system for handling victims of mass casualty events. Hospitals are 
the focal point of the Israeli trauma care archetype. Between 2000 and 2009, the nation 
experienced 146 suicide attacks, resulting in 516 deaths, and 8,022 injuries. 155  In 
response to these attacks, Israeli hospitals developed a prototype for emergency medical 
responses to mass casualty events by adopting what Bruria Adini and Kobi Peleg call a 
“flexible all-hazards approach.”156 Israelis trauma specialists have discovered that the 
medical procedures that work for well terrorist attacks have applicability to other types of 
mass casualty situations.157 Israeli paramedics, physicians, and nurses train and prepare 
for worst-case scenarios, and they do not use drastically different procedures for 
bombings, shootings, chemical, or biological attacks. 158  They employ certain core 
elements and skills to aid those wounded in any type of mass casualty incidents.159 For 
example, hospital admittance sites and personnel assigned to work them are pre-
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designated; medical teams are predetermined and additional supplies and equipment are 
stored at hospitals anticipation of emergencies.160 Other core elements at Israeli hospitals 
include the establishment of standard operating procedures (SOPs), surge capacities (e.g., 
utilization of additional medical personnel and emergency room space), a clear chain of 
command, training exercises, and drills. Israeli trauma experts have also conceptualized a 
method of managing those injured in terrorist attacks called the accordion approach in 
which a surgeon in charge directs the treatment plans of victims in a hyper-triage 
fashion. 161  Another major asset in the Israeli trauma system is its national trauma 
registry, which is a repository of information on casualties that can be studied for ways in 
which medical care can be improved. Each of these concepts will be discussed in depth in 
this chapter. 
A. STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES, TRAINING, AND DRILLS 
Israel’s Ministry of Health requires that all hospitals and health care providers 
have formal plans in place to treat victims of mass casualty events based on their 
available resources. Israel’s Supreme Health Authority, a subcommittee of the Ministry 
of Health, mandates that each hospital develop its own standard operating procedures 
(SOPs) and regularly participate in training and drill programs to improve preparedness 
for different emergency scenarios.162 These SOPs and training drills are deemed to be 
“fundamental critical blocks” that improve readiness and performance during actual mass 
casualty events. 163  Additionally, emergency service personnel in Israel use uniform 
terminology and common language, which simplifies communications in stressful 
situations.164 According to Adini et al., the use of SOPs, training, drills, and common 
language have a proven record of improving emergency medical personnel performance 
during influxes of large numbers of casualties.165 During mass casualty events medical 
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professionals perform in accordance to how they practice and prepare. Scenario-based 
training helps first responders and hospital personnel know exactly where to go and what 
to do when disaster strikes.166  
B. ESTABLISHMENT OF TRIAGE ON SCENE AND AT EMERGENCY 
DEPARTMENTS  
The Israeli model emphasizes concepts of coordinated triage at the scene and the 
evacuation of casualties quickly from the points of injury to hospitals as quickly as 
possible. Paramedics from Magen David Adom (MDA), Israel’s national emergency and 
ambulance service, are trained to rapidly assess and treat those wounded on the scene to 
address life-threatening injuries and in the hasty evacuation of victims from points of 
injury to hospitals. MDA paramedics only administer the most basic first aid procedures 
on scene, such as hemorrhage and airway control. During transport MDA paramedics 
treat patients with intravenous fluids or intubation if necessary.167 They also use “scoop 
and run” maneuvers to rush wounded to the hospital and to avoid becoming casualties of 
any secondary explosive devices left behind by terrorists. 168  The goal of the MDA 
paramedics is to conduct only essential life-saving treatments at the scene of injury and 
then expedite victims to area hospitals. After arrival at hospitals, paramedics assist 
trauma surgeons by providing them with initial diagnostics for each patient. 
Israeli medical personnel have discovered that logistics are just as important as 
administering medical treatment to victims in mass casualty events. This means that 
emergency responses to mass casualty events require planning and organization. As 
patients begin to arrive at emergency rooms, all aspects of the treatment plan need to be 
managed, and each patient is assigned to a specifically designated medical team. This is 
necessary because victims of bombings are usually inflicted with multiple injuries, 
including extensive penetrating injuries from shrapnel, burns, and blunt force trauma.169 
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A dedicated emergency medical team is necessary to ably triage and monitor each 
shooting or bombing casualty after arrival at the emergency room so that all injuries are 
detected.170  
C. ISRAELI HOSPITALS 
All hospitals in Israel are required by the Ministry of Health to have surge 
amplitudes of 20 percent beyond their normal operating capacities. This means that 
additional staffing and equipment are available at hospitals at a moment’s notice in the 
wake of mass casualty events. One way hospitals in Israel accomplish this is by storing 
additional beds and them moving them to hallways when needed to accommodate an 
overflow of patients when the need arises. The corridors of Israeli hospitals are equipped 
with electrical outlets and oxygen lines so that their space can be fully utilized during 
times when the hospital’s resources are heavily burdened.171 Additionally, physicians 
from a variety of disciplines, along with hospital support staff, are expected to remain on 
duty for as long as necessary beyond their normal shifts to assist with high volumes of 
casualties.172 During mass casualty scenarios, elective surgery is postponed throughout 
the hospital so that operating rooms and medical personnel are available to deal with the 
critically wounded as they arrive en mass.  
Emergency departments in Israeli hospitals are designed for practicality. For 
example, essential equipment is mounted to the ceilings to accommodate personnel who 
need to move without impediment. In order to alleviate any potential confusion when 
numerous casualties arrive at hospitals, Israeli emergency departments (EDs) have a 
simple floor plan with a straight path running from the arrival area to the emergency 
room.173 The ingress areas at the exterior of the ED as well as the floors are marked with 
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painted lines, and there is ample signage posted to make navigation easier.174 Israeli 
physicians have also developed a triage system known as “look, touch, feel” method.175 
Because wounds suffered as a result of improvised explosives consist of multitudinous 
penetration and blunt trauma wounds, the process of injury detection can be arduous, and 
doctors need to physically examine each patient with the utmost thoroughness to find the 
sources of life threatening injury. The look, touch, feel mnemonic is a system that guides 
doctors in a literal sense as they try to determine the number and types of injuries 
suffered by bombing victims. 
D. THE ACCORDION APPROACH 
Between October 1, 2000 and September 1, 2004, Israel experienced an acute 
number of terrorist attacks spurred by the Second Intifada.176 During this span, there 
were 93 mass casualty events as a result of strikes on the nation’s civilian population, 
with 33 of these attacks taking place in Jerusalem.177 As the only level 1 trauma facility 
in Jerusalem, the Hadassah-Hebrew University Medical Center’s Shock Trauma Unit 
(HHSTU) provided care for those critically injured in the attacks. The hospital treated 
541 victims and admitted 208 of them. 178  The severity, frequency, and volume of 
incoming casualties over this extended period led to the acquisition of invaluable 
experiences in the treatment of trauma patients at HHSTU. Trauma surgeons learned that 
not only was it advantageous to reinforce the emergency department staff with personnel 
from the intensive care unit, but also of the need to have a clear chain of command to 
manage tumult in the aftermath of mass casualty event. Israeli medical officials also 
recognized the need to organize medical teams and treatment protocols when receiving 
multiple casualties simultaneously.  
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Hospital resources can be overwhelmed without special planning and preparations 
for these events. In response to suicide bombings, Israeli hospitals, and the HHSTU in 
particular, developed archetypical emergency department procedures based on existing 
guidelines for trauma management. Physicians and nurses from multiple disciplines, such 
as pediatrics, anesthesiology, orthopedic surgery, neurosurgery, and other specialties, are 
expected to report to the emergency departments and be part of teams that will triage and 
render medical assistance to victims.179  
Israeli medical experts have found that one of the key elements in response to 
mass casualty events is the designation surgeons in charge (SIC) to continually monitor 
each patient and control emergency room activity. A SIC, who is a seasoned trauma 
surgeon, oversees triage and prioritization of victims from the time that they arrive at the 
hospital until the time they are stabilized and admitted. Those patients with the most life 
threatening injuries (e.g., massive bleeding and internal trauma) receive immediate 
treatment, while those with less serious injuries will be treated later. The SIC is 
responsible for monitoring each patient’s condition and treatment protocols until that 
patient can be stabilized. Each patient is assigned their own medical team, which is 
important, as victims of bombings often suffer both obvious and insidious injuries.180  
HHSTU trauma physicians, such as Gidon Almogy and Avarham Rivkind et al., 
conceptualized a system known as the “accordion approach” to efficiently manage the 
flow of large numbers of victims in the emergency department after a mass casualty 
event.181 The accordion approach involves the facilitation of patients through a series of 
treatment protocols under the supervision and guidance of SIC. It is the SIC’s 
responsibility to continually assess and re-assess the treatment plan of each patient until 
he or she has been stabilized and admitted to the hospital. The accordion approach 
consists of seven key stages: evacuation, triage, primary evaluation/initial treatment, re-
assessment, continued evaluation/definitive treatment, re-assessment, and admission. In a 
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collaborative series of “dispersals” and “convergences,” the SIC prescribes the medical 
plan for each patient.182  
In the evacuation phase, paramedics treat patients on scene and then transport to a 
medical facility as quickly as possible because every moment counts in a traumatic injury 
situation. Evacuation is followed by the triage phase, in which paramedics continue to 
treat victims during transport to the hospital. Immediately after arrival at the emergency 
room, each patient is evaluated during triage, and the exact nature of injuries is 
determined. Upon arrival at the emergency department, the patient then undergoes a 
series of primary evaluations, including an assessment by the SIC. Since bombings 
typically result in multiple and complex injuries, some injuries may be obvious, while 
others may be latent and difficult to diagnose. Patients may display obvious life-
threatening injuries, such as shrapnel or extremity amputations, and they may also have 
internal damage, which may be more difficult for medical personnel to detect, such as 
blast lung injury (BLI)183 or blast abdominal injuries that do not always have external 
manifestations. 184  For Israeli trauma surgeons, “undertriage is unavoidable” as mass 
casualties flood into emergency rooms.185 The surgeons operate under the assumption 
that a piece of shrapnel or some other type of injury could be missed during initial 
examinations and therefore, re-assessments are administered frequently. As shown in 
Figure 1, the SIC orchestrates all phases of the care of acute patients in the emergency 
department. 
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Figure 1.  Accordion Approach186 
E. ISRAEL NATIONAL TRAUMA REGISTRY 
The Israel National Trauma Registry (ITR) is another major asset in the nation’s 
health care system. The ITR was created in 1995 upon a recommendation of a special 
committee of the ministry of health, and it mandates that all hospitals report trauma 
injury data.187 With the ultimate goal of improving survivability, the ITR is used to 
record and analyze the data on patients injured in traumatic events. Data recorded in the 
ITR includes injury typology and resultant medical treatments administered. Researchers 
have found that over time, certain epidemiological patterns emerge that help researchers 
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identify emergency medical techniques that can be corrected or improved upon to save 
lives.188  
The ITR has been used to measure certain variables and outcomes on a national 
level that can be used by policy makers to implement systematic advancements. Peleg et 
al. conducted a study of 7,423 severe trauma patients admitted to Israeli hospitals 
between January 1, 1997 and December 31, 2001 and found that mortality rates 
decreased from 21.6 percent to 14.7 percent during this period of time.189 There were 
several factors that led to this reduction. One reason is that trauma care protocols from 
were improved at Israeli trauma centers. Also, during this same period, ambulance 
dispatch centers in Israel more than doubled from 47 to 98, and the number of paramedics 
employed by Magen David Adom grew from 100 to 350, which enhanced the ability of 
EMS personnel to expedite sick and injured people to hospitals. Additionally, the nation’s 
advanced life support (ALS) ambulance fleet was expanded from 47 to 98 units to 
provide greater coverage.190 Other positive factors consisted of an increased number of 
hospital shock trauma beds, as well as the introduction of better training and equipment at 
emergency departments.191 The results of this study indicate that enhanced field triage, 
rapid transport of trauma patients to definitive care, and improved hospital care protocols 
resulted in a significant decrease in the mortality rates of trauma victims in Israel. 
Researchers also use ITR data to conduct studies on the epidemiology of unique 
injuries occurring in terrorist attacks.192 Heldenberg et al. studied a cohort consisting of 
all patients entered into entered into the ITR from September 2000 to December 2005 and 
found that due to high explosives and penetrating fragmentation, vascular injuries are 
much more prevalent in terrorist attacks than in non-terror related trauma events.193 
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Extensive vascular injuries were suffered in 9.9 percent of trauma cases, compared to 1.1 
percent in non-terror related trauma cases. As these types of injuries are complex, 
Heldenberg et al. recommend that emergency departments have an expanded complement 
of vascular surgeons on staff as part of the response to terror attacks.194 Studies such as 
this attest to the ITR’s utility in helping guide research into of these types of mass 
casualty incidents by placing emphasis on the special of wounding patterns and the types 
of medical specialties needed to treat them.  
In the United States, the only national repository for trauma injury data is the 
National Trauma Data Bank (NTDB), which was established by the American College of 
Surgeons (ACS) in 1989.195 However, one of the limitations of the NTDB is that only 
level 1 trauma centers in the U.S. are required to report data. For all other trauma centers 
and hospitals, reporting of injury data is voluntary, which means much of the data on 
trauma injuries occurring in the U.S. is not available for study and assessment in the 
U.S.196  
F. ANALYSIS 
The Israeli model for emergency response to mass casualty events has become 
world-renowned for its effectiveness. Israeli techniques have evolved over recent years 
and have saved many lives. Maya Siman-Tov, Irina Radomislensky, and Kobi Peleg 
conducted a study of all severe trauma patients treated at Israel’s six level 1 trauma 
centers between 2000 and 2010 and found that inpatient mortality decreased from 16 
percent to 11 percent.197 Given the high number of terrorist attacks Israel has experienced 
during this same period, these statistics reflect extraordinary results. 
Between 1993 and 2004, Hebrew University-Hadassah Hospital Shock Trauma 
Unit treated (HHSTU) more victims of suicide bombings than any other hospital in 
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Israel.198 In adaptation to high casualty counts emanating from these attacks, doctors at 
HHSTU developed a dynamic approach (referred to as the “accordion approach” by 
Almogy et al. (as depicted in Figure 1 199 ) that involves the activation of multi-
disciplinary medical teams working under the direct supervision of senior trauma 
physicians.200 Dr. Avraham Rivkind and other physicians at the HHSTU measured the 
impact of their approach by conducting an extended multi-phase study examining trauma 
patient case fatality rates (CFRs) at level 1 trauma centers in Israel and the United States 
during specific periods.201  
For the first phase of their study, Rivkind et al. conducted an inquiry into the 
CFR’s of 8,127 trauma patients admitted to HHSTU from 1999 to 2003. This period is 
significant because it was during the midst of the Second Intifada in which there was a 
particularly high number of suicide bombing and other terrorist attacks in Israel. Rivkind 
et al. examined the survivability and fatality rates of the 8,127 trauma patients treated at 
HHSTU, of whom 190 died within a 30-day period after being admitted. The 190 deaths 
represent a CFR of 2.3 percent of all trauma casualties treated. The researchers then 
compared the HHSTU CFR with CFRs of 51 level 1 trauma centers in the U.S. (roughly 
half of the 100-plus level 1 trauma centers in the U.S.) between 1999 and 2003, using the 
same criteria by which they measured HHSTU CFRs (total number of deaths of trauma 
patients within 30 days of admittance to hospitals).202 During this five-year period, a total 
265,902 trauma patients were admitted to the 51 U.S. level 1 trauma centers queried, with 
15,237 deaths occurring,203 constituting a CFR of 5.73percent. This is notable because 
this percentage is more than twice that of trauma patients treated at HHSTU.204  
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Injuries and deaths for both the Israeli and American cohorts were categorized by 
type (e.g., motor vehicle-crashes, falls, burns) and severity levels. An important aspect of 
the study is that the researchers were able to compare data on patients in both countries 
who were injured by what are classified as blast-firearms-gunshot wound (GSW) 
injuries.205 At HHSTU from 1999 to 2003, there were 611 people treated for blast-
firearms-GSW injuries (7.5 percent of all traumatic injuries recorded), with 47 fatalities 
transpiring, which represents a CFR of 7.7 percent. At the 51 level 1 trauma centers in the 
U.S., 25,561 patients (9.7 percent of all trauma patients) were injured by blast-firearms-
GSW, with approximately 4,089 dying, which constituted a CFR of 16.0 percent.206 This 
data shows that the proportion of blast-firearms-GSW injuries in Israel and the U.S. are 
similar in relation to the overall number of trauma injuries recorded over a five-year span. 
More importantly, this data indicates that the survivability rates of patients treated for 
blast-firearms-GSW at HHSTU was more than double that of 51 level 1 trauma centers in 
the U.S. 
For a second phase of their study, Rivkind et al. measured the CFR averages of 
HHSTU with the CFR averages of the 51 level 1 trauma centers in the U.S. from 1999 
through 2003 and then continued to measure HHSTU’s CFRs through 2009. CFRs were 
divided into two categories based on injury severity scores: severe and all trauma injury 
categories in general. Table 1 illustrates the results of this inquiry. 
 
Table 1.   Case Fatality Rates at HHSTU and U.S. Level 1 Trauma Centers from 
1999 through 2003 and at HHSTU through 2009207 
                                                 
205 Ibid., 6.  
206 Ibid., table 2. 
207 Ibid., 6. 
 61 
As Table 1 depicts from the study of Rivkind et al., in 1999, Israeli level 1 trauma 
center’s CFRs for severe injury categories was 18.4 percent, which was closely aligned 
with the 19.7 percent CFR of 51 level 1 trauma centers in the U.S.; however, by 1999, the 
severe injury CFR at HHSTU dropped four points to 14.4 percent, while level 1 trauma 
centers in the U.S. increased to 20.9 percent. Over the course of 11 years examined, the 
CFRs at HHSTU decreased significantly through 2009, when the CFR for severe injuries 
was 9.9 percent, which is roughly half of what the HHSTU CFR was in 1999 (it was 18.4 
percent). 208  This shows that improved medical treatment protocols led to drastically 
improved survivability of trauma victims at HHSTU and superior results when compared 
to level 1 trauma centers in the U.S. 
Rivkind et al. also evaluated CFR trends at five Israeli level 1 trauma centers 
(including HHSTU) in comparison to 51 level 1 trauma centers in the U.S. between 1998 
and 2008, and they found that the Israeli centers consistently exhibited lower CFR’s for 
trauma patients, including those with severe injuries, as shown in Table 2. 
 
 
Table 2.   Case Fatality Rates at Israeli and U.S. Level 1 Trauma Centers from 
1998 to 2008209 
While both the U.S. and Israeli level 1 trauma centers assessed have continually 
improved CFRs for all injury categories, Israeli level 1 trauma centers have continually 
surpassed their U.S. counterparts in terms of lives saved. This is attributable to the 
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nation’s systemic approach to trauma care that focuses upon speed of transport to the 
hospital and a collaborative approach of emergency department care that entails multi-
disciplinary medical teams supervised by senior trauma physicians. 
Israel’s methods are adaptable to the United States. In fact, the HHSTU was 
established in 1992 and was modeled after the concept developed by American doctor R. 
Adams Cowley and other physicians of the Maryland Institute of Emergency Medical 
Services System (MIEMSS). In the MIESSS, experienced trauma surgeons oversee all 
aspects of medical treatment—from care at the point of injury—through definitive 
treatment at the emergency department. 210  What distinguished Israel from other 
developed countries such as the U.S. is the pervasive incidence of terrorist attacks that 
have occurred over a protracted period. And as a result of experience gained in treating 
mass casualties over the course of recent years, the Israeli paradigm had evolved into one 
of the world’s preeminent trauma care systems. 
The victims of the Boston Marathon bombing were direct beneficiaries of the 
Israeli emergency medical paradigm. Boston area hospitals conducted numerous training 
exercises and drills in the years leading up to the attacks. After consultations with Israeli 
physicians, doctors at Massachusetts General Hospital improved their emergency 
department triage protocols and updated their response plans for large-scale casualty 
events. 211  When they learned of the bombings and massive casualties, emergency 
department personnel at Massachusetts General Hospital, Brigham and Women’s 
Hospital, and other trauma centers activated their emergency response plans according to 
Israeli-type protocols. Emergency rooms were cleared of any patients with non-life 
threatening ailments, and elective procedures at the hospitals were postponed. All 
available physicians, nurses, and medical technicians reported to emergency departments. 
Experienced doctors were designated to evaluate patients in ambulances as they arrived at 
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emergency rooms.212 In some instances, hospitals staffs re-applied tourniquets to victims 
whose legs were damaged or amputated. 213  Doctors from Massachusetts General 
Hospital in Boston conveyed to the media that consultations with Israeli trauma doctors 
enhanced their ability to treat victims of the marathon bombings. These lessons learned 
from Israel served Boston hospitals extremely well in the aftermath of the marathon 
bombings. 
The Israeli all-hazards approach is not limited to the management of terrorist 
attack casualties. Their protocols can also be used to treat victims of automobile 
accidents, train derailments, plane crashes, and natural disasters. Additionally, the all-
hazards approach can be scaled up or down based on the size of the mass casualty event. 
Lessons learned from Israel can save lives and can be replicated in jurisdictions across 
the U.S. In recognition that Israeli model can be constantly improved upon, researchers 
from Israel continually seek to learn from the emergency responses from mass casualty 
events across the globe, including the earthquakes in Haiti and even the Boston Marathon 
bombings.214 What is not evident is whether all jurisdictions in the United States are 
prepared to respond to mass casualty events in the way that hospitals in Israel and Boston 
have demonstrated. 
The next chapter is a case study of the police and emergency medical response to 
the active shooter event that took place in Aurora, Colorado at the Century Theater in 
July 2012. The purpose of this chapter is to provide analysis of what procedures worked 
and which failed as police, fire, and EMS personnel converged on at the theater complex 
after being notified that an active shooter situation was underway. Law enforcement had 
to contend with an active shooter, crowd control, and perimeter security, while 
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firefighters and EMS personnel had to deal with a multitude of casualties spread out over 
a wide area at the scene of the mass shooting in Aurora. 
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V. CASE STUDY, AURORA CENTURY THEATRE MASS 
SHOOTING, JULY 20, 2012 
The past chapter described the systematic Israeli trauma method for treating 
victims of terror attacks. The current chapter is the first of three case studies on recent 
mass casualty events in the United States. It will examine the response of public safety 
agencies to the mass murder incident that took place at the Century Theater in Aurora, 
Colorado in July 2012. The Century Theater incident necessitated a massive law 
enforcement and emergency medical service response to a fluid active shooter scene in 
which dozens of people were injured. This was a complex situation in which medical aid 
was rendered in a hostile environment as the perpetrator was still on scene when police, 
fire and EMS arrived.  
A. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT 
On July 20, 2012, over 400 people were attending a midnight premier of The 
Dark Knight Rises inside cinema nine of the Century 16 movie theater complex in 
Aurora, Colorado. At approximately 12:38 a.m., a heavily armed 24-year-old man 
entered theater nine through an emergency exit door at the back of the auditorium that he 
had previously propped open. The gunman would later be identified as James E. Holmes 
of Aurora, Colorado.215 Holmes was wearing a gas mask, a ballistic helmet, and body 
armor while wielding a Smith and Wesson M & P 15 (military and police) assault rifle 
loaded with .223 caliber bullets, a Glock .40 caliber pistol, and a Remington 870 
shotgun.216 Shortly after entering the theater, Holmes tossed at least one tear gas canister 
into the crowd and then started shooting unsuspecting spectators in rapid succession.217 
Initially, some moviegoers thought the shooting was part of the show, but were soon 
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horrified to learn that assailant’s weapons were loaded with live ammunition. Starting at 
approximately 12:38 p.m. and continuing for several minutes, the assailant fired dozens 
of rounds into the crowd, striking 70 people.218 As the shooting unfolded, panicked 
victims and bystanders rushed out of the cinema nine and into the theater’s parking lots 
and lobby areas. Additional people from adjacent theaters at the complex fled outside as 
well, a factor that complicated EMS rescue efforts. The first police officers were 
dispatched at 12:39 a.m. and arrived on scene approximately 85 seconds later.219 The 
first ambulance arrived on scene at 12:43 a.m. and the first fire company at 12:45 a.m.220 
Subsequently, a large contingent of police, fire, and EMS personnel arrived at the theater 
complex. 221  First responders encountered a chaotic and frenetic scene and observed 
multiple victims at the theater complex bleeding from gunshot wounds. James Holmes 
was taken into custody just outside the theater at approximately 12:46 a.m. and did not 
resist the police officers arresting him.222 A total of 82 people were injured at the Century 
Theater incident, with 70 suffering gunshot wounds.223 Ultimately, 12 of them died, with 
the victims ranging in ages from six to 51.224 An additional 12 people were hurt while 
fleeing the shooter.225 
B. POLICE, FIRE, AND EMS RESPONSE 
Initial 911 calls from inside Century Theater nine to the Aurora Public Safety 
Communications Center were received at 12:38 a.m., which immediately dispatched 
Aurora Police, Aurora Fire Department (AFD) and Rural Metro ambulance units to the 
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scene. The first APD officers were on scene in less than two minutes,226 Rural Metro 
ambulance in five minutes,227 and AFD was on site in fewer than eight minutes.228 Police 
were tasked with apprehending the shooter, searching the area for additional suspects and 
explosive devices, and setting up a secure perimeter around the theater complex. AFD 
and Rural Metro paramedics were responsible for providing medical care to those 
wounded at the theater.  
The first shooting victim was encountered by an APD officer outside the theater 
at 12:41 a.m. 229 In the moments that followed, APD and AFD personnel came into 
contact with dozens of seriously injured people. The assailant was taken into custody at 
12:46 a.m. (eight minutes after the first 911 call), and police made entry into theater nine 
at 12:47 a.m. (eleven minutes after the first 911 calls).230 Inside theater nine, police found 
many wounded civilians, including 10 deceased victims. Many others inside were triaged 
as critical and needed immediate medical care and needed to be rushed to area hospitals. 
Police inside the theater made the first request for AFD EMS personnel inside the theater 
at 12:48 a.m. When this assistance did not materialize, APD made several follow-up calls 
for assistance. These requests for EMS assistance inside the theater went unanswered for 
an extended period. Due to confusion concerning scene safety, AFD paramedics did not 
enter theater nine until approximately 1:14 a.m., which was 36 minutes after the first 911 
call reporting the shooting.231 By this time, the only victims remaining inside the theater 
were those who had already died. At 1:16 p.m., AFD paramedics conducted a secondary 
triage of the 10 deceased victims inside the theater and confirmed the initial assessments 
of these victims, which was conducted by APD.232  
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Although a total of 82 people were injured at the Century Theater incident,233 the 
Arapahoe District Attorney is only charging the assailant, James E. Holmes, with 
harming 75 people, including 12 homicides. 234  A probable explanation of this 
discrepancy is that Holmes is being charged for crimes against those people who he most 
severely wounded.  
Seventy victims sustained gunshot wounds with severity ranging from superficial 
to fatal. According to AFD and Rural Metro paramedics and medical directors, victims 
who died suffered wounds that were “non survivable,” 235  meaning that even with 
immediate EMS care, they would have succumbed. Another 43 victims had life threating 
injuries and were in danger of bleeding to death from internal lacerations, extremity 
wounds, or both.236 Twenty-one of these 43 were assessed as critical by first responders 
and hospitals and required emergency surgery at the hospitals. An additional 22 patients 
were triaged with wounds that were categorized as “gunshot wounds/complex,” which 
means they had wounds to more than one anatomical organ system and required 
immediate medical attention.237 Those most seriously wounded would, in all likelihood, 
have succumbed to hemorrhaging if they were not rescued and transported to hospitals 
within a finite amount of time. Table 3, excerpted from the TriData after action report, 
provides a breakdown of types of injuries and number of persons afflicted in the Century 
Theater shooting:238 
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*75 reflects the number of people who were most seriously wounded in the attack. It is also the number of 
people that James E. Holmes is charged with injuring. 
Table 3.   Patient Type and Severity239 
Ambulances from Rural Metro and Denver Health, under the direction of AFD, 
were responsible for transporting the wounded at the Century Theater shooting to 
hospitals. Twenty-four ambulances responded to the Century Theater shootings. 240 
However, ambulances and EMS personnel were unable to provide care to many of those 
wounded due to several factors: concerns about scene safety, inability to maneuver 
ambulances through the congested parking lots adjacent to the theater, and confusion as 
to where many victims were located. In fact, only 12 ambulances were used to transport 
victims to hospitals, and in most cases, ambulances only took one victim per trip.241 
Ambulances transported 20 victims to hospitals, many of whom were in critical 
condition. APD transported 27 victims to hospitals, and 25 of whom were triaged with a 
“red” classification, meaning they were gravely injured. 242  In all probability, these 
victims would not had survived if police and fire officials not made a quick decision to 
deviate from existing protocols, which under ordinary circumstances would have 
prohibited police from transporting casualties. Doctors who treated these patients stated 
that many of them would have died if they had not been expedited to hospitals for 
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definitive care.243 An APD SWAT team paramedic medic also factored heavily into the 
positive outcome of the emergency response. This medic was able to triage victims inside 
theater nine and ensure that several critical patients were expedited to hospitals.244 This 
should serve as an exemplar of a military TCCC protocol applied in a civilian emergency 
medical situation.   
Eighteen survivors had gunshot wounds categorized as soft tissue wounds, which 
were not deemed to be life threatening. Another 14 victims had orthopedic or chemical-
induced ailments, the latter of which was likely from the tear gas dispersed inside the 
theater by the assailant.245 Table 4 provides a list of the numbers of victims who were 
triaged and transported to one of six Aurora hospitals. 
 
 
Table 4.   Triaged, Treated, and Transported246  
The first police officers were on scene just after 12:40 a.m.,247 ambulances at 
12:43 a.m.,248 and fire personnel at 12:45 a.m.,249 and APD made the first “contact” with 
a victim on the street outside theater at 12:42 (four minutes into the incident).250 The 
assailant was taken into custody at 12:46 a.m.,251 and police made entry into theater nine 
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at 12:47 a.m., 252  and shortly thereafter requested medical assistance for numerous 
victims.253 APD cleared the all of the 16 auditoriums at the theater complex by 12:55 
a.m. (17 minutes after the first 911 calls), but this was not readily apparent to AFD 
personnel at the scene due to communication problems. 254  In addition, emergency 
medical response to the Century City cinema was hampered by vehicular traffic, 1,200 
panicked moviegoers, and disjointed communications between police and fire officials. 
Scores of wounded victims were scattered in eight different geographic locations spread 
out over a wide area, including one inside theatre nine.255 The other seven were scattered 
in a group of locations outside the theater complex: near the front entrance of the theater 
to the northwest; in the parking lot in front of Dillard’s department store over 500 feet 
from the entrance of the theater; at the immediate northwest side of the theater; at the 
immediate northeast side of the theater; at the intersection of Sable Boulevard and 
Exposition Avenue—over 700 feet southeast from the rear of the theater); at the 
intersection of Sable Boulevard and Centrepoint Drive over 900 feet from the rear 
northeast of the theater; and on Alameda Avenue—over 1100 feet from the north side of 
the theater.256 Triage sites were established by first responders at each of these locations. 
Ambulances had difficulty navigating through the parking lot of the theater 
because it heavily congested with parked police cars, civilian vehicles, and 1,200 
pedestrians.257 This created a perilous situation for those wounded that were still inside 
the secure perimeter because it delayed initial medical treatment to many of the victims. 
As a consequence of ambulance immobility, APD officers, rather than AFD paramedics, 
had to treat many of the victims. This was problematic because the majority of APDs 
officers had limited training in treating trauma victims and were not supplied with 
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medical supplies.258 Nevertheless, APD officers worked earnestly to provide first aid at 
the scene.  
At 12:48 a.m., APD officers were ordered by one of their supervisors to start 
moving victims out of the theater nine’s auditorium.259 Also at 12:48 a.m., APD initiated 
their first victim transport from an exterior location outside the theater complex.260 Other 
patients were triaged by AFD paramedics at several locations outside the theater and 
were subsequently transported by Rural Metro ambulances to area hospitals. During this 
time, police officers located a group of 10 seriously wounded victims at the rear exterior 
of the theater that had not been previously located by first responders. Apparently, in the 
mayhem ensuing outside the theater, this group had somehow been overlooked. APD 
officers advised their dispatchers persistently over the course of the next seven minutes 
that they needed medical assistance for multiple victims at the rear of the theater. 
However, most EMS personnel did not come to this location due to communications 
breakdowns and the inability of ambulances to navigate to this area due to vehicular and 
pedestrian congestion.261 An AFD paramedic who had made his way to the exterior rear 
of the theater told a police lieutenant that he did not think ambulances could access 
patients at that location because a clear path was blocked by vehicles and pedestrians.262 
At 12:54 a.m., APD and AFD officials made a joint decision to load multiple victims into 
police cars for transport to area hospitals. Although this was a deviation from established 
departmental procedures, police and fire commanders at the scene jointly agreed to 
authorize officers to drive the wounded to medical facilities in police cars.263 The reason 
this made sense is that police cars, which are smaller and more maneuverable than 
ambulances, were able to make their way through the congestion surrounding the theater 
complex. This was not optimal because the majority of APDs officers had limited 
                                                 
258 Ibid., 17.  
259 Ibid., 145.  
260 Ibid.  
261 Crummy, and llescas, “Aurora Theatre Shooting Report Shows Delays.”  
262 Ibid.  
263 Ibid.  
 73 
training in treating trauma victims and were not equipped with medical supplies.264 
Nevertheless, APD officers worked earnestly to provide first aid at the scene, and their 
patrol cars were able to maneuver through narrow spaces in the parking lots areas where 
ambulances and fire trucks were unable to drive. One APD officer alone made four trips 
from the Century Theater complex to the hospital with victims.265  
According to the TriData after action report on the Century Theater shooting, 
APD transported between 27 and 28 victims to hospitals, ambulances took 20, and 
another 13 to 14 victims were driven in privately owned vehicles. 266  Below is a 




Table 5.   Modes of Transportation for Victims267 
Getting medical assistance to casualties inside theater nine proved to be one of the 
more problematic aspects of the public safety response to the Century Theater incident. 
APD made an initial request for victim medical assistance inside theater nine at 12:47 
a.m. (19 minutes after the first 911 call).268 APD made follow up requests for medical  
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assistance inside theater nine at 12:50 a.m.,269 12:54 a.m.270 and at 12:58 a.m.271 At 1:13 
a.m., an Aurora Public Safety Communications dispatcher notified AFD command that 
an APD lieutenant was requesting paramedics at the front of the theater. 272  At 
approximately 1:14 a.m., 36 minutes after gunshots were reported, AFD paramedics 
entered theater nine for the first time.273 At this juncture, the only remaining victims 
inside the theater were those that were deceased.274 AFD paramedics subsequently re-
triaged the 10 victims inside theater nine, and confirmed the grim initial assessment 
(conducted by APD officers) that these individuals were dead.275 Post event analysis 
conducted by the Tridata Corporation, which included interviews of paramedics, EMS 
medical directors, attending physicians at Aurora hospitals, and coroner’s office staff, 
indicates that none of the fatalities could have been saved by EMS due to the devastating 
nature of their injuries.276 However, 36 minutes from the first 911 call to EMS personnel 
entry into theater nine was an inordinate period of time for paramedics to enter theater 
nine. This delay placed AFD officers, most of whom had limited training and first aid 
equipment, in the role of primary medical caregiver to multiple victims during the 
incident. The public safety agency response was sufficient for this particular crisis, but it 
could have resulted in adverse consequences had there been additional casualties. Given 
the number of weapons and amount of ammunition of which James Holmes was in 
possession, the latter would have been easily attainable.277 However, Holmes’ assault 
rifle malfunctioned, and he was unable to fire all of the ammunition he had in his 
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possession before police arrived at the theater.278 At the time James Holmes was arrested 
by Aurora police officers, he was reported to be carrying over 200 rounds of unspent 
ammunition, and could he could have undoubtedly harmed a great many more people.279  
It is important to note that Aurora firefighters, along with Rural Metro and Denver 
Health ambulance personnel, worked diligently to triage and treat those victims that they 
could access outside the theater complex. There were a total of 24 ambulances on 
scene.280 The first ambulance transport took place at 12:57 a.m., followed by 11 other 
ambulance transports, with the last patient being cleared from the scene at 1:33 a.m.281 In 
all, AFD triaged 100 people at the theater complex, many of whom were seriously 
wounded. 282 APD, Rural Metro, and Denver Health transported all critically injured 
victims to hospitals within 52 minutes after the first 911 calls.283 
As referenced earlier in this chapter, prior to the Century Theater shooting 
incident, most APD officers did not have any advanced training in trauma care and were 
not equipped with any medical supplies.284 This placed them at a disadvantage when 
trying to provide aid to those wounded at the theater complex. As a result of the shooting 
and in anticipation of future mass casualty incidents, APD officers now receive training 
in hemorrhage control techniques based on the U.S. military’s TCCC methodology.285 
APD and AFD have also developed a joint high risk extraction protocol (HREP) for any 
future mass casualty events.286 In the HREP, firefighters will enter warm zones under 
police escort to treat casualties. The HREP appears to be a version of the Arlington 
County Rescue Task Force model. 
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The Century Theater complex is within close proximity to six trauma centers, 
which was also a significant survivability factor. It meant that victims received definitive 
medical care within minutes of being evacuated from Century Theater. Most of the 
shooting victims went to the Medical Center of Aurora or the University of Colorado 
Hospital, which are located within three miles of the theater.  
In scenarios where transport distances are longer than just a few miles, victims 
suffering from traumatic injuries in terrorist attacks will need expert emergency care 
while in transit and this care may best be provided by paramedics in ambulances. 
However, in circumstances where ambulances are not available, police vehicles can and 
be used, as was the case in Aurora. However, it is optimal to have paramedics or police 
officers trained in trauma care ride in these cars to administer first aid. A TECC-type 
rescue task force would have been able to enter theater nine to administer medical care to 
patients immediately after APD officers concluded their cursory sweep. The rescue task 
force model also ensures an integrated police and fire response to active shooter and mass 
casualty incidents. 
C. HOSPITAL RESPONSE 
The University of Colorado Hospital (UCH) received the highest number of 
victims, receiving 23 for definitive care. Another 21 victims were transported to the 
Medical Center of Aurora (TMCA), six to Children’s Hospital, and five went to Denver 
Medical Health (DMH). 287  Swedish Medical Center (SMC) and Parker Adventist 
Hospital also treated victims.288 The staff on duty at University of Colorado Hospital on 
the night of the shootings noted that all but three of the 23 victims they received arrived 
via police cars.289 One emergency room doctor described observing gunshot wounds that 
looked like something she expected could only happen in a “war zone” because patients 
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were struck by large caliber bullets that caused extensive injuries to their torsos, limbs, 
and heads.290 
The chairman of the department of emergency medicine at the University of 
Colorado described multiple victims arriving at the facility’s emergency department (ED) 
simultaneously. Officials at the hospital activated a mass casualty alert and an 
announcement was broadcast throughout the hospital. Physicians, nurses, and medical 
technicians from other departments subsequently reported to the ED in a coordinated 
effort to perform triage and surgeries for the shooting victims;291 hospital custodians 
were recruited to assist as well.292  
Hospital staffs were well prepared to handle casualties from the Century Theater 
shooting. According to Dr. Comilla Sasson, one of the attending emergency room 
physicians at the UCH, “Everyone who had a pulse while being transported to the 
hospital is alive today.”293 Medical personnel at Aurora hospitals were able to save the 
lives of multiple victims, including those that arrived at the hospital in “code red” 
condition.294 Code red is a triage classification that EMS personnel use to assess patients 
who are in grave danger of expiring due to respiratory and cardiac failure.295 These “red” 
classified patients would have died had they not received immediate medical treatment on 
scene followed expert trauma care at the hospitals. 
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D. PREVIOUS TRAINING AND EXERCISES 
The staff at Aurora area hospitals trained and prepared for mass casualty events. 
According to Aurora trauma physicians, hospitals in the Denver area changed their 
response protocols after the Columbine High School massacre and the September 11 
terror attacks.296 Mass casualty events such as these led hospital leaders to realize that the 
existing procedures, which allowed for the treatment of relatively small numbers of 
patients at one time, were inadequate for mass casualty incidents. A paradigm change 
involved improved training and increased emergency room capacity for mass casualty 
events. For example, UCH holds monthly drills in which hospital personnel train and 
prepare their responses to atypical, high volume casualty events, such as bombings and 
active shootings. 297  This training readies medical professionals for highly stressful, 
resource intensive situations involving multiple victims who suffer from life threatening 
injuries.298  
Prior to the Century Theater shooting, public safety officials in Aurora also 
participated in large-scale training exercises. In 2010, 2011, and 2012, APD and AFD 
collaborated with officials from Aurora’s school district to conduct active shooter drills 
that were centered on school campus-based scenarios and athletic events. 299  In 
September 2011, 100 public safety agencies in Denver’s metropolitan area, which 
includes Aurora, participated in a day long, full scale exercise designed to assess the law 
enforcement, fire service, and emergency medical community’s capacity to respond to 
and mitigate a “Mumbai-style terrorist attack,” should one ever occur in the Colorado 
North Central Region (NCR). In November 2008, a series of well-coordinated terrorist 
attacks took place in Mumbai, India over a three-day period in which 166 people were 
killed and over 300 more were wounded. 300  This NCR exercise, dubbed Operation 
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Mountain Guardian (OMG), involved a series of coordinated mock attacks at locations 
throughout the Denver area. One of the venues was the Community College of Aurora 
where a simulated terrorist bombing took place in which multiple people were killed or 
wounded. 301  Various entities from Aurora participated, including Aurora dispatch, 
police, fire, and Rural Metro Ambulance. After OMG concluded, a summary report was 
issued that detailed several aspects of mass casualty incident response protocols in need 
of improvement, such as communications and triage/pre-hospital treatment.302  
E. ANALYSIS  
In Aurora, despite the difficulties encountered by first responders in reaching 
many of the wounded, fire and police officials demonstrated keen initiative by making a 
snap decision to break existing regulations: police officers transported wounded to 
hospitals in their cars when ambulances were unable to do so. This was done to prevent 
victims of the shooting from bleeding to death on scene, as exsanguination can occur in 
as little as two to three minutes without medical intervention.303 It is evident that the 
police transports saved the lives of at least at least 25 people who were in critical 
condition (those classified as triage “reds”).304 Though this was effective, it was not ideal 
because while victims were in the police cars they did not receive medical treatment. The 
speed of transportation to hospitals is why this improvisation worked. The average time 
of transports in police vehicles was approximately four minutes and fifty-three 
seconds.305 Although more than 20 ambulances were on scene at the incident, only 12 
transported patients to hospitals, and in most instances, ambulances that made transports 
were not filled to capacity.306 
                                                 
301 Colorado North Central Region, Executive Summary, Operation Mountain Guardian (2010) Exercise and 
Training Series (Centennial, CO: North Central All-Hazards Region, 2011), https://www.denvergov.org/Portals/428/
documents/OMG%20Executive%20Summary%20Public%20Release.pdf, 12. 
302 Ibid.  
303 Iselin, and Smith, “Arlington County, VA Task Force.”  
304 TriData Division System Planning Corporation, Aurora Century 16 Theater Shooting, 57.  
305 Aurora Fire Department. Century Theatre Shooting, 8–10.   
306 Ibid.  
 80 
The optimal EMS response to the Century Theater shooting would have been for 
the victims of the shooting to be triaged on scene by a TECC rescue task force, consisting 
of teams of paramedics and police officers, and then placed in ambulances where they 
could continue receive medical attention from paramedics while in transit to the hospital. 
This could have been accomplished by paramedics equipped with ballistic body armor 
and helmets working in unison with police as part of a rescue task force, entering Century 
Theater nine at 12:47 a.m. after police had cleared and secured it of any additional threat. 
In actuality, AFD paramedics waited outside until approximately 1:14 a.m., 36 minutes 
after gunshots were first reported.307 
Another benefit to ambulatory transport is that upon arrival at the hospital, 
paramedics can fully apprise emergency department personnel of each patient’s triage 
status. However, in large-scale casualty incidents, police cars may be used to expedite 
casualties from the point of injury to hospitals because it is vital that victims get to 
definitive care as quickly as possible. The combined efforts of APD, AFD, and Rural 
Metro ambulance saved the lives of 43 seriously injured victims. Other jurisdictions in 
the U.S. can learn from the Century Theater shooting in Aurora to better coordinate 
police and fire department resources to mass casualty events through the use of TECC 
rescue task forces. They should also should plan on utilizing police vehicles to transport 
victims when ambulances are unavailable; however, to better address victim’s injuries, 
paramedics should also ride in the vehicle to render medical attention. 
The outcome of the Century Theater shooting could have been far worse if 
victims had not been rushed to hospitals in police cars, or if there had been more than a 
lone perpetrator. The shooting involved just one assailant, who surrendered within 
minutes to police without offering any resistance; however, the actions of this one 
assailant wreaked havoc on the community and public safety agencies in Aurora. If the 
incident at Century Theater had involved multiple attackers, the results would have 
undoubtedly resulted in more casualties and greater confusion at the scene.  
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Aurora teaches us that TECC rescue task forces consisting of police and fire 
personnel are necessary to provide a joint EMS-law enforcement response to mass 
casualty incidents. This is critical to get medical aid victims of active shooter incidents 
quickly. The placement of paramedics on standby for inordinate periods of time at mass 
casualty events is an antiquated practice that is detrimental to victims. It is vital that first 
responders have capabilities to provide rapid, unimpeded transport from the point of 
injury to the hospital. The EMS response to Aurora was successful because TECC 
concepts, such as rapid on-scene medical care and rapid evacuation to hospitals, were 
effected. However, because public safety agencies in Aurora did not have a TECC rescue 
task force program in place at the time of the shootings, there were delays in getting 
medical care to the wounded. The ideal response at Century Theater would have been for 
the victims of the shooting to be triaged on scene by rescue task force paramedics, then 
transferred in ambulances where they could receive medical attention from paramedics 
during the drive to the hospital. Another benefit to ambulatory transport is that once they 
arrive at the hospital, paramedics can fully apprise emergency department doctors, 
nurses, and technicians of each patient’s status.  
Although expedited transport was imperative in this situation, victims continued 
to lose large quantities of blood during the drive to the hospital,308 and had the distance 
to the hospitals been greater than it was in Aurora, some would have likely exsanguinated 
before receiving definitive medical care. However, transportation by police is also a 
viable option when ambulances are unavailable. The key to saving victims of gunshot 
wounds and IEDs is to get them triaged on scene to stop bleeding and then expedited to 
the hospital as quickly as possible. TECC rescue task forces or high-risk extraction 
protocols, the latter of which is which is being implemented by APD and AFD (post-
Century Theater shooting), are necessary to deliver emergency medical services at mass 
casualty events. 
Another lesson learned from the Century Theater shooting incident is that 
communities can plan and train for mass casualty events. Training and exercises enhance 
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first responders’ abilities to provide casualty care to multiple casualties under adverse 
conditions. APD and AFD benefited from active shooter training, and Aurora hospital 
professionals proved themselves to be well prepared to treat victims of the massacre. On 
a cautionary note, if there had been additional assailants or more victims at Century 
Theater, the outcome could have been worse. 
The next chapter will detail the emergency medical response to Boston Marathon 
bombings in April 2013, which represented the largest terrorist event, in terms of the 
number of casualties, on U.S soil since the September 11 hijackings. The Boston 
Marathon bombing is unique because firefighters, EMS personnel, doctors, and nurses 
were prepositioned in the area in which two improvised explosive devices were 
detonated. First responders and hospitals used lessons learned from the U.S. military and 
Israel to save the lives scores of victims of the marathon bombings. 
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VI. CASE STUDY, BOSTON MARATHON BOMBINGS,  
APRIL 15, 2013 
We in Boston have taken many lessons from our surgical colleagues 
treating the war injured and have learned that timely and effective 
interventions can be strung together along the chain of transport to provide 
excellent care.309  
—Doctors at Brigham and Women’s Hospital 
 after the Boston Marathon Bombings. 
The previous case study was on the July 2012 shooting that took place in Aurora, 
Colorado. This event demonstrates the need for TECC rescue task forces at mass casualty 
events. The Aurora case study also shows how well trained and prepared hospital staffs 
can have a significantly positive impact on victim survivability at mass casualty 
occurrences. The Boston Marathon bombing case study that comprises this chapter shows 
the advantages of an effective integrated public safety response a mass casualty incident. 
A. DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT  
On April 15, 2013, at 2:49 p.m., two homemade bombs detonated near the finish 
line of the Boston Marathon within 12 seconds and 550 feet of each other.310 These 
improvised explosive devices were pieced together from pressure cookers, black powder 
explosives,311 nails, metal fragments, and pellets.312 The initial scene was one of chaos 
and confusion with scores of grievously wounded spectators lying helplessly on the 
ground while others moved about dazed in search of medical assistance. Many yelled out 
in agony. It was readily apparent that some people did not survive the blasts while many 
others who were bleeding profusely were in grave danger of dying. Over a dozen victims 
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had severed legs while the remainder suffered from a combination of internal trauma, 
burns, and shrapnel wounds.313  
In the moments after the blasts, multitudes of emergency medical personnel and 
police officers already prepositioned at various locations along the racecourse 
immediately mobilized and aided the wounded.314 A considerable number of bystanders 
also rushed to the sides of the stricken to assist with first aid.315 Rescuers sought out 
those in most obvious need of assistance. At 3 p.m., Boston firefighters located two badly 
injured children among the dozens of victims on Boylston Street. These children were 
eight-year old Martin Richard and his seven-year old sister Jane. Tragically, Martin did 
not exhibit any signs of life and was deemed by first responders to be beyond 
resuscitation. However, Jane was still alive, though her condition was rapidly 
deteriorating due to multiple injuries that included the traumatic amputation of her left 
leg below the knee, which resulted in uncontrollable bleeding.316 One of the firefighters 
lifted Jane and summoned a passing ambulance in an effort to get her to the hospital 
before she exsanguinated. The ambulance was already filled to capacity, but the vehicle’s 
crew made room for Jane and sped her to Boston Children’s Hospital. 317  During 
transport, paramedics quickly affixed a tourniquet to her leg, which prevented further 
blood loss and likely prevented her from exsanguinating. 318  It is noteworthy that 
tourniquet use is one of the tenets of both TCCC and TECC doctrines. Once she arrived 
at the hospital, doctors there were able to conduct a series of surgical interventions to 
save her life.319 This is just one example of the many instances of victims being rescued 
by expert medical aid and prompt transport to hospitals in the aftermath of the bombings.  
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A total of 264 people were injured and three were killed in the Boston Marathon 
blasts.320 There could have likely been many more fatalities. However, many of those 
seriously wounded were saved because Boston emergency teams and hospitals had 
previously studied exemplars of emergency medical responses to mass casualty events 
from around the globe.  
B. POLICE, FIRE, AND EMS RESPONSE 
Boston’s police officers, firefighters, and EMS personnel were already 
performing marathon race day duties—crowd control and first aid administration to 
runners—when the bombs exploded. In the moments after the blasts, these rescuers 
navigated the scene and assisted the wounded without hesitation. Because the bombs had 
been placed on the ground, many spectators sustained severe lower extremity wounds 
such as amputated or maimed legs. Others suffered from shrapnel penetrations, burns, 
and barotrauma,321 the latter of which consisted mainly of lung, ear, and gastrointestinal 
damage caused by the blasts’ shock waves.322 Many victims bled profusely from their 
injuries, presenting a problem for emergency medical personnel that needed to be 
managed posthaste. To prevent exsanguination, first responders used tourniquets, and 
bandage applications with direct pressure (e.g., hands placed directly onto wounds) to 
control hemorrhaging. Some of the tourniquets were professionally manufactured devices 
carried by Boston EMS technicians, while others were improvised from belts or pieces of 
clothing.323 It was readily apparent that survivors needed to be transported to hospitals 
without delay, and first responders worked diligently to expedite them from the disaster 
site to Boston trauma centers. 
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First responders also collaborated to triage and identify the most seriously 
wounded people, prioritizing those with life-threatening injuries. 324  Some EMS 
personnel used indelible markers to write the letter “T” and a time on the foreheads of 
victims on whom tourniquets were affixed to let physicians know so that they could 
loosen or re-apply the tourniquets at the hospital.325 This is a concept taken from TCCC. 
Ambulances were used to bring the most serious casualties to level 1 trauma centers and 
other medical facilities. 326 When ambulance resources were exhausted, victims were 
loaded into police cars and were taken to hospitals.327 While this is not typical or ideal, it 
is necessary to utilize alternate vehicles when ambulance resources are stretched beyond 
normal operating capacity during mass casualty events. 
A large medical tent staffed with a full contingent of physicians, nurses, and 
paramedics had been set up in Copley Square near finish line for race participant first aid. 
Soon after the blasts, the tent was converted to a triage area for the wounded. Health care 
professionals working at the tent used their skills to help treat people suffering from poly-
traumatic injuries by helping EMS apply tourniquets and affix splints to broken bones.328 
The presence of physicians, nurses, and medical supplies near the bombing site was 
fortunate and proved beneficial to the casualty care efforts in the wake of the bombings. 
All of the most seriously wounded patients received stabilizing treatment at the 
scene and were then expedited to hospitals within twenty-two minutes of the 
explosions.329 The prompt and expert medical attention of first responders at the points of 
injury resulted in lives being saved. There was a direct correlation between the 
emergency medical response to the Boston Marathon bombings, tactical combat casualty 
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care, and the Israeli hospital system.330 Had it not been for lessons learned from the U.S. 
military and Israeli trauma surgeons over the course of the past decade, the mortality rate 
of the bombings would have been far greater.  
C. HOSPITAL RESPONSE 
The first patients started arriving at Massachusetts General Hospital at 3:04 p.m. 
and at Brigham and Women’s Hospital at 3:08 p.m.331 Some of the trauma surgeons at 
these facilities stated that had any time been wasted in getting victims to emergency 
rooms, they would not have survived.332 Brigham and Women’s took in multiple patients 
and eventually received almost 40 bombing victims-the most of any hospital.333 The first 
patient undergo surgery was a man who had a leg severed in the attack and had lost a 
great deal of blood. He was treated on the scene by EMS technicians with a tourniquet 
and had another tourniquet applied at the emergency department by hospital personnel; 
he subsequently went into the operating room just 35 minutes after he was injured.334 
Table 6 is a breakdown of the numbers of seriously wounded victims treated at each level 
1 trauma center in Boston: 
 
Level 1 Trauma Center Number of Patients Treated 
Brigham and Women’s Hospital 38 
Massachusetts General Hospital  37 
Boston Medical Center  29 
Tufts Medical Center 28 
Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center  24 
Boston Children’s Hospital 8 
Table 6.   Patients Treated at Level 1 Trauma Centers in Boston335 
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Some victims who sustained non-life threating injuries, such as hearing loss and 
superficial contusions from blast and shrapnel,336 were treated at St. Elizabeth’s Medical 
Center, Carney Hospital, and the Faulkner Hospital.337 These facilities are not verified 
level 1 trauma centers by the American College of Surgeons but nonetheless have 
emergency departments capable of treating mass casualties. 
Upon notification of the bombings and of large numbers of incoming casualties, 
hospitals in Boston cleared out their emergency rooms and postponed elective medical 
procedures to make room for those seriously wounded.338 As patients arrived, surgeons 
triaged them to ensure that those in greatest need of medical care were treated first.339 In 
some cases, doctors re-applied tourniquets to ensure that hemorrhaging did not 
resume.340 As a precautionary measure, patients arriving from the bombing site were 
searched for hidden explosive devices before they entered the emergency department,341 
a practice derived from Israeli hospitals. 
In one seemingly miraculous event, a female patient arrived at Massachusetts 
General Hospital (MGH) without any blood pressure, as she had lost virtually all of her 
body’s blood supply. Physicians gave her blood transfusions and were able to revive her 
in large part because of the swiftness in which she was taken from the bombing site to the 
hospital.342 Dr. Alistair Conn, director of emergency services at MGH stated, “If these 
victims had spent even a few more minutes at the scene they would not be alive 
today.” 343  The astute observation by Dr. Conn emphasizes the need to get victims 
suffering from hemorrhaging injuries to a medical facility as quickly as possible so that 
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doctors can surgically repair damaged limbs and internal organs. Using another lesson 
learned from TCCC, Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center staff used indelible pens to 
write directly onto the chest of each marathon bombing victim, which is a means of 
denoting exactly what type of injuries each victim had and what type of treatment plan 
was needed resolve them. 344 Hospital staffs also had to administer intravenous fluid 
resuscitations to patients who experienced significant blood loss and shock.345 The highly 
successful hospital community response in this event may be directly attributed to Israeli 
best practices in trauma treatment. 
D. AFTER ACTION REVIEWS 
During the bombing close to 300 people were hurt, but just three were killed. As 
Dr. Arthur Kellerman points out, this mortality rate represents just one percent of those 
injured.346 164 of the most seriously wounded were taken to level 1 trauma centers in 
Boston, including Massachusetts General and Brigham and Women’s.347 As a result of 
knowledge passed on from Israel, these hospitals were poised to treat large numbers those 
injured in the Boston Marathon bombings. 
Over 40 people suffered serious leg injuries, including 16 whose legs were 
severed or required surgical amputations at the hospital; 348  some lost both of their 
legs.349 Many, if not all of these individuals were saved because EMS and bystanders 
used tourniquets and other means, such as applying direct pressure to wounds to prevent 
them from bleeding to death. Another critical determinant in survivability was the ability 
of EMS to expedite the wounded to hospitals.350 
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All of the wounded who showed vital signs when admitted to hospitals ultimately 
survived the blasts. The three fatalities likely died near-instantaneously and could not 
have been saved due to the catastrophic nature of their injuries.351 The police, EMS, and 
bystander response demonstrated that lessons from the American military community 
serving in Iraq and Afghanistan have made their way to the U.S. civilian emergency 
medical community.352 Although Boston did not have a TECC rescue task force in place 
at the time of the bombings, the integrated response and of police and EMS personnel at 
the scene very closely resembled the TECC rescue task force approach. 
Doctors at Brigham and Women’s, which treated the highest number of survivors 
of all of the hospitals,353 stated that the initial triage and treatment at the scene of the 
bombings provided by first responders was a major factor in saving lives. Another facet 
was rapid transport from the scene of the bombings to hospitals. 354 Boston hospital 
officials cited lessons learned from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Israel as playing major roles in 
the successful medical outcome of the bombings.355 Boston EMS and medical trauma 
professionals know that in the immediate aftermath of a mass casualty incident, it is 
crucial to stop victims from bleeding and rush them to the hospital. EMS used tourniquets 
and hemostatic agents, along with any other means available (e.g., hands pressed tightly 
on wounds) to apply direct pressure to stop any type of extremity hemorrhaging. Some of 
the internal injuries were treated initially with tranexamic acid (TXA), a medication that 
may slow or stop bleeding and can increase chances of survivability of trauma victims.356 
Upon arrival at emergency rooms, trauma victims were evaluated and expedited into 
surgery.357 All of these components of the rescue effort helped save numerous lives.  
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E. PREVIOUS TRAINING AND EXERCISES 
In the years preceding the 2013 Boston Marathon, hospital officials and public 
safety personnel engaged in extensive planning and preparations in anticipation of mass 
casualty events. In the wake of the 9–11 attacks, some trauma specialists in Boston, such 
as Dr. Alisdair Conn, Director of Emergency Services at MGH, came to the realization 
that area emergency rooms were only capable of treating relatively low numbers of mass 
casualties of no more than three to five at a time. Any disaster generating a greater 
number of casualties would be problematic for hospitals to manage. Subsequently, Dr. 
Conn and his associates consulted emergency medical experts in Israel who had gained 
experience in treating large numbers of casualties after suicide bombings and other 
terrorist attacks.358 Starting in 2005, medical experts from Tel Aviv Medical Center made 
the first of several trips to Massachusetts General and other Boston hospitals with the 
stated purpose of teaching hospital staff how to treat large numbers of mass casualties.359 
The focus of this training was on triage treatment on injuries typically seen after the 
detonation of improvised explosive devices.360 Lessons on mass casualty trauma care 
learned from Israel are credited with saving the lives of many of those wounded in the 
marathon bombings.361 
In addition to the instruction hospital staffs received from Israeli medical experts 
on how to treat mass casualties, public safety, and health officials from Boston 
participated in several large scale training exercises.362 In 2009, some 750 emergency 
medicine professionals in Boston had the opportunity to attend the “Tale of Our Cities” 
conference, hosted by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). This 
symposium featured lecturers (mainly physicians) from Israel, the United Kingdom, and 
India, who related their experience in treating those wounded in terrorist attacks in Tel 
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Aviv, London, and Mumbai.363 And in 2011, hospital personnel in the Metro Boston 
Homeland Security Region (MBHSR) participated in Operation Falcon II—a scenario-
based exercise that sought to measure the ability of medical centers to respond to mass 
casualty events.364 
Dr. Paul Biddinger, Medical Director of Emergency Department Operations at 
Massachusetts General Hospital (MGH), who treated victims of the bombings, 365 
expounded on the import roles played by both professional first responders and 
bystanders at the scene of the Marathon blasts. 366  He described how they used 
tourniquets and the direct application of pressure to control hemorrhaging. Biddinger 
said,  
It’s actually one of the most important lessons, in the civilian medical 
community, we’ve learned from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. And, 
actually, as a result of it, the Boston EMS ambulances carry tourniquets 
just like the military tourniquets on their ambulances. They were used at 
the finish line. I have no doubt they saved lives.367  
The success in the treatment of Boston Marathon bombing victims may be directly 
attributed to the recently acquired knowledge and skills passed on from the U.S. military, 
such as the use of tourniquets combined with rapid transport to the permanent medical 
facilities.368  
Some doctors at Brigham Women’s emergency department also studied the 
emergency medical response to the Aurora, Colorado mass shooting in 2012,369 where 82 
people were wounded.370 In Aurora, large groups of survivors arrived simultaneously at 
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local hospitals, which presented logistical difficulties for emergency room personnel at 
University of Colorado Medical Center and others. Brigham and Women’s Hospital staff 
came to the realization that if such an event occurred in Boston, they would be 
underprepared. As a result of lessons learned from Aurora, Brigham and Women’s 
executive leadership bolstered their emergency response plans for treatment of victims 
for mass casualty events from four or five teams of physicians and support staff to fifteen 
teams.371 
In addition to medical training, public safety officials in Boston participated in 
several large-scale exercises. In 2011, a Joint Counterterrorism Awareness Workshop 
Series (JCTAWS) event was held in Boston. This event, hosted by the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) brought together 
200 local, state, and federal law enforcement, fire, and emergency service agencies to 
discuss and plan responses for large-scale terrorist attacks.372 In both 2011 and 2012, 
MBHSR used Department of Homeland Security grants to fund and conduct Urban 
Shield Boston, which is a 24-hour exercise in which first responders from 50 public 
safety agencies collaborated to test the effectiveness of existing protocols to respond to 
large scale emergency situations.373  
In the weeks and months leading up to the Boston Marathon, a series of meetings 
and planning events were held. One of these was particularly fortuitous: on March 14, 
Massachusetts State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) held the annual pre-marathon 
tabletop exercise.374 Participants, including representatives from local, state, and federal 
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agencies,375 were put run through several mass casualty scenarios, one of which was an 
IED attack at the Boston Marathon.376 
F. ANALYSIS OF EMERGENCY MEDICAL RESPONSE 
Lessons learned from combat medics and military trauma surgeons over the 
course of the past decade have made their way to the emergency medical community in 
Boston. Every branch of the U.S. military practices a doctrine known as tactical combat 
casualty care to treat wounded on the battlefield. The most significant contribution of 
TCCC course is the emphasis on hemorrhage control. The TCCC lessons applied at the 
marathon bombings included immediate on-site treatment of injuries, the use of 
tourniquets, and expeditious transport to trauma centers.377 It is also noteworthy that 
virtually all hospitals in Boston have medical professionals on their staffs with combat 
casualty care experience gained in Iraq or Afghanistan, and this greatly benefits the 
medical community as a whole.378 
Paramedics and medical technicians also had unobstructed access to victims 
because they were in the immediate area in which the bombs were detonated. In addition, 
ambulances had clear paths to reach and then transport victims to hospitals. The 
bombings took place within relative close proximity to Boston’s eight level 1 trauma 
centers (five adult and three children’s), which also contributed to the successful medical 
outcome of the event.379 According to the data from the American College of Surgeons 
(ACS), Boston has one of the highest apportionments of level 1 trauma centers in the 
nation; there are fewer than 150 in the entire U.S.380 To be verified as a level 1 trauma 
center, a hospital must be criteria established by the ACS including the capability of 
handling mass casualties at short notice.  
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First responders were already on scene, and the rescue effort commenced 
immediately. An estimated 264 people were treated for wounds ranging from easily 
treatable soft tissue lacerations to life threatening injuries. Additionally, 164 of the most 
seriously wounded were distributed amongst six of Boston’s eight level 1 trauma 
hospitals, while other less serious injured patients went to other area medical facilities.381 
At least 67 people were deemed to have life-threatening wounds, necessitating immediate 
definitive care.382 These victims had severe lower extremity injuries, arterial wounds, 
vascular damage, and internal injuries.383 In addition, 16 people had lower extremity 
wounds that resulted in amputations.384 Three victims died near the locations of the 
blasts, and they are believed to have died almost instantaneously on scene. No one who 
made it to the hospital showing vital signs died.385 
Although Boston did not have an established TECC rescue task force program 
instituted at the time of the bombings, the EMS response encompassed many TECC 
elements. There was virtually no delay in getting aid to casualties at the Boston marathon 
bombing sites as emergency medical personnel, first responders, and bystanders went to 
work on victims within seconds of the blasts. All critical patents were evacuated within 
22 minutes,386 and the first victim of the bombings reached a hospital within eleven 
minutes, and the most badly injured arrived within 20 to 30 minutes of the explosions.387 
The quick emergency response, followed by rapid transport to definitive care, likely 
saved at least 67 of the most critically wounded.  
Boston’s medical community is in contrast with jurisdictions where EMS 
personnel do not carry tourniquets, where regular training and drills for mass casualty 
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events do not take place, and where accessibility to level 1 trauma centers is not as 
prevalent. Public safety agencies in Boston prepared for mass casualty attacks,388 and 
prior training, drills, and exercises proved extremely useful at the Marathon bombing. 
Other jurisdictions in the U.S. should learn from the Boston by adopting best practices in 
treating mass casualties developed by the U.S. emergency medical community serving in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as from trauma surgeons from the country of Israel. These 
procedures include the emphasis of hemorrhage control, effective triage, and immediate 
transport to a hospital. The next critical phase of treatment began upon arrival at the 
emergency room, where experienced doctors evaluated patients and continued the triage 
efforts initiated by EMS in the field. Each patient was then assigned her or his own 
individual medical team to ensure that comprehensive treatment was effected.389 Another 
reason that resulted in the favorable medical outcome was that EMS had immediate 
access to victims, and they were not placed on standby by their commanders.  
Other factors weighed in favor of the first responders, such as the fact that the 
blasts did injure any police, firefighter, or EMS personnel, and none of the first aid 
stations near the finish line were damaged. The bombs were relatively crude devices 
made with low yield, black powder explosives, and they were set off outdoors, which 
likely dissipated the blasts, which resulted in fewer and less severe casualties than had 
they been detonated indoors.390 Furthermore, there were no secondary IEDs or attackers 
targeting first responders, though this is an issue that has presented problems in other 
countries and could occur in future terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. 391  Public safety 
jurisdictions in the U.S. need to prepare for more dynamic attacks in which medical 
treatment of victims is must be administered while threats still exist. A TECC rescue task 
force is the ideal approach to guarantee that medical care is rendered in volatile 
situations. 
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Even before something happened, hospital staffs in Boston had proactively sought 
knowledge about treating victims of bombings and other mass casualty events from 
medical experts in Israel. They were taught how to clear out emergency rooms after mass 
casualty events by postponing elective medical procedure and how to effectively triage 
multiple victims. They also learned the importance of having dedicated medical teams 
assigned to each patient.392 
After the bombs exploded and the smoke began to clear, professional first 
responders and bystanders (many of whom are military veterans of the Iraqi and 
Afghanistan campaigns) mobilized to treat victims and then worked expeditiously 
transport survivors to area hospitals.393 EMS personnel had unfettered access to victims, 
and police ensured roadways were kept clear for survivors of the bombings to be 
expedited to hospitals.394 Such unrestricted access of EMS personnel to the wounded 
without delay is one of the primary tenets of TECC rescue task force methodology. 
Although Boston did not have a rescue task force program in place prior to the marathon 
bombings, the response between police and EMS personnel was integrated because they 
were pre-positioned along the racecourse to provide first aid to runners. The medical 
response to the Boston Marathon bombings provides an exemplar from which other 
jurisdictions can learn. The response to the Boston Marathon bombings should also be 
further studied for areas in which protocols can be improved. It is worth noting that since 
the Boston Marathon bombings, Boston EMS and police authorities have established a 
rescue task force program based on the Arlington County (Virginia) model and are now 
prepared to respond to active shooter incidents as part of integrated EMS-police teams.395 
The emergency medical response to the Boston Marathon bombings was effective 
for three primary reasons. The first was the transference of expertise and knowledge from 
the U.S. military’s tactical combat casualty care program coming out of Afghanistan and 
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Iraq. While Boston did not have a formal TECC rescue task force program prior to the 
marathon bombings, public safety agencies had embraced some TECC methodologies, 
such as the use of tourniquets to control blood loss stemming from extremity injuries. 
The second reason was that hospitals adopted Israeli from trauma protocols. Third, and 
no less important, Boston’s first responders and hospital staffs executed their duties with 
the utmost skill and proficiency. In the ensuing chapter, the emergency response to the 
active shooter event that took place at the Los Angeles International Airport in November 
2013 will be examined.  
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VII. CASE STUDY, LAX MASS SHOOTING, NOVEMBER 1, 2013 
The previous chapter appraised the emergency medical response to the Boston 
Marathon bombings. The marathon bombings resulted in the highest number of casualties 
of any terrorist attack on U.S. soil since the 9–11 hijackings and necessitated a massive 
emergency medical effort. This next chapter will delve into the public safety agency 
reaction to the LAX active shooter event that transpired on November 1, 2013 with the 
purpose of evaluating the emergency medical response to this incident.  
A. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT 
On Friday, November 1, 2013 at 9:18 a.m., a 24-year old individual named Paul 
Ciancia walked into Terminal 3 at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) carrying a 
duffel bag concealing an Smith and Wesson M & P 15 assault rifle,396 five 30-round 
magazines and hundreds of additional bullets contained in boxes.397 At approximately 
9:20 a.m., Ciancia removed the rifle from his duffel bag and began shooting at TSA 
officers and passengers inside the terminal. 398  TSA officer Gerardo Hernandez was 
struck by 12 .223 caliber bullets from Ciancia’s weapon.399 Ciancia also shot two more 
TSA officers—James Speer and Tony Grigsby—and a traveler named Brian Ludmer.400 
Another unidentified man was injured when he jumped from the second story of the 
Terminal 3 to the ground level to escape the gunfire. At 9:20 a.m., officers from the Los 
Angeles World Airport Police Department (LAWAPD) and Los Angeles Police 
Department (LAPD) 911 centers started receiving numerous phone calls reporting a 
shooting at LAX. By 9:22 a.m., LAWAPD, LAPD, and Customs and Border Protection 
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(CBP) officers assigned to the airport coalesced into “contact teams” and rushed to 
Terminal 3 to interdict the assailant. 401  At approximately 9:25 a.m., the responding 
officers fired on, struck, and incapacitated Ciancia,402 and shortly thereafter, LAWAPD 
officers radioed their dispatchers that the perpetrator was down (in this case meaning 
injured and incapacitated) and in custody at Gate 35 of Terminal 3. 403 Police were 
concerned that there were additional assailants at large inside the airport’s terminal 
complex, so they initiated an exhaustive search. While this search was underway, some 
police officers began administering first aid to the victims of the assault. 404  Citing 
unnamed law enforcement sources, media reporters indicated Officer Hernandez awaited 
medical assistance for 33 minutes405 and laid incapacitated, bottom of an escalator in the 
general ticketing area of Terminal 3,406 only 20 feet from an airport exit while police 
searched the terminal buildings.407 During this event, LAFD paramedics were staged 
approximately 150 yards away from Hernandez’s location because they were told by 
police officials that the terminal was not safe for them to enter any of the airport 
buildings.408 According to media reports, at 10:53 a.m., police officers inside Terminal 3 
used a wheelchair to move Hernandez to the triage area located outside Terminal 2 where 
paramedics were waiting on standby. An LAFD ambulance subsequently rushed 
Hernandez to the Harborview-UCLA Medical Center, arriving at 10:15 a.m. 409 
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Paramedics, physicians, and medical support staff worked diligently but were unable 
resuscitate Hernandez, and he was pronounced dead at the hospital at 11:00 a.m.410  
B. POLICE, FIRE, AND EMS RESPONSE 
The first 911 calls were received by public safety dispatch centers at 9:20 a.m., 
and the police responded swiftly. By 9:22 a.m., teams of officers from LAWAPD, LAFD, 
and CBP made their way to Terminal 3 and engaged the assailant. At 9:25 a.m., 
LAWAPD officers notified their dispatch center that the shooter was down and in 
custody.411 Concerned that there were additional suspects, police proceeded to search the 
entire central terminal complex of the airport. 
At 9:32 a.m. PST, an incident command post (ICP) was established by LAWAPD 
at the east end of Terminal 3. LAFD officials on scene were concerned that the police 
ICP was too close to the active shooter site and decided to establish their own separate 
ICP at the east end of Terminal 2, a considerable distance away from Terminal 3.412 
LAFD officials later told the Public Safety Working Group, a committee convened after 
the shootings, that at the time of the incident, they had safety concerns about the location 
of the LAWAFD ICP because of apprehensions that there were additional active shooters 
and improvised explosive devices inside Terminal 3.413 In addition to setting up an ICP, 
LAFD established a curbside triage area outside Terminal 2.414 A large contingent of 
firefighters and paramedics assembled at this location, but incident commanders ordered 
them to stay outside the airport terminals because a search for an active shooter was 
underway inside the airport terminal building and adjacent areas.415 Communications 
were hampered by the fact that the responding public safety agencies at LAX did not set 
up a unified command post until 10:14 a.m., 46 minutes after the first shots were fired by 
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Ciancia.416 LAFD ultimately deployed over 50 vehicles, including ambulances and fire 
apparatuses to the scene.417 The first ambulance arrived at LAX at 9:35 a.m., and its crew 
was advised by LAPD officers that the situation was still “active,” meaning that a threat 
still existed inside of Terminal 3. By 9:45 a.m., dispatchers broadcasted that LAWAPD 
had declared the scene safe, and that there was a seriously injured victim still inside 
Terminal 3.418  
C. HOSPITAL RESPONSE 
The LAX shooting was not a large-scale mass casualty event and thus did not 
require hospitals in the Los Angeles area to take extraordinary measures to provide extra 
staffing or to expand their operational capabilities. A total of six victims were taken by 
Los Angeles Fire Department ambulance to level 1 trauma centers. Three victims, 
including the perpetrator of the active shooting, were transported to UCLA Medical 
Center in Los Angeles, and two patients, including TSA officer Gerardo Hernandez were 
transported to Harbor UCLA Medical Center in Torrance, California. The transport times 
ranged from 13 to 30 minutes.419 TSA officer Tony Grigsby, who was shot in the foot, 
was also treated and released from a Los Angeles area hospital.420 
All patients except one survived. The single fatality in the shooting, TSA officer 
Gerardo Hernandez, was in full cardiac arrest when police officers reached him inside of 
Terminal 3. Police officers brought Hernandez to LAFD paramedics staged at the triage 
area outside of Terminal 2. Hernandez had been struck by 12 gunshots, causing massive 
internal injuries.421 LAFD paramedics and medical staff at Harbor UCLA Medical Center 
tried to revive Hernandez but were unsuccessful. An autopsy conducted by a medical 
examiner from the County of Los Angeles Coroner’s Office determined that Hernandez 
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died from multiple gunshot wounds that caused massive internal bleeding. The medical 
examiner determined that Hernandez had been hit with 12 bullets, and located 40 separate 
bullet fragments inside his body. 422  Despite the fact the Hernandez’s prospects for 
survival were grim, the consensus of police, fire, and TSA officials was that he should 
have been rescued far sooner. All other victims were eventually treated and released.423 
This included Brian Ludmer, who remained in the hospital for several weeks after the 
shooting with a severe leg injury. 424  Table 7 illustrates the injuries and emergency 
response times for each victim. 
 
GSW= gunshot wound 
Table 7.   Injuries and Emergency Response Times for each casualty of the 
LAX active shooter incident, November 1, 2013425 
A seventh unidentified victim was triaged at the scene by LAFD for ringing in his ears but 
was not transported to a hospital due to the superficial nature of his injury.426 
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D. AFTER ACTION REVIEWS 
Officials from the Los Angeles World Airports (LAWA) and the Los Angeles 
Fire Department (LAFD) conducted their own after-action reviews of the event, and both 
determined that police and EMS integration at the scene was lacking. Even before any 
after action review of the LAX shooting had been completed, the Los Angeles Fire 
Department released a training bulletin that announced and outlined a dramatic change in 
the way the department would respond to any future tactical law enforcement situations, 
including active shooter, barricaded suspect, and hostage situations.427 The new protocol 
established in the November 2013 LAFD training bulletin states that henceforth, rescue 
task forces (RTFs) will mobilize at the scene of any tactical law enforcement occurrence 
(e.g., active shooter, hostage situation or barricaded suspect).428 These task forces are to 
consist of a minimum of two firefighters and two police officers, working in tandem, who 
will enter “warm zones” to render medical assistance to casualties. 429  RTFs can be 
expanded in size for situations requiring additional EMS and police personnel. 
According to the LAFD after action review, the first ambulances were on scene at 
LAX within six minutes of being dispatched. 430  After they arrived, LAFD incident 
commanders placed ambulances and paramedic crews on standby until police could deal 
with potential threats in Terminal 3. Police officers also had to transport victims from the 
interior of Terminal 3 to the exterior of Terminal 2, where LAFD had established their 
triage area for the site. The LAFD after action report states that Rescue 63 (one of the 
LAFD ambulance units) made “contact” with wounded TSA officer Gerardo Hernandez 
at 9:46 a.m., administered treatment on scene for seven minutes, and then transported him 
to Harbor UCLA in Torrance, California.431 Hernandez was in full cardiac arrest when 
paramedics first assessed him, and he remained in this condition during transport to the 
hospital. LAFD’s account of how long it took for paramedics to treat Hernandez is at 
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odds with media accounts of the event. According to LAFD call logs, paramedics made 
contact with Hernandez 28 minutes after the shooting started,432 not 33 minutes as news 
outlets, including NBC, reported.433 Nevertheless, there was a lengthy delay in providing 
casualty care at the LAX after the shooting. 
LAFD paramedics also treated a 54-year old male (identified in the LAFD AAR 
as Patient 1) with a gunshot wound to the chest and a 29-year old male (identified as 
Patient 2) with a bullet wound to his left leg. The perpetrator of the attack, Paul Cianci 
(identified as Patient 5) was shot by police several times, including once in the mouth. 
He, too, received medical attention from LAFD paramedics. A 44 year old man 
(identified as Patient 4) sustained unspecified life threatening injuries when he jumped 
from the second floor of the terminal. One additional individual (Patient 6) was treated 
for ringing of the ears (due to the sound of gunfire) and was released at the scene.434 
Inexplicably, LAFD’s after action report does not indicate that any medical treatment was 
administered to wounded TSA officer Tony Grigsby, age 36-years old, although the 
report does state that a total of three TSA officers were injured in the LAX shooting 
incident.  
In a memorandum to Los Angeles’ Board of Fire Commissioner’s dated June 27, 
2014, LAFD Interim Fire Chief James G. Featherstone stated, “The most significant gap 
in performance was the late ‘unification’ of LAFD and Los Angeles Police Department 
(LAPD)into a collocated Unified Command Post.” 435  Chief Featherstone stated that 
delays (such as those that transpired at the LAX shooting) could have adverse 
implications for the department’s ability to treat wounded during active shooter 
situations. To improve LAFD’s response to future mass casualty events, departmental 
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leadership enacted a tactical emergency medical support (TEMS) protocol by adopting 
the rescue task force (RTF) model.436  
E. PREVIOUS TRAINING AND EXERCISES 
According to a public safety review of security at LAX, the LAWAPD actively 
engaged in tactical training and preparations for active shooter and terrorist events prior 
to November 1, 2013. LAWAPD calls its training program “MACTAC,” which stands 
for Multi-Assault Counter Terrorism Action Capabilities. A part of MACTAC protocol 
involves officers becoming versed in military-style urban assault tactics known as close 
quarters combat (CQC). In CQC, law enforcement and military operators proactively 
seek out and engage violent perpetrators, as opposed to taking a defensive posture by 
waiting outside a secure perimeter. Based on the response times and decisive outcome of 
this active shooter event, with Paul Ciancia incapacitated with minutes of initiating his 
assault, it appears the tactical response, which was consistent with MACTAC training, 
was appropriate and effective.437 
In 2012, LAPD hosted the Joint Counterterrorism Awareness Workshop Series 
(JCTAWS) training session for local, state, and federal public safety agencies in the Los 
Angeles area participated. JCTAWS are a product of the National Counterterrorism 
Center (NCTC), the DHS, and the FBI. JCTAWS entails tabletop exercises designed to 
foster collaboration between federal, state, and local law enforcement entities during 
complex mass casualty events. There is no indication that the 2012 JCTAWS held in 
involved active shooter scenarios at LAX, or had any impact on the combined emergency 
response on during the LAX active shooter event.438 
LAFD did not participate in any agency-specific or police integrated training for 
active shooter events prior to November 2013. According to the Joint Public Safety 
Review of the LAX shooting conducted by LAWAPD, LAPD, and LAFD, emergency 
medical service preparations for large-scale emergency medical event at LAX were 
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lacking.439 There was no prior training to enter the LAX terminals during an active 
shooter event for EMS personnel. This lack of training and preparation adversely affected 
the ability of paramedics to aid the wounded at LAX. Paramedics possessing the skills 
and abilities to treat gunshot wounds were held on standby outside the LAX terminals 
while police searched for additional shooters. 
The Joint Public Safety Review also found that there were deficiencies in police 
and fire department communications during the LAX shooting. A unified command 
between all fire, police, and EMS personnel was not fully established until 10:14 a.m., 
which was almost one hour after the first shots were fired inside Terminal 3.440 This lack 
of police and fire department integration hindered emergency rescue efforts. The most 
seriously wounded victims, Gerardo Hernandez and Brian Ludmer, were not triaged by 
LAFD paramedics until 9:46 a.m., which was approximately 28 minutes after they were 
shot. LAFD EMS did not enter Terminal 3 to treat victims of the shooting as it was 
against existing departmental protocols. 
F. ANALYSIS OF EMERGENCY MEDICAL RESPONSE 
The emergency medical response to the LAX active shooter incident was 
hampered by the absence of TECC rescue task forces. The police response was swift; the 
assailant incapacitated and taken into custody by within seven minutes of opening fire 
inside the terminal. The first Los Angeles Fire Department ambulance was on scene 
within 12 minutes of the first shots being fired, and others following in short order. A 
total of seven individuals were triaged by LAFD paramedics, six of whom were 
transported to hospitals. One victim, TSA officer Gerardo Hernandez, most likely died 
before receiving medical treatment; however, no other person died in the LAX active 
shooter incident. The initial security sweep of Terminal 3 was completed 42 minutes after 
the event began but only law enforcement personnel were allowed in this area during, and 
for a prolonged period after the sweeps were completed.441 It took police over five hours 
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to clear all nine LAX terminals and parking facilities.442 LAFD paramedics did not enter 
the terminals during the police security sweeps. 
Gerardo Hernandez was the most seriously injured of all of the victims and likely 
died within minutes of being struck. Due to the extensive nature of his wounds, it is 
doubtful that he could have been saved. A review of the coroner’s report from 
Hernandez’s autopsy indicates that his injuries, which included perforations of his aorta, 
liver, and a kidney, were not survivable.443 Another victim, Brian Ludmer, suffered a 
potentially life threatening wound after he was shot in the upper left leg. Subsequent to 
being struck, Ludmer made his way to a closet to avoid being injured further by the 
gunman. 444  The bullet caused extensive vascular damage and bleeding, so Ludmer 
affixed an improvised tourniquet made from a sweatshirt to his own leg445—a technique 
he learned as a Boy Scout. 446 Realizing he was in urgent need of medical attention, 
Ludmer yelled for help. Two police officers pulled him from the closet, placed him in a 
wheelchair and transported him outside Terminal 2 where LAFD EMS personnel were 
standing by.447  
At the time of the LAX shooting the LAFD’s standard operating procedure for an 
active shooter event was to stay outside the secure perimeter until it was declared safe by 
police.448 Such was the procedure that was jointly recognized by LAFD, LAWAPD, and 
LAPD on November 1, 2013. LAFD, LAPD, and LAWAPD did not have a TECC rescue 
task force program in place at the time of the shootings. The non-existence of TECC 
rescue task forces resulted in delayed medical treatment of victims at the scene and a lag 
in evacuating them to hospitals. In recognition that the emergency medical response to 
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the LAX shooting exposed systemic deficiencies, the LAFD implemented a rescue task 
force program within weeks of the incident. To date, the LAFD has trained all of its fire 
captains and is in the process of training and equipping the entire department.449 After 
unveiling the new program via Los Angeles Fire Department Training Bulletin Number 
135, Interim Fire Chief James G. Featherstone released a memorandum in which he 
refers to the department as one of the United States’ “trailblazers” in tactical emergency 
program standardization. This statement emphasizes the point that only a few 
jurisdictions in the nation have implemented RTF programs.450 If a similar situation to 
the LAX shooting occurs, medical responders will not necessarily wait until the scene is 
declared safe by police but instead will enter with police so they can administer medical 
treatment to injured victims, and evacuate them to a hospital as soon as possible.451 
LAX is similar to the Aurora mass shooting because it highlights the need for 
TECC rescue task forces at active shooter incidents. LAFD paramedics responding to 
active shooting events will now have plans in place to enter warm zones at mass casualty 
event sites accompanied by a dedicated police force protection unit. Warm zones are 
areas where police have conducted initial sweeps for perpetrators, or where the shooter is 
may still be present but has been incapacitated.  
It took a catalyst such as the 2013 LAX shooting to demonstrate the necessity for 
LAFD to establish a TECC rescue task force program. The fact that LAFD did not have a 
rescue task force program in place before the November 2013 active shooter event is not 
unusual, as most jurisdictions in the U.S. do not have such task forces. LAFD is now 
among the few departments in the nation that have a formal rescue task program. This 
thesis will recommended that more jurisdictions take a proactive approach and institute 
TECC rescue task forces programs before a mass casualty events take place. Having the 
rescue task forces in place ahead of time will save lives. The next chapter will provide 
summaries and detailed analyses of the three case studies on mass casualty events that are 
encompassed in this thesis. 
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The case studies in the previous chapters reviewed and assessed the abilities of 
particular public safety agencies to provide emergency medical services to victims in 
three mass casualty incidents. The case studies also evaluated hospital trauma responses 
during these mass events. The case studies on the Aurora, Boston, and Los Angeles 
attacks provide insight as to how different police and fire departments provide tactical 
emergency medical services in mass situations and illustrate the need for TECC rescue 
task force programs. The Israeli case study examines how hospitals in that country 
manage casualties occurring in terrorist attacks. Lessons can be learned in terms of what 
practices and procedures worked well and which were detrimental to rescue efforts. All 
of the case studies show that active shooter and other terrorist-type events created several 
logistical and force protection problems for public safety professionals. First responders 
at these incidents had to contend with multiple casualties as well as the continued threat 
posed by assailants, while hospitals had to manage numerous casualties simultaneously.  
The purpose of the current chapter is to provide summaries and in-depth analyses 
of public safety agency actions in Aurora, Boston, and Los Angeles after mass casualty 
incidents. This chapter will examine responses through the lenses of tactical emergency 
casualty care and the Israeli trauma model. Both of these paradigms are critical 
components in the provision of emergency medical services at mass casualty events. 
B. BOSTON MARATHON BOMBINGS-SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS 
The bombings at the Boston Marathon in April 2013 constituted the largest 
terrorist attack on U.S. soil since the September 11 hijackings. The response by police, 
fire, and EMS personnel in Boston was near instantaneous. Within seconds of dual blasts, 
law enforcement officers, firefighters, and paramedics were at the sides of the injured 
administering first aid. EMS applied tourniquets while police and bystanders used belts 
and pieces of clothing to stanch arterial bleeding in numerous extremity wounds. The 
practice of using combat application tourniquets to treat casualties has been highly 
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developed and refined by U.S. military medical practitioners of tactical combat casualty 
care in Iraq and Afghanistan over the course of the past decade. Knowledge in treating 
combat casualties had been transferred from the military to the civilian domain as was 
evident in Boston. We learn from the public safety response to the Boston Marathon 
bombings that training for disasters works. Boston is an area in which local, state, and 
federal public safety agencies regularly participate in joint training exercises, and this 
greatly has bolstered the emergency medical response to the bombings. Many had 
actually participated in a tabletop exercise just a few weeks before the 2013 Boston 
Marathon, and one of the scenarios posited was an improvised explosive device on the 
day of the race.452 This likely helped first responders visualize how emergency medical 
personnel and assets would deploy if a bomb were detonated at the marathon.  
As a result of lessons learned from the U.S. military’s TCCC programs, Boston 
EMS paramedics carry tourniquets, which they used extensively to treat victims of the 
marathon bombings. Tourniquet use to control hemorrhages is one of the basic tenets of 
both TCCC and TECC. Also, many of the race’s participants and bystanders were active 
or former U.S. military veterans who had been trained in TCCC protocols, and many of 
these people used their skills to assist with rescue efforts.453 Using lessons learned from 
the U.S. military in Iraq and Afghanistan, EMS personnel in Boston recognized the 
urgency to address bleeding using tourniquets and get victims to hospitals posthaste. 
After initial treatment was administered, there was a concerted effort among fire, police 
and EMS personnel to rush victims of the bombings to trauma centers in Boston. The 
bombing sites were cleared of the most seriously wounded victims within 22 minutes.454 
Hospital personnel in Boston also participated in extensive training exercises and 
drills in preparation for mass casualty events prior to the 2013 Boston Marathon. In 
addition, medical professionals at Boston Hospital learned how to treat large numbers of 
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trauma casualties from their counterparts in Israel. In the years prior to the marathon 
bombings, hospitals conducted training and drills designed to ready themselves for IED 
and other types of mass casualty events. Furthermore, hospital staffs in Boston trained 
using Israeli trauma methodologies, such as clearing their emergency departments of non-
critical patients and designating “micro-sites” consisting of multi-disciplinary teams of 
surgeons and medical support staff for each patient. This meant that they were in a 
position to provide definitive medical care once the victims arrived at emergency 
departments. The emergency medical responses to the Boston Marathon bombings and 
related events serve as exemplars of for other jurisdictions in the U.S.  
The emergency response to the Boston Marathon bombings highlights the need 
for TECC rescue task force programs. Although Boston did not have a formal TECC 
rescue task force program in place prior to the bombings, the emergency response 
between police and fire personnel was fully integrated in TECC-fashion, making it 
optimal for treatment of mass casualties. It was fortuitous that police, firefighters, and 
EMS personnel were already at the Boston Marathon finish line when the bombs went 
off, and they easily refocused their attention on wounded spectators. Once victims were 
triaged, they were rapidly evacuated to trauma centers, where physicians were able to 
perform definitive life-saving medical interventions. Police effectively controlled civilian 
and vehicular traffic at and around the scene of the bombings, which helped facilitate 
ingress and egress of ambulances. When the fleet of available ambulances was exhausted, 
police cars were to transport many of the injured to hospitals. 
For future mass casualty events, first responders will need to consider how they 
will mitigate a combined attack in which IED detonations are followed by active shooting 
assaults. In Israel, Afghanistan, and Iraq, first responders have been the targets of 
secondary attacks. In order to guard against this, public safety agencies must consider this 
possibility and have plans in place to mitigate the targeting of first responders. The best 
way to treat casualties while guarding against additional attacks is a rescue task force. 
Since the bombings, Boston EMS has initiated a training and operational TECC program 
based on Arlington County’s RTF. For future mass casualty events, Boston EMS 
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paramedics will enter warm zones with a dedicated police force protection unit.455 The 
establishment of RTFs enhances the abilities of public safety agencies to provide medical 
treatment in hostile environments. 
C. AURORA’S CENTURY THEATER SHOOTING-SUMMARY AND 
ANALYSIS 
At the time of the Century Theater shooting, Aurora public safety agencies did not 
have a TECC rescue task force program in place. This put first responders at a 
disadvantage, as the overall response was not fully integrated. The Aurora Fire 
Department’s primary concern during the event was to treat wounded at the theater and 
then transport them to area hospitals as soon as possible. Fire officials followed the 
departmental procedures by placing firefighters and paramedics on standby outside the 
theater while waiting for the scene to be declared safe by police.456 This protocol proved 
detrimental to the rescue efforts when it failed to address the crisis unfolding inside the 
theater; there were at least 10 people gravely wounded inside the theater, and EMS 
personnel did not get inside the auditorium for 36 minutes after the first 911 calls were 
received.457 During this crucial period, the only individual present with advanced life 
support training skills was an Aurora Police Department SWAT team medic.458  
Simultaneous with the security sweep for the suspect, police officers, firefighters, 
and EMS personnel collaborated to treat the scores of victims, most of whom had made 
their way to various locations outside the theater. Some of the most seriously wounded 
victims inside theater nine were unable to move. As the event unfolded, it became 
apparent that ambulances could not navigate through the theater’s parking lots and access 
roads because of congestion created by parked vehicles—including many police cars—
and the large numbers of moviegoers that flooded outside in the wake of the shooting. 
This created a perilous situation for victims who were bleeding profusely from gunshot 
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wounds and in desperate need of medical aid. Police and fire commanders subsequently 
made the decision to deviate from protocol by loading 19 victims into police cars and 
rushing them to area hospitals, a decision that unquestionably saved lives.  
Police and fire officials also had the obligation to ensure that the personnel under 
their command were not placed in any unnecessarily perilous situations. Incident 
commanders followed existing protocols and placed fire and EMS personnel on standby a 
safe distance from the building. While police and fire officials arrived on scene quickly, 
they had difficulty grasping the magnitude of the event. They were initially surprised by 
the omnipresence of panicked spectators moving about frantically outside the theater and 
by the high volume of casualties they encountered. This led to confusion and resulted in a 
communications breakdown over how many people needed medical assistance and where 
they were located.459 One of the Aurora Fire Department’s incident commanders initially 
thought there were a total of only 20 casualties at the site,460 when in fact there were 
more than four times that many.461 Police officers deploying at the scene parked their 
vehicles in a manner that prevented ambulances and fire trucks from navigating through 
the theater’s parking lot and access roads, which added to the turmoil. As a consequence, 
many of the emergency responders were unable to reach their intended destinations. 
Police also had difficulty containing the 1,200 people who amassed outside the 
theater. Consequently, police officers and EMS personnel deluged by multitudes of 
terror-stricken survivors of the shooting, which hindered the triage and evacuation 
processes. The congestion outside the theater made it impossible for ambulances to reach 
all of the victims in need of medical assistance.462 As a result, police cars and privately 
owned vehicles transported the majority of those wounded to area hospitals. While speed 
of movement from the point of injury to the hospital is important in traumatic events, it is 
also important that patients receive medical treatment on scene and while in transport, 
and EMS personnel can best achieve this in ambulances. In Aurora, those who were 
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transported in police cars arrived at the hospital quickly but received little if any 
treatment while they were in transit.463 
Hospitals in Aurora were well prepared to treat victims of this mass casualty 
event. Aurora hospitals regularly participated in drills, training, and exercises in the 
months and years leading up to the event. Each hospital had a robust disaster plan in 
place, and just as importantly, each hospital had skilled and dedicated physicians, nurses, 
and technicians on hand. Attending physicians coordinated medical teams and treatment 
plans for each patient. Furthermore, hospital employees, such as custodians and 
housekeeping staff who do not typically assist in medical situations, were called into 
action. Aurora hospitals management of Century Theater shooting victims very closely 
mirrored the Israeli hospital model for dealing with mass casualty events. In a similar 
manner to the Israeli accordion approach, the two attending physicians inside the 
University of Colorado Hospital (UCH) emergency department acted as surgeons in 
charge (SIC). They conducted initial assessments of each patient and determined who 
was in greatest need of medical intervention. Some of the victims were near death when 
they arrived at UCH and needed immediate surgery. The attending physicians prescribed 
the treatment plan for each patient and then continually monitored each one’s status. At 
various junctures, they summoned specialists from various disciplines to attend to 
patients based on injury patterns. UCH would ultimately treat 23 victims of the shooting, 
which was the highest number of any hospital. One of these victims arrived without any 
vital signs and hospital staff were unable to resuscitate. However, the other 22 victims 
brought to UCH survived, in large part to the speed in which they were transported from 
the theater to the emergency department and the expert medical attention they received 
after arriving at the hospital.  
Aurora’s hospitals ensured that there was adequate numbers of staff in the 
emergency department to perform triage on Century Theater shooting victims. 464 
Hospital supervisors convened approximately 30 minutes after the first victims arrived 
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activated their disaster plan. As part of this plan, an incident command center was 
established at UCH so that information could be received and disseminated more 
efficiently during the crisis.465 Additional surgeons and other essential staff members 
were contacted at their homes, and some reported to the hospital’s emergency department 
within 20 minutes of being notified of the shooting event.466 There was a particular need 
for trauma surgeons, neurosurgeons, vascular surgeons, radiologists, and orthopedic 
specialists to deal with penetrating wounds suffered by the victims.467 Even housekeepers 
and custodial staff were called in to assist. The emergency department at UCH filled with 
over 100 staff members, all of who were focused on patient care.468 Four operating 
rooms were prepared and staffed for surgery within 30 minutes of notification of the 
incident, and an additional five were established over the course of the next hour.469 
Making practical use of all available space, a storage room in the emergency department 
was converted into a triage area.470 Understanding that survivors of the shooting were 
hemorrhaging profusely, doctors and nurses prepared transfusion systems and requested 
blood products from the hospital’s blood bank. 471  Because of the high numbers of 
casualties from the shooting, it became necessary to augment the existing supply from a 
local blood center, and a total of 185 units of blood products were delivered to the 
UCH.472 By requesting additional blood, the UCH staff demonstrated foresight, realizing 
that the many victims of the Century Theater shooting would need infusions of blood 
once they arrived at the emergency department. Personnel assigned to the incident 
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command center also directed extra supplies delivered to the emergency department, such 
as code carts, medical tubing, and portable code carts.473  
When responding to a mass casualty event, it is important for first responders to 
maintain situational awareness and have plans in place for cumulative deployment of 
personnel and resources as they arrive on scene. Police officers and firefighters 
responding to these events need to know exactly where to go and what tasks need to be 
carried out at active shooter and mass casualty incidents. Police need to stop assailants 
from wounding additional victims and provide force protection to EMS personnel. EMS 
technicians need to have unimpeded access to the wounded. The best way to deliver 
emergency medical services at active shooting events, such as the Century Theater 
incident, is with a TECC rescue task force.  
D. LAX SHOOTING-SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS 
The police reaction to the LAX shooting was prompt and was the greatest strength 
of the overall public safety effort. Law enforcement officers assigned to the airport had 
trained specifically for an active shooter situation. When confronted with an assailant 
armed with an assault rifle, police officers were able to incapacitate him within a 
relatively brief time. They also had to conduct security sweeps of nine passenger 
terminals and adjacent parking facilities. Police contributed to the emergency medical 
effort by moving victims from inside Terminal 3 to the triage area staged outside of 
Terminal 2. The emergency medical response to the shooting proved to be problematic, 
though the initial EMS deployment was rapid. LAFD EMS personnel followed 
established protocols by assembling in a safe area at curbside arrival outside Terminal 2 
while waiting for the “all clear” pronouncement from police inside the terminal. 
However, this strict adherence to procedures was a problem at the LAX shooting 
incident. The police security sweep of Terminal 3 took approximately two hours to 
complete, and it took a total of five hours to clear the entire LAX complex. These times 
are not out of the ordinary for active shooting events. In such situations, police must 
methodically check for additionally threats. In this case, the assailant was apprehended at 
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9:25 a.m., approximately seven minutes after he fired the first shots. By this time, or 
shortly thereafter, LAFD paramedics could have entered Terminal 3 to initiate medical 
treatment and evacuate victims for definitive medical care.  
The EMS response to the LAX incident is typical for active shooting events in the 
U.S.: firefighters remained on standby for an inordinate period while casualties laid 
waiting for medical attention. At LAX, once the shooter was taken into custody by law 
enforcement, Terminal 3 of LAX had become a warm zone. This is the type of situation 
for which the TECC rescue model is designed. Under the rescue task force model, LAFD 
would enter the active shooter site with a dedicated force protection unit comprised of 
police officers. The police officers assigned to the RTFs’ sole function would be to 
maintain the integrity and safety of the task force. If the scene remains stable, the 
paramedics move quickly to the wounded administer exigent lifesaving procedures and 
then evacuate wounded to hospitals. If conditions deteriorate into a hazardous situation, 
the force protection unit can resolve by neutralizing any threats or by withdrawing with 
the paramedics to a safe area. Neither LAFD command staff nor firefighters can be 
faulted for following established training and protocols. At the time of the LAX shooting, 
the LAFD’s standard operating procedure for an active shooter event was to stay outside 
the secure perimeter until the scene was declared safe by police. 474  Such was the 
procedure that was jointly recognized by LAFD, LAWAPD, and LAPD. This status quo 
response resulted in delayed medical treatment of victims at the scene and a lag in 
evacuating them to hospitals.  
The LAX shooting in November 2013475 accentuates the need to have a TECC 
rescue task force response at mass casualty events. A rescue task force response gives 
EMS personnel the ability to access, treat, and evacuate wounded under the protection of 
a police force protection unit. Recognizing that the emergency medical response to the 
LAX shooting exposed systemic deficiencies, the LAFD implemented a rescue task force 
program within weeks of the incident. LAFD paramedics responding to active shooting 
events now have plans in place to enter warm zones at mass casualty event sites 
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accompanied by a dedicated police force protection unit. The LAX active shooter 
incident is similar to the Aurora mass shooting because it highlights the need for better 
police and fire department coordination and integration at mass casualty events. Also, 
these events show the need for paramedics to be able to access and treat the wounded 
without delay.  
E. CONCLUSION  
Analyses of the case studies discussed in this chapter illustrate how some police 
and fire departments in jurisdictions across the U.S. prepared for and responded to active 
shooter and other types of terrorist events and demonstrates the need for TECC rescue 
task force programs. In the Aurora and Los Angeles active shooter events, the most 
significant problems encountered involved delays in providing emergency medical 
treatment to the wounded on scene. Neither Aurora nor Los Angeles public safety 
agencies had TECC rescue task force programs in place prior to the active shooter 
incidents detailed in this thesis. During the time that these shootings transpired, both 
jurisdictions had policies in place that precluded firefighters from entering the scene of an 
active shooting. Also, in both the Aurora and LAX incidents, the perpetrators were taken 
into custody within minutes of police arriving on scene, and therefore, no longer posed 
any type of threat. However, firefighters had difficulty rendering medical assistance 
because they remained on standby instead of working as part of an integrated rescue task 
force with police. The Aurora police and fire departments have since instituted a high-
risk extraction protocol (HREP) since the Century City incident,476 and the Los Angeles 
Fire Department has remedied the response deficiencies exposed during the LAX 
shooting by adopting the rescue task force model pioneered by the Arlington County 
(Virginia) Fire Department.477 
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In the Boston and Aurora mass casualty incidents, area hospitals were required to 
take extraordinary measures to treat high volumes of trauma patients. Prior to their 
respective events, hospitals in both of these locations had conducted training drills and 
exercises in preparation for mass casualty events. Additionally, hospitals personnel in 
Boston learned from Israeli trauma specialists. While the research in this thesis does not 
indicate where Aurora hospitals learned how to handle large numbers of trauma patients, 
their response was very similar to the Israeli archetype. 
For future mass casualty incidents, police, fire, and EMS professionals will need 
to be prepared to manage greater numbers of injured than were encountered in Aurora, 
Boston, and Los Angeles. Based on availability of human targets, the casualty counts in 
each of these events could have been much higher. For example, at the incident in 
Aurora, the assailant, James Holmes, shot 70 people, and there were approximately 400 
people in the theater, and another 800 moviegoers were in adjacent theaters. Holmes’ 
assault rifle was reported to have jammed during the rampage, which likely resulted in far 
fewer people being wounded; he had hundreds of unspent rounds of ammunition in his 
possession when the police took him into custody.478 Similarly, the perpetrator of the 
LAX 2013 shooting had hundreds of rounds on his person and access to hundreds of 
victims in LAX’s Terminal 3.479 And the Boston marathon bombers timed the explosive 
devices to detonate at point when the race’s finish line would be the most crowded.480 If 
the bombs had been more powerful, many more people would have been seriously 
injured. 
The next and final chapter will offer conclusions and recommendations for the 
implementation of tactical emergency casualty care (TECC) rescue task force programs 
and Israeli-trauma center protocols in jurisdictions across the United States. Tactical 
emergency medical programs and hospital preparedness initiatives are essential to ensure 
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IX. FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The previous chapter provided analyses of the three case studies of mass casualty 
incidents detailed in this thesis: Aurora’s Century Theater mass shooting, the Boston 
Marathon bombings, and the Los Angeles International Airport active shooter event. This 
chapter will present the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of this thesis. 
A. FINDINGS 
This thesis sought to answer the research question: why are tactical emergency 
casualty care rescue (TECC) task force (RTF) and Israeli hospital trauma programs the 
best approaches to addressing the current gaps and weaknesses in trauma management in 
the United States in the context of terrorist attacks and/or active shooter incidents? 
To find answers to these questions and in an effort to develop a model for other 
jurisdictions to consider, specific case studies were undertaken to examine how public 
safety agencies in three communities across the U.S. responded to mass casualty events. 
Additionally, a case study on the Israeli trauma system was conducted to explain how 
physicians in that country manage mass casualty situations, and what it is necessary for 
hospitals in the U.S. to emulate the Israeli approach. The contentions of this thesis are 
that civilian TECC rescue task force programs, based on U.S. military’s prototypical 
TCCC system for treating combat casualties in the field and Israel’s model for managing 
mass casualties at the hospital, are necessary to save the lives of people injured in acts of 
mass violence. Active shooter events are on the rise in the United States and require an 
integrated law enforcement and EMS response with TECC rescue task forces. These task 
forces involve highly trained firefighters and EMS personnel working in tandem with 
police force protection units to administer on-scene medical aid and rapidly evacuate 
victims to hospitals. Active shooter incidents and terrorist attacks also necessitate 
hospitals that are capable of managing large numbers of trauma patients simultaneously.  
Chapter II consisted of a literature review, which showed that lessons learned 
from the U.S. military and the Israeli hospital system are slowly making their way to the 
civilian domain in the United States. Over the course of the past two decades, the U.S. 
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military has developed a dynamic new emergency medical program known as tactical 
combat casualty care. There is compelling data to support military researchers’ 
contentions that TCCC in saves lives at unprecedented rates on battlefields. TCCC 
addresses the need to get medical attention to wounded combatants at the point of injury 
and to rapidly evacuate them to definitive care. In TCCC, medics prioritize the leading 
causes of preventable death on the battlefield: bleeding, collapsed lungs, and airway 
obstructions. Once a patient is stabilized in the field, they must rapidly evacuate to a 
hospital. This is achieved with specially trained medics working in conjunction with a 
force protection unit designed to keep the medics safe and assist with casualty 
evacuation. The literature on TCCC also validates the use of modern tourniquets to treat 
extremity hemorrhaging. Tourniquet use essentially buys time for first responders to get 
individuals suffering from extremity hemorrhages to the hospital for definitive, life-
saving treatment.  
The research undertaken for this thesis found that hospitals in Israel are adept in 
the care of mass casualties stemming from the large number of suicide attacks on its 
civilian population. Trauma physicians in Israel developed a unique system—known as 
the accordion approach—for trauma care of large numbers of people injured in 
bombings.481 Data analyzed for this thesis indicates Israeli trauma centers have lower 
case fatality rates than trauma centers in the U.S. Israeli emergency medicine is 
predicated on training and drills, standard operating procedures, and surge capacities for 
mass casualty incidents. From the accordion approach, Israeli hospitals have advanced a 
flexible all hazards approach to mass casualty events.482 This means that they train and 
prepare for any type of disaster—whether it is a terrorist attack or natural disaster—
which might result in large numbers of injuries. Israeli medical experts have found that 
the processes that work well for suicide bombings are also suitable for other types of 
medical emergencies in which multitudes of people are injured. 
Chapter III provided a historical perspective of the creation and development of 
tactical combat casualty care after the Battle of Mogadishu in 1993, and the beginnings of 
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domestic tactical emergency casualty care programs, such as TECC rescue task forces, in 
the U.S. The need for such programs at active shooter events was first made apparent by 
the Columbine High School massacre in 1999. Chapter IV chronicled the evolution of the 
Israeli trauma model, which is focused on treating victims of suicide bombings and other 
mass casualty incidents with multi-disciplinary teams of trauma specialists working under 
the guidance of senior doctors. 
The case studies discussed in Chapters V, VI, VII, and VIII covered recent mass 
casualty events that took place in U.S. cities. Each identified critical areas of strengths 
and weaknesses of public safety agency responses to these events. In Boston, the public 
safety and hospital responses to the marathon bombings were estimable because first 
responders and medical professionals were on scene at the race’s finish line when the 
bombs exploded, and they went to work immediately to treat the injured. Many first 
responders had training in TCCC techniques, such as tourniquet application, and they 
made extraordinary efforts to transport victims of the bombings to hospitals rapidly. 
Staffs at Boston hospitals were ready to provide medical care to large numbers of 
severely injured patients because they had trained under the tutelage of physicians in 
Israel, whom in turn, had acquired knowledge in treating traumatic casualties in the wake 
of suicide bombings over the past two decades. 
In Aurora, public safety resources were initially overwhelmed by the high number 
of casualties, concerns about the possibility of additional assailants and the specter of 
hidden improvised explosive devices at the scene. Aurora public safety agencies did not 
have a TECC rescue task force program in place at the time of the Century Theater 
shooting, and this hindered the treatment of victims at the scene. When it became 
apparent that EMS personnel could not reach many of the wounded, public safety 
officials deviated from existing protocols and rushed casualties to area hospitals in police 
cars. While this decision saved lives, it was not optimal because victims did not receive 
medical treatment during transport. It took a combined effort of police officers, 
firefighters, paramedics, and even civilians to get victims to definitive care, but the 
overall response, in terms of on-site triage and evacuation, was successful. However, had 
there been additional casualties or had the hospitals been a greater distance away from the 
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point of injury than they were in Aurora, the loss of life could have been far greater 
because of the absence of TECC rescue task forces. 
Hospitals in Aurora were well prepared to handle multiple casualties from the 
event because they trained and drilled in for mass casualty incidents in the years leading 
up to the shooting, and the exemplary performance of doctors, nurses, and other staff 
members at area medical facilities was a major factor in victim survivability. At LAX, the 
police response was swift, but the emergency medical response lagged because existing 
protocols required EMS personnel to remain on standby outside the secure perimeter, and 
they were consequently unable to access those persons who were seriously wounded 
inside the terminal complex. 
These case studies illustrate the urgent need for integrated police and emergency 
medical service responses to mass casualty events. Optimal care of wounded in such 
episodes can only take place if law enforcement, emergency medical service, and hospital 
personnel work in synchronicity. The best way to achieve successful outcomes at mass 
casualty incidents is the establishment of TECC rescue task force programs and Israeli-
style hospital trauma protocols. Victims sustaining injuries due to gunfire and explosive 
fragmentation require immediate treatment on scene, which primarily addresses bleeding, 
followed by rapid transport to the hospital. Hospitals with personnel trained in advanced 
trauma care protocols are needed to treat numerous victims of active shooter incidents, 
terrorist attacks, and other types of hazards. The nation of Israel has developed the 
prototypical system for the management of large numbers of mass casualties, and the 
procedures employed by Israeli trauma physicians can be replicated in the U.S. 
The Century Theater shooting shows us why TECC rescue task forces, used in 
conjunction with skilled hospital trauma care, is essential to saving the lives of those 
injured in active shooter situations. If the response is not unified, victims will go without 
medical attention and run the risk of dying from penetrating trauma injuries, such as 
gunshot wounds and explosive fragmentation. Police and fire department incident 
commanders must coordinate vehicular and personnel deployment so that crowds can be 
controlled, and ingress and egress access areas remain clear of obstacles. Since the 
Century Theater shootings, public safety departments in Aurora have established high-
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risk extraction protocols (HREP) in order to facilitate the medical treatment and 
evacuation of wounded people from active shooter sites. 
From Boston, we know that TCCC methods, such as tourniquet applications and 
other hemorrhage control techniques, are effective. Additionally, scenario-based training 
can prepare first responders and hospital personnel for mass casualty events. We also see 
the value of an integrated police, firefighter, and EMS response to disasters. We may also 
observe how lessons learned from TCCC play a role in the civilian realm in the U.S. 
EMS personnel in Boston now carry tourniquets, and many of the first responders in 
Boston, have military experience, which ostensibly included TCCC training.483 Leaving 
nothing to chance since the marathon bombings, Boston has initiated a program modeled 
after the Arlington County Fire Department’s rescue task force. The successful 
emergency medical response to the marathon bombings involved another critical 
component-expert hospital trauma care. Staff members at hospitals, such as 
Massachusetts General, had consulted with Israeli trauma surgeons on a regular basis in 
the years prior to the bombings, and consequently they had embraced many Israeli 
practices, such as clearing of space in emergency rooms, bringing in extra physicians and 
other medical personnel, and having a seasoned trauma doctor examine each casualty as 
they arrived. A designated medical team was also assigned to each patient to ensure 
comprehensive care and continual triage. 
The emergency medical response was to the LAX active shooter event was not 
optimal, but it is archetypical for most communities in the United States. Prior to the 
November 2013 active shooter incident, there was no TECC rescue task force in Los 
Angeles. Los Angeles Fire Department firefighters followed established protocols and 
went into a standby mode outside of LAX’s terminal buildings while police cleared the 
scene inside. Unfortunately, this resulted in a significant delay in getting medical 
treatment to the wounded. LAFD paramedics did not enter the passenger terminals at 
LAX to treat the wounded, and they had to depend on police officers had to move victims 
from the interior of the terminal to the LAFD triage area outside. Once casualties were 
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brought to the LAFD triage area, they were administered first aid and eventually 
transported to the hospital. Just weeks after the LAX shooting, the Los Angeles Fire 
Department officially changed its response protocol for an active shooter incident by 
instituting a rescue task force program. LAFD firefighter paramedics now train for and 
are prepared to enter warm zones with a police escort at active shooting scenes. This 
represents a paradigm change for the department, and it is a positive development that 
will undoubtedly pay dividends in saved lives during future mass casualty situations. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
The typical jurisdiction in the United States is not ready for an active shooter 
event or a terrorist attack resulting in mass casualties. The nation as a whole is 
unprepared to get medical assistance to the wounded in these events. This is because 
most public safety jurisdictions do not have TECC rescue task force programs in place 
that would enable EMS personnel to enter the scenes of mass casualty events assimilated 
with law enforcement. Due to this systemic deficiency, the nation is particularly 
vulnerable, and lives will be unnecessarily lost due to the inability to get medical 
attention to the wounded during high threat situations. 
It is difficult to predict where and when mass casualty incidents will occur, which 
makes planning, preparation, and visualization for them difficult. Unfortunately, active 
shooter incidents are taking place across the U.S. with increasing degrees of regularity 
and lethality. The Boston Marathon bombing is also a likely harbinger of future terrorist 
attacks from homegrown terrorists using improvised explosive devices in crowded areas. 
Therefore, it is necessary that public safety officials demonstrate foresight and make the 
necessary changes that will affect the paradigm change of having special trained and 
equipped paramedics make entry into warm zones at mass casualty events. 
Public safety jurisdictions lacking specialized rescue task force units or tactical 
emergency casualty care programs are leaving themselves susceptible to disaster. Active 
shooter incidents and terrorist attacks require an integrated police, firefighter, and EMS 
response, and TECC programs must be in place before an event occurs. This means that 
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law enforcement and emergency medical service personnel must train together and have 
explicit plans in place for response to high threat, mass casualty situations.  
Another vital component of mass casualty care is having hospital systems in place 
that are prepared and capable of handling multiple trauma patients simultaneously. 
Hospital staffs in Boston learned about the treatment of mass casualties—and in 
particular how to respond to improvised explosive devices—from their counterparts in 
Israel. They trained and drilled for an event in which Boston hospital emergency 
departments would be inundated with trauma patients. Hospitals in Boston were able to 
manage hundreds of casualties seamlessly because they understood Israeli concepts such 
as surge capacity and having an experienced trauma physician triage and then manage 
each victim’s curative plan. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS  
In Thinking in Systems, Donatella Meadows posits that there are leverage points 
that can be used to change systems.484 The shift from the status quo to a national standard 
for tactical emergency casualty care programs necessitates a paradigm change. Leverage 
points, as defined by Meadows, are needed to bring such a paradigm change about. A 
national standard is necessary to ensure that emergency medical services are quickly and 
efficiently rendered at active shooter incidents and other terrorist events.  
The most sensible approach to deliver these emergency medical services is the 
TECC rescue task force model pioneered by the Arlington County Fire Department in 
Virginia. Establishment and implementation of TECC rescue task forces require funding 
for equipment and joint tactical training. Police officers assigned to these task forces 
provide force protection to EMS personnel as they enter warm zones to administer first 
aid. Additionally, fire and EMS departments need to equip their personnel to participate 
in rescue task forces. Basic equipment for firefighter paramedics assigned to rescue task 
forces include combat application tourniquets (C.A.T.s), hemostatic bandages, thoracic 
needles, and nasopharyngeal airways, and first responders need this gear to address 
hemorrhaging and breathing impediments. Just as importantly, firefighters and EMS 
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personnel assigned to rescue task forces will need to have access to specialized personnel 
protection equipment—specifically level III body armor and helmets—because they will 
be entering high threat areas and run the risk of being exposed to gunfire. Level III body 
armor is designed to stop projectiles fired from assault rifles, which have been frequently 
used in active shooter attacks, including those that transpired at Century Theater in 
Aurora and LAX. 
Congress, DHS, and FEMA must identify funding mechanisms that will meet the 
needs for TECC rescue task force training and equipment. FEMA’s Assistance to 
Firefighters Grant (AFG) program would be a logical source for rescue task force 
funding. In terms financing for firefighting activities in the Unites States, there is a 
complex relationship between the federal government and local governments. Up until 
the 1990s, firefighting and EMS departments were generally funded by state and 
municipal governments. This changed after members of the firefighting community 
requested federal augmentation of local fire departments to compensate for budget 
insufficiencies and increased responsibilities, such as providing emergency medical 
services that were not previously firefighter functions.485 As a result of the recognized 
need for federal assistance, the Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program (AFG) was 
established in 2001. Since the AFG program’s inception in 2001 through fiscal year 
2013, Congress appropriated over $6 billion to firefighter assistance. 486  The AFG 
program is designed to help fire departments obtain equipment and facilitate training to 
enhance firefighter safety and bolters departmental capabilities to provide emergency 
services during fires and other analogous perils. Fire and EMS departments that establish 
TECC programs would be worthy recipients for Assistance to Firefighter Grants. 
Additional funding for rescue task forces may be obtained through the Homeland 
Security Grant Programs, such as the State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSP), 
which has $401,346,000 available in fiscal year 2014 and the Urban Areas Security 
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Initiative (UASI), which has $587,000,000 appropriated for fiscal year 2014.487 FEMA 
administers both the AFG and Homeland Security Grant Programs. As funding is made 
available for rescue task forces, FEMA administrators will need to collaborate with 
decision makers at the local government level, including elected officials, fire, and EMS 
chiefs to determine specific training and equipment needs in various jurisdictions. It is 
incumbent upon Congress, DHS, and FEMA to require local jurisdictions requesting 
various types of homeland security grants to establish tactical emergency casualty care 
programs with any designated funding. 
As part of increased preparedness across the country, police officers need training 
in hemorrhage control techniques and should be issued combat application tourniquets 
and hemostatic agents. Law enforcement will likely be the first public safety 
professionals to respond to the scene of mass casualty event and may have to render first 
aid before firefighters and EMS arrive on scene. Police officers are also frequently 
wounded themselves at active shooter incidents, and they must acquire knowledge on 
administering self-aid techniques. Police departments across the country should also learn 
lessons from the Aurora and Boston mass casualty incidents and prepare to transport 
casualties to hospitals when ambulances are unavailable. 
There is a need for hospitals in the United States to emulate the Israeli hospital 
methodology for treating mass casualties. The Israeli all-hazards approach works well for 
any type of large-scale trauma event. The provision of comprehensive care during active 
shooter events, terrorist attacks, and natural large-scale medical emergencies, requires 
that hospitals conduct training exercises and establish standard operating procedures to 
handle a high volume of seriously injured or sick people. All available hospital personnel 
should be assigned specific tasks or be assigned to a pre-designated medical team. An 
experienced trauma surgeon (modeled after the Israeli surgeon in charge concept) must 
examine each patient as he or she arrives at the hospital to ensure they are triaged 
appropriately. This surgeon is then responsible for monitoring each patient’s treatment 
plan and recuperative progress. Israeli physicians have found that under-triage inevitably 
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occurs at hospitals in the wake of IED attacks, and therefore victims need to be re-
examined until all injuries are diagnosed and treated.488 
Additionally, it is recommended that hospitals in the U.S.—particularly the 
emergency rooms—be designed similarly to those in Israeli hospitals. It is crucial that 
emergency departments be designed with simple, easy to navigate layouts. For example, 
in Israeli hospitals, equipment is mounted on the ceiling (freeing up floor space for 
medical teams to move about freely) and extra supplies are stockpiled and are clearly 
marked so they are readily accessible when mass casualties arrive at the hospital. 
Hospitals in Israel use all available space during mass casualty events, including storage 
rooms and hallways. This may necessitate the installation of oxygen lines and other 
medical apparatuses at hospitals in advance of circumstances in which influxes of 
patients arrive at a pace that is beyond normal operational capacity. 
Funding for improvements in hospital capabilities may be available through the 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP), 
which is designed to assist communities enhance operational capacities during disasters. 
In fiscal year 2014, a total of $228,500,000 in Hospital Preparedness Program and 
Hospital Preparedness Funding was allocated to 50 states, as well several U.S. 
territories.489 HPP funding grants would be the sensible vector to fund equipment and 
training based on the Israeli model to U.S. hospitals across the nation. While funding is 
critical, some experts in the emergency medical community argue that disaster 
preparedness in hospitals can be enhanced by the incorporation of sound emergency 
medical practices into day-today regimens.490 
Interoperability between the first responder community and hospital staffs is also 
a vital component in the provision of comprehensive resources to mass casualty events. 
Hospital personnel need to participate in joint training exercises along with police, fire, 
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and EMS professionals. Furthermore, personnel from multiple disciplines will need to 
practice together for large-scale medical events. Such collaboration is necessary to 
provide medical care for victims of active shooter, terrorist attacks, and natural disasters.  
DHS Office of Health Affairs (OHA) currently facilitates dialogue between state, 
local and regional first responders. DHS OHA is also working to ensure that lessons 
learned from tactical combat casualty care are transferred to the civilian realm in the 
United States. In February of 2014, DHS OHA hosted a two-day stakeholder engagement 
meeting with police, fire, and EMS first responders from around the nation to discuss 
ways in which to improve survivability in active shooter and terrorist incidents.491 DHS 
OHA should increase these efforts by hosting similar stakeholder engagement meetings 
on a regional basis across the U.S. In addition, DHS OHA should also guide local and 
state agencies through the various grant application processes. Moreover, this thesis 
recommends that DHS OHA collaborate with the American College of Surgeons to 
establish a national trauma registry based on the Israeli and U.S. military models. A 
national trauma registry would give medical researchers the ability to collect and analyze 
data on traumatic events, including active shooter and mass casualty events to look for 
ways to improve care and increase survivability through enhanced trauma care. 
Further research can build on this thesis to identify funding, legislative, and 
educational mechanisms to ensure that TECC rescue task force and Israeli hospital 
trauma programs are proactively implemented. As is evident in the case studies of this 
thesis, the current leverage point for establishment of formal tactical emergency medical 
programs is a violent event in which mass casualties transpire, such as the active 
shootings that took place in Aurora and Los Angeles and also the Boston Marathon 
bombings. Each of these jurisdictions formally embraced TECC concepts by adopting 
rescue task force programs after mass casualty events in each of their respective 
communities. New, proactive leverage points for the establishment of TECC rescue task 
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force and Israeli hospital trauma programs must be identified by policy makers and 
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